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Legal theory has failed to fully explore the rhetorical in the judicial decision 
and, in doing so, has misunderstood the key role played by reasons that seek 
to  legitimate  and justifY  while  expressing  emotion  and  commitment.  This 
thesis sets out to understand why  legal theory has  failed to do  so  and what 
role rhetoric plays in the judicial decision. 
Three  legal  theorists,  Chaim  Perelman,  Bernard  Jackson  and  Neil 
MacCormick  are  used  to  show  that  it  is  seeking  to  be  philosophically 
acceptable that has led legal theorists to  avoid the emotional and character-
based aspects of the judicial decision.  Two historical studies, of the Talmud 
and Aristotle's Ars Rhetorica, demonstrate that rhetoric can be seen as closely 
related to the limits of authority in the system and the character and identity 
of the decision-maker.  These insights are then applied to the common law, 
exemplified by  six  cases  from  the  law of negligence.  This  highlights  the 
importance of the commitment of judges to  their own sense of role and the 
way limitations on reasoning help to create this sense. 
The thesis concludes by considering the relationship between philosophy and 
judgment and argues that they can be seen as different forms of  understanding 
and that there are strong ethical reasons for rejecting attempts to see either as 
a paradigm for all understanding. Acknowledgements 
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Introduction and methodology 
Persuasion is the power of  the weak: 
Appeal to facts shared by all parties, the claim to speak in accord with 
the canons of reason universally compelling for every side - these serve 
in particular the polemical requirements of  the weak. The strong decline 
logic  for  themselves  and  declare  what  is  reasonable  (Neusner  1983, 
123). 
Although the judiciary are usually associated with power it is the contention 
of this thesis that it is persuasion that is the key to understanding the process 
of  judicial decision-making. 
1 This is because it is in seeking to persuade that 
judges reveal where they feel that they need to provide reasons to legitimate 
and justify their own decision-making processes.  This highlights  aspects of 
the decision-making process that are linked to ethics, emotion and character 
which are often hidden and which legal theory has both ignored and helped to 
hide. 
This introduction chapter starts by setting out the main themes of the work 
before exploring in more detail the problems not simply of  understanding but 
of  describing that process 
1  Michelman (1986) points out that in using justifications judges are presupposing that they 
will be judged according to certain standards and that judgment is an activity which can 
be so judged. A similar point is made by Kraemer see chapter 5 below, p 246. Malloch VA 2002  Introduction and methodology  2 
An overview 
1. Persuasion, legitimacy and legal meaning 
Derrida has said of  law: 
law is always an authorised force, a force that justifies itself, even if  this 
justification may be judged from elsewhere to be unjust or unjustifiable 
....  It is the force essentially implied in the very concept of 'justice as 
law (droit)', of  justice as it becomes 'droit' (Derrida 1992,5) 
The  stated goal of this thesis  is  to  understand the process by which judges 
legitimate and justify their decisions and it concentrates on the limitations, 
the boundaries which define what is and is not persuasive. These are the areas 
where the judge reveals the limits of hislher own power within the system and 
the limits of  the power of  the system itself 
In  concentrating on persuasion the thesis  deals with an  aspect of language 
which has often been discredited or ignored, dismissed as rhetoric:
2 
...  a  speaker's or writer's self-conscious manipulation of his  medium 
with  a  view  to  ensuring  his  message  as  favourable  a  reception  as 
possible on the part of the particular audience being addressed.  (Cole 
1991, ix) 
Yet  it is  these aspects of judicial decision-making which look outward and 
which seek to be acceptable which, it will be argued, are where the judicial 
role  can be best  seen  and  understood.  In the  way  that they  present  their 
decisions judges are  primarily  seeking to  persuade  a legal  and narrowly  a 
judicial audience  that  the  decision  should  live  on and  become part of the 
system either by becoming a precedent or simply by being protected from 
2  See Plato's Gorgias (1953) which is the foundation of much anti-rhetorical philosophy.  See 
also  Vickers'  influential In Defence of  Rhetoric (1988) for a historical overview and  a 
contemporary reevaluation of  rhetoric. Malloch VA 2002  Introduction and methodology  3 
appeal.  The way they structure and use language in these decisions reveals 
what they believe the system will find acceptable. 
For the legal system what is relevant about each judicial decision is the text 
that is recorded and can therefore be reused not the subjective reason why the 
judge made that specific  decision.  The judge does  claim in the text of the 
decision  that  what is  being presented are  the  reasons  why  slhe  made  that 
decision. This may be true or it may not but the reasons that are used publicly 
tell us about what the legal system regards as appropriate reasons, as reasons 
that can legitimately justify the judicial use of power and make the decision 
enforceable.  In doing  so  they also reveal what is  legally meaningful,  what 
statements have meaning within a legal context and this is why the judicial 
decision, the structures within which it is  contained, and the language used 
within it are the subjects of  this thesis. 
These  limitations  should  not  be understood  as  negative  as  they  allow the 
judges access to  a space where they can gain power and authority, help to 
generate  a  strong  sense  of individual  role  and  purpose  and  create  a  legal 
community within which the values and ethics of  justice and the rule of law 
are worked out.  These aspects of the process encourage the judge to absorb 
some of the character of the system into hislher own character and sense of 
identity.  This  provides  a  strong  foundation  of commitment  to  the  system 
which permeates the way individual judges present their role to themselves 
and others in their decisions. 
Yet  although  these  limitations  are  significant  they  have  been  generally 
ignored,  Cyrus  Tata  (1997)  in  an  article  on  representations  of sentencing 
recognises they exist but limits their role: 
The  giving  of publicly  declared  reasons  for  a  decision  tend  to  be 
couched in legal analytical terms. Has this more to do with the necessity 
to fulfil a popularly held expectation of the principles of  justice than a 
revelation of  the stream of  consciousness in the decision process? Malloch VA 2002  Introduction and methodology  4 
...  in  fact  these  accounts  tell  us  little  about  the  actual  sentencing 
decision process itself and more about the demands of legal rhetoric. 
However, this is not to say that legal rhetoric is unimportant or should 
be ignored, but that we  should recognise that it has a symbolic role of 
legitimation rather than an instrumental role. (1997,415) 
Tata is correct in arguing that legal rhetoric has a symbolic role but in arguing 
that rhetoric has less to do  with decision-making he is failing to understand 
the significance of this statement. Claims to legitimacy are used to authorise 
the use of power. The problem of legitimacy, therefore, is how to justify the 
use of power within society3  and is  linked to a central aspect of the judicial 
role, the power to make decisions which will be followed, indeed this is could 
be seen as the defining aspect of  what makes reasoning recognisably judicial. 
The  rhetoric  they  use  therefore,  however  symbolic,  contains  a  wealth  of 
information about the judicial role and the process of  decision-making. It also 
allows an exploration of  the place of character and ethics in law while taking 
the structures and languages of  law seriously. 
The  thesis  then  attempts  to  describe  the  architecture  of the judicial/legal 
space that is  created by these  limitations and to understand in some detail 
how it  generates  authority  and  is  therefore  an  attractive  space  which has 
benefits  for  those  who  choose  to  submit to  its  rules.  It concentrations on 
persuasion rather than the  more acceptable viewpoints of "legitimacy" and 
"justification"  in order to  uncover  aspects  of the  context,  specifically the 
ethical  and  emotional  aspects,  which  are  neither rational  nor  logical  and 
3  Some thinkers,  notably Habermas (1988),  have identified a legitimation crisis.  They argue 
that the move to a post-modern,  pluralist  society with its competing truth claims have 
made it harder for states to justify their use of  power. See also Teubner (1989) and Unger 
(1976).  Douzinas and Warrington (1994) argue that the crisis is  occurring because the 
split  between public  and  private law is  becoming less clear.  Their identification of the 
problem has not been uncritically accepted. Rottleuthner (1989) has argued that there is 
no  evidence  of a  crisis  of legitimacy  caused  by  a  change  from  modernity  to  post-
modernity.  This  is  a  specific  criticism  of the  picture  of social  change  portrayed  by 
Habermas and others and  does not mean that legitimacy is  an issue that legal theorists 
should not consider. Malloch VA 2002  Introduction and methodology  5 
which tend to be missed by legal theorists. 
4 
2. The problems of  legal theory 
Underlying the  contention  of this  thesis  that  persuaSIOn  is  the  key  to  the 
judicial decision-making process is a critique of the failure of legal theory to 
fully consider the rhetorical and symbolic elements of  legal decision-making.
5 
This is despite the fact that the focus of twentieth century philosophy on the 
production  of meaning  by  rendering  the  rational  and  logical  problematic 
encourages a consideration of  these aspects of  law. 
This  movement within philosophy is  of particular significance  for  a thesis 
which aims to understand legal meaning because the growing interest in the 
production  of meaning within  western  philosophy  is  closely  linked to  the 
collapse  of any  philosophically  objective  worldview and  has  generated  an 
entirely new field of  analysis - cultural theory. Initially, under the influence of 
Marx, the aim of such theories was to  discover the defining structures that 
underlay  and  determined  societies  but,  in  the  latter  half of the  twentieth 
century,  structuralism  was  widely  rejected  and,  in  the  collapse  of 
structuralism that is contemporary post-structuralism, meaning is found to be 
more fluid, more organic, hierarchical structures have been rejected in favour 
of webs  of significance.
6  This  more  complex  view  of the  way  in  which 
4  Almost  every legal theorist has at some time considered judicial decision-making. In recent 
years, Dworkin (1986) has been particularly influential but he is only the latest in a long 
line which could include Cardozo (1926), Wasserstrom (1961) and Fuller (1966) amongst 
many others. 
5 Fish is perhaps the most extreme example of  this. He has gone so far as to state that theory 
has no  consequences other than "rhetorical" ones in  his  attempts to explain its limited 
impact.  (1989,  15) This thesis will  attempt to answer this by showing the way in which 
rhetorical  consequences  can  be  significant  and  in  chapters  2  and  5 will  consider the 
relationship between theory and judgment. 
6 Milner (1994) has identified three dominant strands within the post-structuralist movement, 
Derridean which revels in the tensions of  the collapse of  structures and seeks to demystifY 
and deconstruct, Lacanian, which is Freudian and focused on the creation of the subject 
and  Foucaultian  which  seeks  to describe  an  interplay  of relative  cultural  schemes  of 
signification.  This description of the movement of cultural theory is clearly not the only 
one see Chaney (1994) which is similar in some respects but concentrates on the roots in 
sociology  rather  than  philosophy.  There  is  though  agreement  that turning  to  cultural Malloch VA 2002  Introduction and methodology  6 
meaning is created and sustained provide opportunities for a re-evaluation of 
the role of  the symbolic and rhetorical in law. 
Chapter  2  contains  an  analysis  of the  work  of three  theorists,  Cha'im 
Perelman,  Bernard  Jackson  and  Neil  MacCormick  which  describes  their 
attempts to create theories of  legal reasoning within the shadow of  these shifts 
in philosophy. It will be argued that although interesting these theories fail to 
understand why judicial decisions are grounded and compellable and that this 
is because they have concentrated not on understanding the decision within its 
own  context  but  in  translating  it  in  a  "philosophically  acceptable  way". 
Although they are  attempting to  rethink how philosophy should understand 
judicial  decision-making  they  are  still  attempting  to  fit  the  decision  into 
philosophical  paradigms  and  concentrate  on  providing  solutions  to 
philosophical  problems  rather  than  seemg  in  them  the  opportunity  to 
reunderstand legal decision-making. 
This  concentration  on  methodology  and  on  the  relationship  between  the 
theorist and the  material reflects  the concerns of contemporary philosophy 
which  has  become  increasingly  self-referential.  All  three  theorists  are 
working within the tradition of  philosophy and Emmanuel Levinas has argued 
that the strength of philosophy, which he describes as speaking Greek, is its 
ability to say anything but that this is also is the source of  its problems: 
I believe that Greek philosophy cannot be eliminated. Even in order to 
criticise the ultimate character of Greek philosophy, one needs Greek 
philosophy ...  The Greeks have taught us how to speak.  Not to speak, 
not the saying but to rediscover ourselves in the said. Greek philosophy 
is  a special language which can say everything to everyone because it 
theory  has  been  largely  about  attempts  to  understand  the  ways  in  which  meaning  is 
produced and created. Malloch VA 2002  Introduction and methodology  7 
never presupposes anything in particular. Greek philosophy is the way 
that people  speak  in the  modem university the  world over ...  It is  a 
certain way of presenting things. It is a way of using  a language which 
everyone can enter.  The second quality of this language is that one is 
not obliged to take the forms of the language for the actual forms of  the 
meaning it represents. In spite of the fact that something has been said 
in a certain way, the forms of this saying do not leave a trace in what 
has been shown. And consequently, one can show what goes beyond the 
universality of comprehension. It is a form which leaves no trace in the 
matter it presents. You can unsay what you have said.  (Ainley, Hughes 
and Wright 1988, 178) 
This  means  that  there  can  be  problems  within  philosophy  with  founding 
theories and making those theories compellable. This is a particular problem 
for these three theorists who are seeking to understand a form of reasoning 
which seeks to be both grounded and compellable and further exacerbated by 
the loss to philosophy of the ways it has generally sought to be so, logic and 
rationality. 
The theorists chosen have all explored reasoning and rationality and share the 
view that the traditional methods  of describing law and the  way  in which 
people  reason  within  the  legal  process  is  in  some  way  inadequate.  They 
therefore deal with the problems raised by twentieth century philosophy and 
this is one reason why they have been chosen. 
Although their interests in reasoning and in finding new ways to describe the 
reasoning  process  makes  them  suitable  for  this  study,  they  are  not  alone. 
Many  others  have  looked  at  these  issues.  These  three  have  been chosen 
because of  the way they relate to the texts which are being considered here. 
7 
7 It may  appear that there are others who are equally relevant.  Notably, Dworkin, who has 
dominated the discussion of  judicial reasoning since Law's Empire (1986); and Goodrich 
(1987) who has written on rhetoric.  These theorists, though,  do not show the range of 
interests which has led to the decision to focus on the three theorists chosen here. They Malloch V.A. 2002  Introduction and methodology  8 
Chalm  Perelman's  work  cuts  directly  across  the  concerns  of this  thesis. 
Perelman has developed a new theory of  reasoning that borrows heavily from 
Aristotle's theory of rhetoric and that puts  persuasion at the very heart of 
reasoning. His theory, thus, shows one way in which an historical theory that 
is being considered can be adapted to fit modem practice as well as centring 
on the central concept of  the thesis - persuasion. 
Bernard Jackson also has a strong link to one of the traditions being studied 
here. He has published widely on biblical law and the early stages of Jewish 
legal  development. 
8  This alone would make him of special interest to this 
study  but  his  theory  of legal  reasoning  adds  extra  weight  to  this.  Like 
Perelman,  Jackson has  sought  to  find  new ways  to  describe  law.  He  has 
turned to semiotics to provide a model for legal meaning. Unlike Perelman, 
he does not stress the relationship between persuader and persuaded but his 
work is based on language and communication. 
Neil MacCormick was chosen, partly, to contrast with these two theorists. He 
has worked in legal reasoning for some years and has been interested in the 
process of justification as  well  as  the nature  and status of legal  reasoning 
itself. Unlike Perelman and Jackson, he has tried to work within the positivist 
view of legal reasoning. He has updated and adapted this to take account of 
problems in this view and has described himself as a post-positivist. Despite 
this  he  still  remains  within  the  traditional  paradigm  of legal  reasoning. 
Although he has no direct links to the two traditions that the thesis analyses, 
he  is  a  Scots  jurist  and  this  does  link  him  to  the  section  that  explores 
contemporary practice. 
These three then show different  aspects of legal theory and provide three 
will be dealt with where relevant. 
8  Some of  these are dealt with in chapter 3 below though this thesis will not deal in detail with 
Jackson's recent application of his  semiotic theory to this field  - see n 43,  chapter 2.  A 
full  list  of  all  of  Jackson's  published  works  can  be  found  at 
http://www.legaltheory.demon.co.uklIib_biblioBSJI.htmI Malloch V.A. 2002  Introduction and methodology  9 
different models for explaining law and legal reasoning. The analysis of  their 
work concludes by arguing that at the core of  the failure of  all of  these models 
is the person.  They all use individuals at key moments in their theories but 
this  person is  a construct fulfilling the need of the system and they fail  to 
explain why a real individual becomes committed to and works  within the 
system of  legal reasoning. It is in seeking to understand these questions and to 
provide legal theory with a form of  analysis which can include the emotional, 
ethical  and character-based aspects  of reasoning that the thesis turns  to  a 
comparative analysis of  very different models of  law in practice. 
3. Developing a theory of  judicial decision-making. 
Chapter  3  contains  an analysis  of decision-making  presented  in  two  very 
different texts, the Talmud and the Ars Rhetorica. This methodology has been 
chosen in response to the problems described in chapter 2. Instead of  seeking 
to approach legal theory with an abstract or generalised theory the studies of 
these texts allows a theory to  be developed which, by staying close to the 
details of reasoning and using a comparative approach, seeks to understand 
the  aspects of legal  decision-making which a more philosophical approach 
which encourages a focus on the rational and logical elements obscures. 
The  study  of the  Talmud,  a  work  of legal  reasomng  that  evolved  over 
centuries and whose schematic restrictions are highly developed, generates a 
complex  understanding  of the  traditional  within  law.  Aristotle's  work  on 
rhetoric deals with decision-making in a legal context where the impact of 
law was minimal and highlights the influence of character on the process of 
persuasIOn. 
These two studies were chosen in part because they both deal with law in the 
context of a lack of authority, the Talmud developed a system that remain 
authoritative without a state and Aristotle considers persuasion in a system 
which had few limitations on what could be said. The other reason behind the 
choice of these two texts is the recognition of  the central role that Greek and Malloch VA 2002  Introduction and methodology  10 
Jewish tradition has had on western thought and philosophy.9  As  has been 
said: 
Such was the acquisitive reach of Hellenistic and Hebraic articulation, 
that  genuine  additions  and new finds  have been rare.  (Steiner  1998, 
23)10 
Recently  Greek  and  Jewish  approaches  have  been  used  as  exemplary 
paradigms and given this and their influence on western philosophy a study of 
them should also help to illuminate some assumptions which might otherwise 
go unchallenged.
ll 
There is  a need though to be careful as  Rose has pointed out in becoming 
symbols in the post-modem debate about philosophy Jerusalem and Athens 
are in danger of  being misused: 
Jerusalem against Athens has become the emblem for revelation against 
reason, for the hearing of  the commandments against the search for first 
principles, for the love of the neighbour against the explanation of the 
world, and for the prophet against the philosopher. (Rose 1993, 1) 
Stone (1993) argues in particular that in such debates Jerusalem is being used 
because  of the  perceived  failure  of  liberal  philosophy  represented  by 
Athens.12  This,  though,  has  led  to  Jewish  thinking  being  deliberately 
misinterpreted to suit contemporary needs. Rose (1993) makes the same point 
and argues further that the conflict that is set up also misinterprets western 
philosophy: 
In their attempts to find a way to voice commandment and commentary, 
these rediscoveries of Judaism at the end of the end of philosophy are 
9  See Tully (1988) for the argument that both these traditions affected canon law and through 
this English common law. (Leites 1988,3; Sampson 1988, 88). 
10  Handelman makes a similar point:  "Matthew Arnold, in the nineteenth century, defined the 
tension  between  "Hebrew and  Hellene"  as  the  essential  creative  dialectic  of western 
culture." (1982,3) 
11  Kuczewski (1994) outlines the main movements in Aristotelian influenced works on ethics. 
Kronman (1993) has used Aristotle's concept of  Phronesis to generate the concept of  the 
lawyer-statesman. Stone (1993) details the use made by American constitutional theorists 
of  Jewish law, the most influential of  whom has been Robert Cover (1983). 
12 Kronman (1993) turns to Aristotle because of  the same perceived failure. Malloch VA 2002  Introduction and methodology  11 
deeply  misleading:  they  misrepresent  the  rationalism  or  knowledge 
against which they define themselves; they misrepresent Judaism; above 
all, they misrepresent the modernity and the history in which they and 
Judaism  are  implicated  the  <nature'  and  the  <freedom'  so  cavalierly 
cashiered in both approaches. (1993, 16) 
This  argument that  philosophy  is  misunderstanding  its  subject  in  order to 
solve its own problems is similar to that which will be made against the legal 
theories presented in chapter 2. It is hoped that by using these texts as models 
and  seeking  not  to  abstract  from  them  but  to  use  them  as  examples  of 
persuasive strategies this thesis will avoid some of  these dangers. 
At  the  end  of this  chapter  these  studies  are  used  to  present  a  view  of 
persuasive  reasoning  which  includes  the  ethical,  emotional  and  character-
based  aspects  of reasoning  that  legal  theories  have  often  missed.  This 
concentrates  on identity  formation  and the  way  in  which structures which 
seek to be persuasive stay close to the particular and define the distance from 
the text.  The chapter concludes by  considering the implications of this for 
legal theory and introducing the approach taken to the study of common law 
reasoning that follows. 
4. The common law 
The study of  the common law in chapter 3 highlights six influential decisions 
in which judges have explicitly considered their methodology and what forms 
of reasoning should be considered persuasive.  These all come from the area 
of  negligence an area where the judiciary have had to explicitly consider their 
understanding of  the role of  law in society. 
The chapter concentrates on the limitations that the judiciary impose on their 
own decision-making. It starts by exploring the concept of precedent and the 
way  in  which this  founds  the  authority of the judge.  It then considers the 
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in which different views of  the limitations on law affect the arguments which 
are  possible.  The  chapter  concludes  with  an  indepth  exploration  of two 
methodologies, case based and principled reasoning. This exploration looks at 
the  way  in  which  these  strategies  reveal,  hide  and  enforce  the  personal 
commitment of the judge to the law. This is revealed by the use of language 
and persuasive techniques. 
5. Conclusion 
The thesis concludes by revisiting the core themes of the thesis. It considers 
the  relationship  between  philosophy  and  persuasion  and  judgment  and 
persuasion and the ethical choice that is made between choosing to undertake 
either  philosophy  or judgment.  It  also  reexplores  in the  light  of this  the 
reasons why legal theory has so often failed to consider the importance of  the 
emotional  and the  symbolic.  It,  and the  thesis,  concludes  by arguing that 
judgment should not be seen as  a paradigm of understanding and although 
philosophy has made us  aware of our limitations in understanding there is a 
need to both understand the power that limitations provide and the need to see 
beyond them.  This chapter introduces the problem of understanding which 
this conclusion seeks to resolve. Malloch V.A. 2002  Introduction and methodology  13 
Methodology 
1. Understanding 
The  process  by  which  we  understand  each  other  or  texts  often  appear 
immediate and even unmediated but it is  clear, especially since Gadamer's 
Truth and Method,13  that all understanding requires a set of preconceptions. 
The speed with which we  are  able to  understand someone or some text is 
dependent on how many preconceptions are shared. It is not possible to come 
to any topic without preunderstanding: 
The mere recognition of a fact is theory-impregnated and guided by a 
number of  anticipations. (Bleicher 1980, 102) 
The rise of cultural analysis has participated and resulted from the extension 
of  this problem to all knowledge. For Foucault: 
The  breakdown  of philosophical  subjectivity  and  its  dispersion  in a 
language that discourses it while multiplying it within the space created 
by  its  absence  is  probably  one  of the  fundamental  structures  of 
contemporary thought. (1977,42) 
This  raIses  questions  about  any  attempt  to  understand.  If the  subject  is 
determined, preconceptions cannot be avoided. Gadamer (1994) suggests that 
they can be limited: 
The important thing is to be aware of one's own bias, so that the text 
can present itself in all its otherness and thus assert its own truth against 
one's own foremeanings. (1994,269) 
Thus, to understand, the interpreter must be aware of hislher own bias. This 
leads  to  the  problem  of representation  and  of self-representation  as  to 
13  The original  Truth and Method was published in German in  1960.  The text that will  be 
referred to is the English second revised edition (1994) which translates not the original 
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understand requires the interpreter to be able to represent hislher own bias. 
This  though  is  impossible:  'To be  'historically' means that knowledge  of 
oneself can  never be  complete." (Gadamer  1994,  302)  This  is  not simply 
because, as Gadamer suggests one is embedded in history but because every 
attempt  to  understand  and  in  particular  to  understand  one's  own 
preconceptions changes that understanding. The difficulties of representing a 
process  whereby the  process  itself changes  the  subject is  one  that will  be 
returned to throughout the thesis and is a particular one for theorists who in 
seeking to understand have to freeze a process which keeps moving.  George 
Steiner  (1998)  has  asserted  that  any  act  of understanding  is  an  act  of 
translation and that if  the ideal translation is the one that recreates the other's 
thoughts in my own terms with as  little interference as  possible, the goal of 
translation would appear to be replication and in this sense: 
any genuine act of translation is,  in one regard at least, a transparent 
absurdity, an effort to go backwards up the escalator of time and to re-
enact voluntarily what was a contingent notion of  spirit. (1998, 75) 
He (1998, 264) has though helpfully pointed out that: 
The  defense  of translation  has  the  immense  advantage  of abundant, 
vulgar fact.. ..  Somehow the 'impossible' is overcome at every moment 
in human affairs. Its logic subsists in its own rigorous limbo, but it has 
no empirical consequences. 
Steiner's description of translation is  not of a structure but of a four step 
process. He describes the four steps as:  trust; aggression; incorporation; and 
reciprocity.14 Trust refers to the basic assumption that the text is meaningful 
and that there is something there from which we can learn. Aggression is the 
moment of appropriation where choices are made about what the text means. 
14  Although  Steiner  and  Gadamer  agree  on  the  basic  structure  of understanding,  their 
methodology is different. Rather than agreeing that understanding requires "loss of self', 
Steiner  seems  to  suggest  it  requires  a  strong  awareness  of self  Not  only  of the 
preconceptions that are brought to the text but also of  the ethical dilemmas that arise in 
the way that the text is appropriated. The reader needs to know not only what influences 
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Incorporation is the natural result of  this understanding where the knowledge 
taken from the text is  incorporated in to the world-view of the interpreter. 
Reciprocity is the overtly ethical step where the original source is dignified. 
This process is similar, though in more detail to that described by Gadamer 
(1994) who argues that understanding does not mean trying to think: the same 
as the other but rather: 
... understanding always involves something like applying the text to be 
understood to the interpreter's present situation. (1994,308) 
This is a temporal process where "past and present are constantly mediated" 
(1994, 290).  This though leads to the danger that the past is not questioned 
and  this  is  why  Gadamer  has  been  criticised,  by  Apel  amongst  others 
(Bleicher 1980, 147), for failing to consider the question of  justification, for 
abandoning "normatively relevant critique" and settling for mere description. 
It is alleged that Gadamer can explain but not question the tradition. 
This is a slightly unfair critique. In Truth and Method (1994) Gadamer clearly 
maintains that participation in the process of understanding requires critique. 
D sing law as an example he argues that: 
... judging the case involves not merely applying the universal principle 
according to which it is judged, but co-determining, supplementing and 
correcting that principle. (1994,39) 
In law, critique is supplied by the participation of  the interpreter or judge. In 
applying the  law to  his/her present situation the tradition is  altered by it. 
Gadamer  uses  law as  a  paradigm because  of the  necessity  within  law to 
reunderstand previous principles and it could be argued that it is because of 
the power of the principle to ensure that it is noticed that leads to it not only 
being applied but criticised. 
Thus Gadamer does provide for the possibility, indeed necessity, of critique 
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fundamental critique of the principles that form that structure. Fundamental 
critique requires the capacity to go outside, to use something from beyond the 
tradition as a guide to critique. Implicit in any such critique is the assumption 
that the standards used to judge the traditions are somehow more universal 
and not as historically determined. For Gadamer no text can do this as "The 
text that is understood historically is forced to abandon its claim to be saying 
something true."(1994, 303) After all, texts are written and edited and read by 
historically determined subjects.
15 If understanding can be seen as a process 
where  an  established law,  truth,  principle  or text  is  understood  in  a  new 
context the question becomes how does one establish what is relevant, what 
needs to be reunderstood. 
2. Relevancy 
The moment when a translator decides that a text is relevant s/he assumes not 
only that it can be understood but that understanding is useful and specifically 
that it can somehow speak to their present. This section looks at two aspects 
of this, what a reader looks for in the text and the impact of  texts which are 
defined as relevant. 
Any reader starts by assuming that the text in front of him/her can speak to 
him/her. This leads them to consider what in the text s/he should be expecting 
to hear. Traditionally, s/he would be expected to look for authorial intention. 
For Derrida (1988) the name attached to the piece of writing is not the same 
as the person who wrote it. It is not the person's thoughts that live on in the 
text but: 
Only the name can inherit and this is why the name, to be distinguished 
from the bearer, is always and a priori a dead man's name, a name of 
15  Gadamer (1994,  xxxiv)  makes the point that historically determined consciousness means 
not only that consciousness is determined by history but that consciousness is aware of 
being so determined. Malloch VA 2002 
death. (1988, 7) 
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The name at the end of  the text is as much a creation of  the reader as it was of 
the real person who had that name. Derrida (1988) makes this point directly 
with reference to Nietzsche: 
To hear and understand it one must also  produce it, because, like his 
voice, Nietzsche's signature awaits  its  own form  its  own event.  This 
event is entrusted to us. (1988,51) 
It is  up  to the reader to decide then what should live  on.  There is  reason 
though  to  suggest  that  the  reader  is  not  completely  free  in  this  process. 
Whenever a text is approached there is an instinctive urge to go beyond it, to 
find out what the author really meant, or if  it relates to the 'real' world 
Hillis Miller (1987) argues that: 
... reading is subject not to the text as its law, but to the law to which the 
text is  subject.  This law forces the reader to betray the text or deviate 
from it in the act of reading it in the name of a higher demand that can 
yet be reached only by way of the text.  This response creates another 
text which is a new act.(1987, 120) 
The  effects  of this  law that  seems  to  transcend the  text can be  seen in a 
number of  ways e.g., the tendency of  the reader to generalise from the text, to 
make  of it an  example  or  to  see  it  as  a  moral  law.  Hillis  Miller  (1987) 
describes this as  a linguistic necessity rather than a transcendental one.  The 
need to see more in a text than there is, the search for relevance or the elusive 
'author', comes from within the language itself16 
Foucault (1972) sees this need to go beyond as deriving from the poverty of 
language, from its failure to say enough and therefore: 
To  interpret  is  a  way  of reacting  to  enunciative  poverty,  and  to 
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compensate for it by a multiplicity of meaning; a way of speaking on 
the basis ofthat poverty, and yet despite it. (1972, 120) 
Readers  then  have  a  need to  generate  meaning  from  the  text to  apply  it 
beyond its  own context.  This is  particularly true for those readers who  are 
aware that the text they are reading is traditional, a text that has been passed 
down to them as relevant or "classic".17 Classic texts in all disciplines exert a 
certain amount of  dominance. They are regarded by those working in the field 
as  important and this regulates what is and is  not studied.
18  Conal Condren 
(1985)  has  studied the  effect in political theory of designating some texts 
'classic' and has found that: 
As  a field,  they  structure  our judgements on an extraordinarily wide 
range of  intellectual enterprises past, present and future. (1985,3) 
These texts came with a set of readings which have already defined what in 
them as relevant and this not only limits the way the reader approaches these 
texts  but  in  doing  so  affects  the  way  all  other  texts  are  approached. 19 
Critchley'S (1992) definition of the Derridean concept of Cloture or closure 
echoes this. "Closure is the double refusal both of  remaining within the limits 
of  the tradition and of  the possibility of  transgressing the limit." (1992, 20) 
Such texts then impact on the context within which they can be understood. 
They still though need to be reinterpreted to live on and though the reader will 
be given a text with a set of readings they will still need to apply it to their 
own context.  There remains then a need to see something more in the text. 
The  gap  between the  reader  and  the  text  still  needs  to  be  dealt  with,  in 
Steiner's structure this is not a question of meaning and understanding but as 
a choice is a matter of  ethics. 
17 Handelman (1982) points out that it is from Judaism that we have the concepts of  a canon or 
"classic" texts. 
18  In some ways  they operate in  a similar way to the structure of precedent considered in 
chapter 4. 
19  Although Dworkin's chain novel metaphor (Dworkin 1986) would appear to be related to 
this point. Dworkin does not fully  explore the way in which such texts can limit the way 
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3. Ethics 
The  question  of ethics  and  in  particular  how  it  is  revealed  through  the 
language and structures used in persuasive reasoning will appear as a concern 
throughout this thesis.  This section looks at the role of ethics in the decision 
made to  understand or reunderstand a text.  When research is  dealing with 
human beings, ethics is  usually considered at an early stage.
20  This is rarely 
the case with texts. 
Human beings have developed thousands oflanguages. George Steiner (1998) 
believes that languages proliferated to protect societies: 
There have been so many thousands of human tongues, there still are, 
because  there  have  been  particularly  in  the  archaic  stages  of social 
history, so many distinct groups intent on keeping from one another the 
inherited,  singular  springs  of their identity,  and  engaging  in  creating 
their own semantic worlds, their 'alternaties'. (1998,243-4)21 
This extends right down to individuals each of  whom has, to an extent, hislher 
own  language.  It can  also  be  applied to  each work  that an  interpreter or 
commentator is  attempting to  understand.  Translation of all  sorts  seeks to 
break through the barrier of language, to make what is personal and unique 
belong to all: 
in this sense there is in every act of  translation - and especially where it 
succeeds - a touch of  treason. Hoarded dreams, patents of life are being 
taken across the frontier. (Steiner 1998,244) 
Simon Critchley (1993)  points to the  choices  inherent in  all  translation or 
20  The British  Sociological  Association  for  example  has  produced  a  statement  of Ethical 
Practice which considers the ethics of  doing research with human subjects in some detail. 
21  That language is integral to the identity of a culture or society can clearly be shown in the 
way that attempts have been made to control societies.  Following the '45 rebellion in 
Scotland,  the  government  amongst  other provisions  banned  Gaelic  in  an  attempt  to 
undermine  highland  culture  and  there  are  numerous  contemporary  examples;  ego 
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interpretation and concludes that: 
Betrayal is the fate of  all commentary. For commentary is never neutral, 
it employs a meta-language which always derives from  a choice or a 
decision  - in  short,  a  critical judgement which  focuses  upon  certain 
texts, themes, and authors to the exclusion of  others.(1993, 60) 
This appears to be another way of stating the problem of relevance but it is 
possible to see this also from the writer's point of view.  Derrida (1988) has 
looked  in  some  detail  at  the  proper  name  and  finds  that  it  contains  a 
dichotomy within itself A proper name both proclaims its uniqueness, in that 
it cannot be understood as other than itself, and yet it appeals to be interpreted 
for that is how it endures: 
On the  one  hand,  don't translate me,  that is,  respect me  as  a proper 
name, respect my law of  the proper name which stands over and above 
all languages. And, on the other hand, translate me, that is, understand 
me, preserve me within the universal language, follow my law, and so 
on. (1988, 102) 
Writers and the texts they produce are subject to the same law as readers, they 
want to live on and to become exemplary. Gadamer argues that it is possible 
to limit the betrayal and allow the text priority over the translator's views: 
Translation allows what is foreign and what is one's own to merge in a 
new form by defending the point of the other even if it is  opposed to 
one's view. (1994,94) 
This approach respects the otherness of the text but it may be asked if it is 
possible  to  approach  the  text  so  neutrally?  Steiner  (1998)  feels  that  the 
translator  owes  something to  the  text with which  slhe  works  but that this 
consists of  giving back to the text and comes at the end of  the process: 
The translator, the exegetist, the reader is faithful to his text, makes his 
response responsible, only when he endeavours to restore the balance of 
forces, of integral presence, which his appropriative comprehension has 
disrupted. (1998, 318) Malloch VA 2002  Introduction and methodology  21 
As Boucher (1985, 27) puts it: 
The  prejudices  which  afford  us  our initial  entry  into  a text become 
modified by being recognized and confronted with what is identified as 
other.  But  this  confrontation  always  occur  in  the  world  of the 
interpreter, and the modification brought about in the encounter is  not 
of the complete suppression of the self, but one of the assimilation in 
and broadening one's horizon by the appropriation of  a text's meaning. 
Thus focused understanding illuminates the text and, if the interpreter takes 
the text seriously,  s/he  dignifies  it and thus the text remains  relevant.  The 
paradox of  the name has to be maintained rather than avoided. The otherness 
of the text and therefore the difficulties in presuming to speak for it need to 
be recognised. Yet if  it is to continue to exist it needs to be interpreted. 
This  description of the process explains a need to  go  beyond that exists in 
both the  text and  the  reader but does  not deal  with the  gap,  the  distance 
between  the  text  and  reader,  the  details  of the  relationships.  Steiner  has 
described two poles - critic and reader - and describes how they relate: 
The critic argues his distance from and towards the text. To "criticize" 
means to perceive at a distance, at the order of  remove most appropriate 
to clarity, .. to communicate intelligibility. (1979,423) 
It is the distance that allows the critic to understand the text, Steiner uses the 
example of the movement of stepping back from  a painting and argues that 
the "good critic makes this motion conscious to himself and to his public". 
This relationship is ethical because it is open to argument, the good critic is 
the one who allows this motion to be revealed, who makes the distance clear, 
Steiner describes this  as  "responsible", in the sense of open to  a response. 
This  is  certainly  a relationship that can fill  the  content of the  process  of 
translation. 
The relationship between reader and text is  very different.  The goal of the 
reader is to repeat the text. 
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He  would be perpetrated by,  immersed in  its  presentness.  The reader 
strives for fusion with the text via internalization ...  At its primary and 
most radical level, the thorough act of reading, the full apprehension of 
the presences transcedantes in language  ...  entails memorization.  The 
act of  learning by heart - an idiom of  notable precision - is no technical 
auxiliary or carry-over from  liturgical or pedagogical practice. It is of 
the  essence  of the  reader's  attempt  to  abolish  or  sublate  that  very 
distance which the critic stakes out. (1979, 445i
2 
The reader seeks to allow the text to become part of  him/her and although this 
may seem to be a more ethical approach than that of  the critic, it is perhaps a 
less responsible one.  The reader cannot communicate fully this experience, 
indeed it has to be unique - it cannot be  shared, cannot be translated.  This 
suggests that translation is not the only approach to a text and that taking it 
assumes a specific ethical approach. 
It also brings to  light an aspect of methodology that has not yet been dealt 
with - the power of the text itself So far what has been considered has been 
the way in which the text ought to be approached, not what lies within the 
text  itself,  Steiner's  description  of the  reader  suggests  an  openness  to 
something in the text, and clearly that is  something powerful. Umberto Eco 
(1989) takes a less mystical approach but also argues that the way texts are 
written  will  affect  how  they  are  approached  and  in  themselves  generate 
different sorts of relationship to the text,  something which helps to  fill  the 
content of not only the ethical final  step, but the first step of the process of 
translation - trust. 
Eco starts from the author rather than the reader and points out that in order to 
communicate  authors  too  need  to  consider  their  methodology  or,  as  he 
22  This brings to mind the Borges short story, Pierre Menard,  Author of  the  Quixote where 
Pierre Menard is described as seeking to "reconstruct, word for word, the novel that for 
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expresses it, in order to communicate an author pictures a model reader who 
shares a series of codes or underlying assumptions. These codes go beyond a 
shared language and would include shared knowledge of society and even of 
textual interpretation. Indeed the way the author sets out the codes in the text 
can limit the approach that can be taken. Eco describes two types of  texts, the 
closed text which sets out with an average reader in mind and is resistant to 
ot4er interpretations and the open text which will retain a closed text at its 
heart but is open to other interpretations. Eco uses as an example of the way 
authors can close texts the discovery of  perspective in art: 
The  scientific  and  practical  development  of  the  techniques  of 
perspective bear witness to the gradual maturation of this awareness of 
an interpretative  subjectivity pitted against the work of art.  Yet  it is 
equally  certain that this  awareness  has  led to  a  tendency to  operate 
against the  "openness" of the  work,  to  favour  its  "closing out."  The 
various devices of perspective were just so many different concessions 
to the actual location of  the observer in order to ensure that he looked at 
the figure in the only possible right way - that is, the way the author of 
the  work had prescribed,  by providing various visual  devices  for  the 
observer's attention to focus on.(1989, 5) 
It appears  that the  author of a closed text does not trust the reader's own 
subjective point of  view and it is interesting that the phrase Eco uses "the only 
possible  right  way"  has  strong echoes of judicial decision-making.  Judge's 
often use rhetoric to make their decision seem inevitable, to make their text 
closed,  and indeed later in this thesis it will be shown how the systematic 
restraints on their reasoning helps to impart this sense of  certainty. The closed 
text would seem to be closer to Steiner's reader in that it seeks to  restrain 
points  of view,  the  raison  d'  etre  of the  critic  but Eco  links  openness  to 
interpretation and subjectivity and it is this that allows the reader to approach 
the text in such an individual  way.  The author of a closed text is  worried 
about the way it may be used, while the author of an open text is  happy to 
trust the  many  interpretations that may be placed on it,  indeed as  the text 
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the text or others'  view of that text.  Steiner indeed refers to "the judicial 
authority of  the critic" (1979, 438) and links criticism directly to judgment.
23 
The ethical nature and place of  judgment and its relationship to understanding 
will be considered in more detail in the conclusion of  this thesis. This will be 
in the light of  the analysis of  the way in which judges deal with texts and the 
way in which philosophers/theorists understand judges. 
23  Gadamer (1994) also uses the judge as a model and it may be that it is the judicial element 
which has appealed to so many theorists in using Judaism as a model - the final  chapter 
will  consider whether judicial decision-making can or should be used as  a model for all 
reasoning. Malloch VA 2002 
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In seeking to understand judicial decision-making, this thesis goes far from 
the original subject, to works on legal theory, historical studies and in the last 
section on methodology  to  the  problems  of understanding.  All  though are 
used to build up a picture of  the process of  judgment that is revealed through 
the language of  the judiciary. 
Hannah Arendt has described judgment as  a twofold process, the individual 
first  establishing a proper distance between himlherself and the object and 
then reflecting on the object in the light of common sense. This thesis will be 
considering  the  many  ways  in  which  this  common  sense  can  become 
established and how it is revealed in the way that judges communicate their 
decisions.  This  is  similar to  the role  of the  critic described by Steiner but 
according to  Curtis, Arendt can be understood as  arguing that this  process 
always creates a strong emotional response: 
As we travel in imagination through the public, the light from our visits 
floods the thing in question, more deeply illuminating its distinctive and 
complex particularity  .... Having taken the beat of  the world, we feel we 
have achieved a community sense, a feeling for how our world should 
look, sound and feel;  what should be in it; and what it is to which we 
collectively belong  .... Yet this feeling has a paradoxical quality. Having 
performed, in relation to an event or issue in need of our judgment, the 
difficult task of  representative thinking, we emerge with the feeling that 
others ought to  agree with us,  the issue just as  we  see  it.  Indeed we 
emerge feeling compelled to make such a claim on others. And yet the 
mode in which we do  so  is persuasion, as if, though compelled by the 
rightness of our judgment, we  are  nonetheless  oddly  aware that it is 
uniquely and vulnerably ours. (1999, 119-120) 
This  thesis  seeks  to  represent  this  emotional  aspect  of judgment  and  to 
explain not only how the judges use their reasons to legitimate their decisions 
but why. Chapter 2 
Contemporary theorists 
These three theorists are being used to show the ways in which legal theory 
has  tried  to  come  to  terms  with  difficulties  raised  by  twentieth  century 
philosophy. Each theorist is approached in the same way.  First the problems 
that they are seeking to solve is set out, then their general theory of reasoning 
and finally their view of  a legal theory of  reasoning. This approach recognises 
that this  is  a standard philosophical or theoretical pattern and one,  indeed, 
which can be  seen in the  theorists  own work  as  well  as  within this thesis 
itself  1 
One  of the  reasons  why  they  have  been chosen  is  because  they  have  all 
responded to a specific problem, the broader sense of  a problem with theory, 
in a different way. Perelman's response is the most personal coming from his 
desire to end violence. Jackson and MacCormick are both responding to the 
change in the philosophical world view that has occurred since the war, the 
experience  of  which  escalated  the  break  with  previous  philosophical 
certainties  such  as  the  nature  of objectivity  and  the  independence  of the 
subject.  All  in effect are responding to  a change in what can be considered 
meaningful and reasonable. 
Although the problem is a shared one,  each theorist identifies it differently 
and  seeks  to  solve  it  differently,  Perelman  turns  to  rhetoric;  Jackson  to 
semiotics and narrative theory and MacCormick has redeveloped positivism. 
Despite this,  this  study will show that there are similar themes through all 
three theorists.  The clearest is the centrality given to the person, which may 
seem odd given a philosophical climate where the subject is under threat. Yet 
for all of them the person fulfils two roles. One is as a construct essential to 
the theory but effectively created by the theory,  whether it be discourse  in 
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Jackson,  the  committed  participant  in  MacCormick  or  the  audience  in 
Perelman. There are problems with this use of  the person in all three theories, 
they are not real people all are constructs based on the system within which 
the  theorists  are  working.  They  fulfil  a  theoretical  need.  Jackson's theory 
almost  seems  to  describe  not people but a  space  through which discourse 
occurs  and  MacCormick's  committed  participant  is  a  construct  of 
assumptions  about the  nature  of reasoning used to  persuade those  actually 
involved in a legal system to mimic its motivations. 
The second role is  a more vital one where real people reappear. All of these 
occur  at  what  could  be  described  as  crisis  points,  for  Jackson  and 
MacCormick the person appears at the limits of  the system and indeed can be 
seen to  save the  system, for Jackson the integrity of an individual links the 
semiotic world to some form of real world, and for MacCormick it is also a 
virtuous  individual,  a judge,  who  saves  his  system  from  infinite  regress. 
Perelman's core concern is the impact of  his theory on real people because he 
wishes to change behaviour and the problem is his recognition that they can 
choose to turn their back on justice.  A good example of the possibility of 
people to  simply reject or turn their back on others and refuse to  found  a 
community  of spirit  can  be  seen  in  the  exploration  of a  debate  between 
MacCormick  and  Jackson  about  the  syllogism  at  the  end  of the  chapter. 
MacCormick and Jackson simply reject each others foundations and end up 
talking about and being destructive of the others theories rather than to each 
other. 
Yet in dealing with the person all are brought back to the problems they are 
trying  to  solve  and  which  are  linked  to  the  contemporary  philosophical 
climate in which humans are both created and controlled by systems, where 
there  is  no  objective  view point but  no  independent  subject.  The  chapter 
concludes by arguing that it is their inability to understand the role of aspects 
of individual character, ethics and emotions which are the real problems with 
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Chaim Perelman (1912 - 1984) 
In Traite de f 'argumentation,  fa  nouvelle rhetorique, which he co-wrote with 
Lucie Olbrects-Tyteca and published in 1958,  Chaim Perelman updated the 
traditional  study  of rhetoric  and  transformed  it  into  a  general  theory  of 
reasoning.
2  This  was  Perelman's  solution  to  a  problem  with  theory,  the 
problem  of the  subjective/objective  split  which  had  dominated  western 
thought since Descartes. Later he used legal reasoning as a paradigm example 
of this  general  theory.  The driving force  behind his  work was  the need to 
restrict violence. This ethical choice led both to his rejection ofthe contention 
that  it  was  impossible  to  reason  about  values  and  led  to  a  focus  on  the 
individual and relationships within reasoning. 
1. The problem with scientific reasoning 
Perelman  developed  his  theory  of rhetoric  as  a  response  to  his  profound 
dissatisfaction with a study of  justice that he published in 1945. Perelman was 
hoping  to  find  a  way  to  avoid  the  conflict  that  disagreement  about  such 
powerful concepts could create. This is why he chose not to subscribe to one 
ofthe six forms of  justice that he identifies in the work: 
Whatever  our  reasons  for  choosing  one  formula,  antagonists  would 
advance  equally  valid reasons  for  choosing  another.  The  debate,  far 
from bringing about agreement, would serve only to provoke a conflict, 
which would be the more violent in so far as each party was more bitter 
in defence of his own conception. And anyhow the analysis of  the idea 
of  justice would be little forwarded thereby. (Perelman 1963, 11) 
Written in the immediate aftermath of World War II, in which Perelman had 
2 Mme Olbrechts-Tyteca also co-wrote a number of essays with Perelman that were published 
after the Traite.  But Perelman very quickly became the main  proponent of this theory 
and,  although  his  main  work was  co-written,  it  is  still  fair  to  regard  him  as  mostly 
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fought  as  a member of the resistance,
3  his  desire to avoid conflict and seek 
agreement is understandable. This was though considerably hampered by his 
acceptance that the only route to knowledge was the scientific, objective one. 
This meant the only way that he could generate agreement about justice was 
to take it from the arena of  philosophy and place it in the field of  science: 
In seeking to secure agreement on the conceptual meaning of  an idea of 
this kind, one will inevitably be led to play down its affective role: only 
so will one succeed, if ever, in solving the problem. By the same token, 
the  idea will  cease to  be philosophical and will admit of a scientific 
analysis which is devoid of passion but yields more satisfaction to the 
logician.
4 (perelman 1963,4-5) 
He  also accepted that values were subjective and it was not possible to have 
knowledge of  values or to reason about them. In his study he set out a formal 
definition of  justice: 
Formal justice consists in observing a rule containing an obligation to 
treat all the members ofa given category in a certain way. (1963,43) 
Perelman then considered the place of rules in formal justice. He argued that, 
in  order  to  solve  problems  of interpretation  and  arbitrariness  in  their 
application,  they  form  a  hierarchical  structure.
5  This  led  him  to  compare 
formal  justice  to  scientific  theories  whose  rules  can  also  be  structured 
hierarchically.  This not only allowed him to  link his theory to science, thus 
fulfilling a key aim of the study, but also  showed up the limitations of his 
3 Autobiographical information comes from Foss, Foss and Trapp (1991) 
4 Perelman (1963) argues that this would not affect the size of  the field of  philosophy. "By this 
very fact the field of  science will be enlarged, without however, that of  philosophy being 
diminished. As will be seen from the example of  this study, the emotive colouring which 
is dissociated from an idea that has become more scientific will attach itself  to some other 
idea which will  enrich the field of  philosophic controversies. As an idea is denuded of  all 
emotive  colouring,  the  emotivity  is  reflected  back  on  to  another  idea  which  is 
complementary to the first. Thus it is that the efforts of  philosophic thought, which opens 
to science a new domain of  knowledge, recall those of  the Dutch engineers, who, in order 
to hand over to the ploughman a pocket handkerchief of dry land, drive back the waters 
of  the sea without causing them to disappear." (1963, 5) 
5 Note that Perelman (1963, 43) argues that justification in this rule-based structure would be 
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attempt to objectify justice. 
In  Perelman's  VIew  of science,  scientific  rules  can  be  shown  to  form  a 
structure of  explanation with the higher rules explaining the lower rules. This 
structure  is  not  infinite  and  comes  to  a  halt  at  the  barrier of our  present 
capacity to understand reality. The rules of  justice can also be shown to form 
a hierarchy.  This structure is  a normative structure.  The rules are linked not 
by "is" but "ought" and they form a justificatory schema.  The higher, more 
abstract rules justify the lower more particular ones.
6 This structure ends, not 
at a barrier which can be overcome by improving our understanding, but with 
some  arbitrary  value  about  which  it  is  impossible  to  reason.  Even  when 
describing its most formal  aspects Perelman could not fully  exclude values 
from the concept of  justice and argued that: 
A system of  justice constitutes no more than the development of one or 
more  values  whose  arbitrary  character is  linked to  their very  nature. 
(1963,53) 
The requirements  of formal justice that Perelman sets  out does  mean that 
these values can be applied rationally but the values themselves cannot be 
discussed rationally. They are simply a matter of  choice and: 
If we  regard  a  rule  as  unjust  because  it accords  pre-eminence  to  a 
different value, we  can only note the disagreement. No reasoning will 
be able to show that either one of  the opponents is in the wrong. (1963, 
53) 
The result is that only a limited aspect of  justice, its application, can become 
scientific and open to rationality. This will reduce conflict only where there is 
substantive and irrational agreement about values. Perelman's study onjustice 
fails in its aim to generate consensus and agreement. He  does try to suggest 
that this  does  not necessarily mean that conflict is  unavoidable and argues 
that  if people  were  made  aware  that their values  were  arbitrary  it might 
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incline them to tolerance: 
No  system of  justice should lose sight of its own imperfection. Every 
system should thence conclude that an imperfect justice, without charity 
is no justice. (1963, 60) 
Perelman spent the rest of his career creating a way to explain how people 
could and do reason about values.
7 In a 1963 edition of  his study onjustice he 
appends  a footnote  to the phrase "There is  no  value which is  not logically 
arbitrary." (1963, 56) - "Since these lines have been written, the author has 
tried to present through his theory of  argumentation, a way of  reasoning about 
values." (1963, 56) 
Although  the  first  signs  of the  answers  that  he  found  to  resolve  these 
problems  can be  seen  in an article  in  1949,  it was  only in  1958  with the 
publication of his  Traite de I 'argumentation that his full theory of reasoning 
was  revealed.  A  theory  explicitly  dedicated  to  finding  a  way  beyond  the 
subjective/objective split and which would clearly need to see law in a non-
hierarchical non-scientific manner. 
2. General theory of  reasoning 
2.1 Rhetoric 
Perelman could have retained the  subjective/objective structure  and simply 
tried to reclassify values as  objective. He chose not to do this as he believed 
that  giving values  objective  status  would lead to  people  arguing that their 
views on values were conclusive and that they should, therefore, be imposed 
on others. By rejecting objectivity he felt that there was an instant gain in the 
status of  the individual in reasoning: 
Le rejet des criteres objectifs, en toute matiere, revalorisant, ala fois, la 
7  Dearin (1989) has  argued that Perelman's attempts to solve the issue of justice are at  the 
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liberte  d'invention,  a  fait  de  l'individu  humain,  dans  son  unicite, 
l'element central de la philosophie. (1989,297)8 
Perelman found his answer in the ancient theory of rhetoric which had been 
influential  until  the  Middle  Ages  but  had  since  fallen  into  disrepute.
9  In 
rhetoric, and particularly in the rhetoric of  Aristotle, Perelman found a middle 
way,  a  way  of reasoning  about  values  that  was  rational  and  not  purely 
arbitrary but that did not give its conclusions the invariant force of objective 
truth: 
L' etude de la rhetorique, com;ue comme une logique des judgements de 
valeur, portant non sur Ie vrai, mais sur Ie preferable, OU I' adhesion de 
l'homme  n'  est  pas  simplement  sousmission,  mais  decision  et 
engagement,  introduirait  un  nouvel  element  dans  la  theorie  de  la 
connalsance,  et  ne  limiterait pas  Ie  deb at a l'acception entiere  d'un 
rationalisme inspire des procedures scientifiques ou a  son rejet complet. 
L'introduction d'une technique intellectuelle qui permetrait de rompre 
les cadres de  l'altemative "objectivisme sans sujet" ou "subjectivisme 
sans  objet"  ne  peut  que  contribuer  d'une  favon  appreciable  a la 
comprehension  des  conditions  d' exercise  de  notre  liberte  spirituelle. 
(1989,299) 
Having found the answer, Perelman set out to develop the theory of rhetoric 
and bring it up  to  date.  His methodology was  inspired by Gottleib Frege's 
study  of mathematical logic.  Frege  had sought to  understand mathematical 
logic not by looking at it in the abstract but by cataloguing the practice of 
mathematicians. Perelman, with Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, undertook a ten-year 
study of how people reason about values in practice and used this as the basis 
of  their  theory.  The  result  was  the  large  and  influential  Traite  de 
8 This article was first published in 1949 and contains the earliest reference that I have found to 
rhetoric  and  Aristotle  in Perelman's  work.  (1989,  299)  This  shows  how  soon  after 
publishing his work on Justice (1945) that Perelman started to rethink the foundations of 
his philosophy. 
9  Eubanks (1989, 233) cites the talmudic theory of  truth as a source. Perelman accepted this 
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L 'argumentation.  La Nouvelle  Rhetorique  (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 
1988) - the foundation of  all his later work. 10 
The depth of the shift that his thinking had taken since 1945 can be seen in 
the very first line of  this book: 
La  publication  d'une  traite  consacre  a  rargumentation  et  son 
rattachement  a  une  vieille  tradition,  celIe  de  la rhetorique  et  de  la 
dialectique grecques, constituent une rupture avec une conception de fa 
raison  et du raisonnement,  issue  de  Descartes,  qui  a  marque de  son 
sceau la philosophie occidentale des trois derniers siecles.  (Perelman, 
1988 1)11 
Perelman is careful to point out that he is not rejecting all aspects of western 
philosophy since Descartes but he does insist that the achievements of logic 
and science should not be allowed to  deny the benefits of reason to other 
aspects of  life: 
Faut-il  tirer  de  cette  evolution  de  la  logique,  et  des  progres 
incontestables qu'  elle a realises, la conclusion que la raison est tout a 
fait incompetence dans les domaines qui echappent au calcul et que la 
ou ni r experience ni la deduction logique ne peuvent nous fournir la 
solution d'un probleme, nous n'avons plus qu'a nous abandonner aux 
forces irrationnelles, a nos instincts, a la suggestion ou a la violence ? 
(1988,3)12 
This contrasts directly with his earlier goal to bring philosophy into closer 
contact  with  science.  But despite  this  shift,  his  primary  goal  remains the 
same, the need to avoid violence and reduce conflict and this can be allied to 
a related desire to protect and dignify the individual. 
10  In this  thesis,  I  will  be  using  the French fifth  edition of this  work,  published  in  1988. 
Wherever possible, I include footnote references to each quote pointing to the equivalent 
page  in  the  English  edition  published  in  1969.  Although  the  English  (Perelman  and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969) edition is a translation of  the French first edition rather than the 
fifth, (perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1988) the core text has changed little. 
11  (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 1) 
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Perelman's theory borrows most heavily from Aristotle's theory of dialectical 
arguments.  Indeed  his  reliance  on  this  theory  is  so  strong  that  he  has  to 
explain  why  he  uses  the  word  rhetoric  rather  than  dialectic.  He  has  two 
explanations  for  this:  the  first  is  simply  to  avoid  confusion  with the  very 
different Hegelian dialectic; the second takes us  to the heart of Perelman's 
theory: 
Le  raisonnement  dialectique  est  considere  comme  parallele  au 
raisonnement analytique, mais traite du vraisemblable au lieu de traiter 
de  propositions necessaires.  L'idee meme que la dialectique concerne 
des  opinions,  c'est-a-dire  des  theses  auxquelles  on  adhere  avec  une 
intensite  variable,  n'  est pas  mise  a profit  On  dirait que  Ie  statut de 
l'  opinable est impersonnel et que les opinions ne sont pas relatives aux 
esprits  qui  y  adherent  Par contre,  cette  idee  d'adhesion et  d'esprits 
auxquels on adresse un discours est essentielle dans toutes les theories 
anciennes  de  la rhetorique.  Notre rapprochement avec  cette  derniere 
vise  a  souligner  Ie  fait  que  c 'est  en fonction  d'un  auditoire  que  se 
developpe  toute  argumentation;  l'etude  de  l'opinable  des  Topiques 
pourra, dans ce cadre, s'inserer a sa place. (1988, 7)13 
Therefore,  although  Perelman  is  concerned  with  "les preuves  qu 'Aristote 
appelle  dialectiques"  (1988,  6)14  he  believes  his  approach  and  focus  is 
different from Aristotle.
I5 He is concerned less with the relationship between 
dialectical  and analytical  reasoning and instead emphasises the role of the 
audience which becomes  a central concept to his theory of argumentation. 
This is why Perelman prefers the word rhetoric to dialectic as rhetoric implies 
a relationship. At its simplest this is the relationship between a speaker and an 
audience  but Perelman's theory  is  much  broader  than  a  theory  of public 
speaking. He is seeking to produce a general theory of  reasoning. 
13  (perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 5) 
14 (perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 3) 
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This  general  theory  of reasoning  IS  what  he  calls  the  new  rhetoric  or 
argumentation.
16  As  can  be  seen  III  the  quote  above,  Perelman  defines 
argumentation by contrasting it with raisonnement analytique, which he also 
calls demonstration or logique formelle.  Thus,  although a general theory of 
reasoning,  it is  not  a  comprehensive theory as  it does  not cover scientific 
reasonmg  or  fully  explain  the  relationship  between  the  two  forms  of 
reasoning. 17 
Argumentation has two aspects that differentiate it from the scientific form of 
reasoning  - a  distinct  domain  and  a  distinctive  purpose.  The  domain  of 
argumentation is the same as that of dialectic and is  "celui du vraisemblable, 
du  plausible,  du  probable,  dans  la  mesure  ou  ce  dernier  echappe  aux 
certitudes  de  calcul."  (1988,  1)18  The  purpose  of argumentation  is  to 
persuade.  By  persuasion  Perelman  means  "de  provoquer  ou  d'accroftre 
l'adhesion des esprits aux theses qu'on presente a leur assentiment." (1988, 
5)19 
Perelman's general theory of reasoning covers not only the written word as 
well  as  public  speaking but  "la  discussion  avec  un  seul interlocuteur  ou 
meme la deliberation  intime relevent. " (1988,  8)20  In his study he  chose to 
focus on the written word as he felt that this was the most general form. 
As a result of  this study Perelman produced a detailed analysis of  reasoning in 
practice.  This  analysis  forms  the bulk of the  Traite,  comprising two of the 
three  sections.  Yet  despite  the  size  and  comprehensiveness  of these  two 
sections  titled  Ie  point  de  depart  de  I 'argumentation  and  les  techniques 
argumentatives,  this  analysis  has  been  largely  ignored.  Instead  the  first 
16  When referring to Perelman's theory, I will use the term argumentation rather than rhetoric 
as rhetoric is being used as a general term throughout the thesis. 
17  This relationship is discussed in Perelman's work on legal reasoning. (Perelman 1976,  1-4) 
See n 36. below. 
18  (perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 1) 
19 (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 4). Persuasion also includes persuading to act. 
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section  les  cadres  de  I 'argumentation,  the  theoretical  section  In  which 
Perelman  shows  how  he  has  updated  and  adapted  Greek  rhetoric  for  the 
modem age, has dominated the discussion and debate that this new theory of 
rhetoric inspired. This is even true of  much of  Perelman's own later work. 
It is hard to say why this is so.  Certainly the first section contains most of  the 
ideas of  the book and the later sections can be a bit dry. It  would be surprising 
if this were the sole reason why Perelman's academic audience has chosen to 
ignore  these  sections.  Perhaps  the  simple  answer  is  not  that the  last  two 
sections are more boring but that the first section is much more interesting. 
This  is  because  it  is  in this  theoretical  section that Perelman sets  out  his 
general theory of reasoning.  But whatever the underlying reason, this study 
will follow this trend and in considering the Traite only the first section will 
be dealt with. 
2.2 Les cadres de I 'argumentation. 
The  theoretical  section  of the  Traite  deals  mainly  with  the  concept  of 
audience, which Perelman uses to  differentiate his approach from  dialectic. 
Perelman's  theory  is  as  much  concerned  with  the  people  involved  in 
reasoning as the structures of reasoning that they use  and in the theoretical 
section he mainly considers how reasoning fits into social and personal life 
and impacts on relationships. In this Perelman's key aim of  avoiding violence 
and conflict within relationships comes to the fore. 
Argumentation does not occur simply because people have to make decisions. 
It  can  only  occur  when  there  is  a  relationship.  Argumentation  does  not 
necessarily  involve  more  than  one  person.  An individual  can reason  with 
himlherself but to  do  so  the individual needs to conceive of himlherself as 
two persons.  All persuasive reasoning requires a relationship of some kind. 
Perelman argues that,  for  argumentation to  occur, this relationship must be 
based on respect there must be a communaute effective des  esprits.  (1988, Malloch VA 2002  Contemporary theorists  37 
This  relationship  is  created  by  the  decision  of  the  speaker  to  use 
argumentation.  By  choosing  to  use  persuasion  the  speaker  implicitly 
recognises that the view of  the other is not only valid but that it is important. 
S/he is allowing the audience to be the judge of  the worth of  his/her argument. 
S/he is also excluding violence. As  the goal of argumentation is to gain the 
adherence of the other and not just influence the behaviour of the other the 
speaker  will  fail  to  achieve  this  goal  if s/he  uses  violence  to  force  the 
audience to accept his/her argument. 
Yet,  although this form of contact excludes violence, Perelman is aware that 
this openness to the other may be negative: 
II  faut,  en effet, pour argumenter, attacher du prix a  l'  adhesion de son 
interlocuter, a son  consentement, a son concours  mental.  C'est donc 
parfois une distinction appreciee que d'etre une personne avec qui l'on 
discute .... Mais, on l'a dit maintes fois, il n'est pas toujours louable de 
vouloir persuader quelqu'un:  les  conditions dans  lesquelles Ie  contact 
des esprits s'effectue peuvent, en effet, paraitre peu honorables. (1988, 
20-21i
2 
Having set out the minimum conditions and fundamental  moral  content of 
argumentation, Perelman spends most of  the theoretical section exploring the 
speaker/audience relationship in depth.  He  is  particularly interested in how 
this relationship impacts on the form of reasoning used in argumentation. As 
the  goal  of reasoning  is  to  gain  the  adherence  of the  audience,  any 
argumentation must be relative to the audience that it is trying to influence. 
The audience dictates the form of  reasoning to be used. 
This  does  not  mean that  the  role  of the  speaker has  become  diminished. 
21  (perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 14) 
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Although the nature of  the audience affects the nature of  reasoning used, it is 
the speaker who  identifies the audience.  The speaker forms  an idea of the 
audience in his/her mind and this is the audience that s/he tries to persuade. 
This may seem rather abstract but it should be noted that persuasion is not 
only conducted face to face. The writer of  an opinion piece, for example, will 
not have an audience before him. S/he will create an imaginary audience and 
persuade  them.  But the  reasoning s/he  uses  will  only  be successful if the 
audience  s/he  imagines  corresponds  closely to  a  real  audience.  (1988,  22-
25i
3 
If it is the audience, described by the speaker, which dictates the form that 
reason takes, what does this mean for those who seek the highest abstraction, 
for those who look for universal truths? It could be thought that in seeking to 
move  beyond  the  subjective/objective  split  that  Perleman  can  avoid  this 
question but his core aim is to find a way to reason about values and thus the 
ability of argumentation to deal with truth claims in these fields is key and 
Perelman not only does not ignore this group of people, instead he focuses on 
those who seek universal audiences - philosophers. 
2.3 Philosophy as conviction by persuasion 
In  seemg  philosophy  as  a  form  of argumentation,  Perelman  IS  bringing 
together two old adversaries - philosophy and rhetoric: 
En fait,  nous  assistons  ici a la reprise  du  debat  seculaire  entre  les 
partisans de la verite et ceux de l'opinion, entre philosophes, chercheurs 
d'absolu et rheteurs,  engages  dans  l'action.  C'est a l'occasion de  ce 
debat  que  semble  s'elaborer  la  distinction  entre  persuader  et 
convaincre, que nous voudrions reprendre en fonction d'une theorie de 
l'argumentation et du role joue par certains auditoires. (1988,35)24 
23  (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 17-19) 
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In  highlighting these two  aspects of reasoning,  persuading and convincing, 
Perelman is trying to show that they can be reconciled and do not constitute 
two profoundly different ways of thinking. Indeed they cannot do so because 
if he were to accept that they are he would simply be accepting that there are 
some areas where one can be objective and others where one cannot. Instead 
he  argues  that  what  the  difference  between  them  lies  in  their  different 
audiences. Persuasion is the term used for an argument aimed at a particular 
audience, convincing is that which seeks to obtain "Z'adhesion de tout etre de 
raison. .. (1988, 36)25 
This  audience  of all  reasonable  beings  clearly  does  not  exist  and  so  is 
completely a construct of the speaker. It is perhaps the most subjective of  all 
audiences yet it is this audience that Perelman describes as  playing  "Ze  roZe 
normati!" (1988, 39)26 The speaker who approaches such an audience seeks 
not to persuade but to convince. In addressing such an audience, the speaker 
lays claim to a high level of  rationality. Concrete others judge these standards 
not according to how much they personally are persuaded but as to how well 
the speaker fulfils these claims to be convincing. This judgement will include 
a  judgement  of how  well  the  speaker  has  understood  the  nature  of this 
universal audience, or to put it another way, how well the speaker understands 
what it means to claim to be rational. 
Perelman  identifies  two  other  audiences  in  which  this  form  of thinking 
appears and which are, therefore, also central to his thought: the audience of 
one in a dialogue; and the audience of oneself. In relating to these audiences, 
Perelman argues also that the speaker is trying to convince not persuade. It 
should be noted that Perelman does  not believe that it is  possible fully to 
convince any audience because argumentation can never achieve the level of 
rationality  that  is  seen  in  the  sciences.  Ultimately  the  speaker  will  only 
persuade  others  that  hislher  reasoning  is  convincing,  s/he  will  not  be 
25  (perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 28) 
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convincing.  27 
Perelman analyses each of these three audiences separately. Only two points 
from this analysis will be considered here: his rehabilitation of self-evidence 
as an aspect of argumentation and his positive view of rationalisation. These 
points are the ones that best reveal aspects of  Perelman's wider theory. 
Perelman links  self-evidence to the  universal  audience,  which is  the  most 
important  of the  three  models.  The  universal  audience  does  not  exist  in 
reality: 
11  s'agit evidemment, dans ce cas, non pas d'un fait experimentalement 
eprouve, mais d'une universalite et d'une unanimite que se represente 
1'0rateur, de l'accord d'un auditoire qui devrait etre universel, ceux qui 
n'y particient pas pouvant, pour des raisons legitimes, ne pas etre pris 
en consideration. 
Les philosophes pretendent toujours s'adresser a  un pareil auditoire, non 
pas  parce qu'ils esperent obtenir Ie  consentement effectif de  tous les 
hommes - ils savent tres bien que, seule, une petite minorite aura jamais 
1'0ccasion de connaitre leurs ecrits - mais parce qu'ils croient que tollS 
ceux  qui  comprendront  leur  raisons  ne  pourront  qu'adherer a leurs 
conclusions.  L 'accord  d'un  auditoire  universel  n 'est  donc  pas  une 
question de jait,  mais de  droit.  C'  est parce qu'  on affirme  ce  qui  est 
conforme a  un fait objectif, ce qui constitue une assertion vraie et meme 
necessaire, que l'  on table sur I'  adhesion de ceux qui se soumettent aux 
donnees de l'experience ou aux lumieres de la raison. (1988, 41i
8 
Although Perelman has made it clear that there can be no assertion necessaire 
in argumentation, arguments which are aimed at the universal audience seek 
27  There appear to be  similarities between this and the distinction made in law between the 
standards of proof; beyond reasonable doubt and on the balance of  probabilities. Neither 
of  these require absolute proof 
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this standard. A philosopher will never fulfil the strict criteria of  self-evidence 
but his/her ability to convince others that the reasoning used has achieved this 
standard is the measure of  his/her success. 
The universal audience is a constructed audience. Each philosopher appeals 
to  a  slightly  different  version  but,  to  be  successful  in  convincing  other 
philosophers  that  s/he  has  achieved  self-evidence,  this  imagined  audience 
must  have  a  substantial  amount  in  common  with  those  imagined  by  the 
majority of the philosophic community.  This  shows that although Perelman 
stresses the place of the individual within reasoning he is aware of  the impact 
of  socially generated knowledge and opinions. 
Rationalisation would appear to  be the  opposite of self-evidence.  Whereas 
self-evidence  suggests  rational,  impartial  and  almost  scientific  reasoning, 
rationalisation seems to be a dubious form of reasoning that occurs after the 
event to justify past behaviour.  Yet Perelman discusses rationalisation in the 
context  of arguments  that,  like  self-evidence,  aim  to  be  convincing  and 
compelling rather than merely persuasive. 
Rationalisation is the  form  of argumentation that the individual undertakes 
when  s/he  considers  past  actions.  Perelman  argues  that  it  need  not  be 
dishonest and that it fulfils an important function in the life of  an individual: 
Notre  these  est  que  d'une,  part  une,  croyance  une  fois  etablie  peut 
toujours  etre  intensifiee  et  que,  d'autre  part,  l'argumentation  est 
fonction de l'auditoire auquel on s'adresse. Des lors, il est legitime que 
celui qui a acquis une certaine conviction s'attache a. l'affermir vis-a.-vis 
de  lui  meme,  et  surtout  vis-a.-vis  des  attaques  pouvant  venir  de 
l'exterieur; il est normal qu'il envisage tous les arguments susceptibles 
de la renforcer. Ces nouvelles raisons peuvent intensifier la conviction, 
la proteger contre certaines attaques auxquelles on n'  avait pas pense des 
Ie debut, preciser sa portee. (1988, 58i
9 
Unlike  scientific facts,  which are  accepted as  true  or false,  values  can be 
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accepted in part.  In this case rationalisation, justifying a decision after the 
event, is not hypocrisy but is necessary for the individual to improve hislher 
understanding of  values. This may be needed to increase hislher adherence to 
values and to ensure that in the future the individual will be able to act in 
according with those values. It will also allow a speaker aiming to convince to 
become more convincing in line with communal values and Perelman goes 
from  his  consideration  of rationalisation  to  consider  not  the  relationship 
between the reasoning individual and hislher own values and action but the 
relationship between the reasoning society and its values and action. 
Argumentation  aIms  not just to  persuade  in  isolation  but  to  generate  a 
tendency to  act  within  an  audience,  or as  he  puts  it,  elle  se propose  de 
provoquer une action ou d y pre  parer, en agissant par des moyens discursifs 
sur l'esprit des auditeurs. (1988,62)30 It does this by using the values that the 
audience already adheres to and persuading them to follow the implications of 
those values. When this is done within a social context, it  takes the form that 
Aristotle called epideictic rhetoric.
31 
2.4 Epideictic rhetoric 
Epideictic rhetoric is one of Aristotle's three categories of rhetoric but has 
traditionally been the least respected form and has largely been ignored.  In 
contrast to this the  other two forms  of rhetoric that he  identified, forensic 
rhetoric  which  looks  at  the  language  of the  courtroom  and  deliberative 
rhetoric which looks at debate, have been studied in depth.  Perelman feels 
that this is a mistake and that epideictic rhetoric is at the heart of  rhetoric not 
the fringes. 
Epideictic or display rhetoric was the term Aristotle used to cover exhibition 
30 (perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 47) 
31  See chapter 3 below for a full  exploration of  this and the other forms of  rhetoric identified 
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speeches that were common in ancient Greece. The speaker aimed to please 
the audience by a flamboyant use of language and by supporting opinions that 
were  already  widely held.  It was  often  used  to  praise  local  heroes  or to 
commemorate feast days. 
Why does Perelman see this rhetoric as the key to persuasive reasoning? After 
all it simply persuades people to believe what they already believe. It is this 
that interests Perelman. Like rationalisation, which allows the individual to 
understand hislher values  and motivations  better,  epideictic rhetoric helps 
society to understand its values better. 
By reiterating the society's values,  epideictic rhetoric reinforces them.  This 
not only protects those values but also increases the likelihood that the values 
will be translated into action.  It protects society as  a  whole by generating 
agreement around the  nature  and identity  of these values.  In doing  so,  it 
pushes language to its highest forms: 
C'est dans l'epidictique que tous les procedes de l'art litteraire sont de 
mise,  car il  s'  agit de faire  concourir tout ce qui peut favoriser  cette 
communion de l'  auditoire. C'  est Ie seul geme qui, immediatement, fait 
penser it de litterature, Ie seul que l'on aurait pu comparer au livret d'un 
cantate, celui qui risque Ie plus facilement de tourner it la declamation, 
de  devenir  de  la  rhetorique,  dans  Ie  sens  perjoratif et habituel  du 
mot.(Perelman 1988,67)32 
The power of  language can be seen as dangerous. It could be used to persuade 
people to do things that we may see as evil. Perelman cannot rid rhetoric of 
this danger. His theory of  reasoning means that he cannot condemn those who 
try  to  persuade  us  on the  grounds  that their arguments  are  true  or false 
according to some objective standard. We can only oppose them on grounds 
that are more or less persuasive. That is, we can only use the same power of 
language against them. 
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Although Perelman cannot deny the danger of rhetoric, there is an answer to 
this problem within his theory. Perelman cannot protect us from the power of 
persuasion but he  can  protect  us  from  the  power of violence.  As  s/he  is 
involved in argumentation, the  speaker must respect the people that s/he is 
trying to persuade and cannot force them to agree with his/her point of  view. 
This respect implies other values, openness and tolerance, that a society that 
used argumentation rather than violence would espouse.  Epideictic rhetoric 
would be used to enhance these values and, in doing so, would tend to create 
a liberal society.33 
An example of  this can be seen in the way Perelman approaches the problems 
of scepticism and fanaticism.  Both of these could be seen as possible results 
of  the misuse of  rhetoric. Scepticism could be the result of  being persuaded to 
believe  nothing  and  fanaticism  the  result  of being  too  well  convinced. 
Perelman  argues  though,  that  in  the  same  way  as  violence  is  excluded, 
argumentation excludes both of these extremes. Argumentation allows us to 
be committed whilst remaining open: 
La preuve rhetorique n'etant jamais tout a fait necessaire, l'esprit qui 
donne son adhesion aux conclusions d'une argumentation, Ie fait par un 
acte qui  l'  engage  et dont il  est responsable.  Le  fanatique  accepte cet 
engagement, mais a la maniere de  quelqu'un qui  s'incline devant une 
verite absolue et irrefragable; Ie  sceptique refuse cet engagement sous 
pretexte qu'il ne lui paralt pas pouvoir etre definitif. Il refuse d'adherer 
parce  qu'il  se  fait  de  l'adhesion  une  idee  qui  ressemble a celle  du 
fanatique:  l'un et l'autre meconnaissent que l'argumentation vise a  un 
choix entre des possibles; en proposant et justifiant leur hierarchie, elle 
vise a  rendre rationnelle une decision. Fanatisme et scepticisme nient ce 
role  de  l'  argumentation  dans  nos  decisions.  Ils  tendent  tous  deux a 
laisser, a defaut de raison contraignante, libre champ a  la violence, en 
33  It has  been argued that to be involved in  argumentation requires such rigorous standards 
participants  would  have  to  undertake  a  specific  course  of instruction  or  education 
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recusant l'engagement de la personne. (1988, 82_83)34 
While it is possible to accept much of  this with regard to debate about values, 
it does  seem that Perelman might have  a problem when it comes to areas 
where people need to act following debate, when irrevocable decisions need 
to be made how is  it possible to  be committed while remaining open,  and 
what of law, where decisions are enforced. Perelman though did not see law 
as a problem for his theory but as a paradigm example of  argumentation. 
3. Legal reasoning 
Legal reasoning has featured in Perelman's published work from the start and 
it has a key place in Perelman's early work on justice.35  (Perelman 1963) In 
that study he  defined justice as  essentially a system of rules working out a 
value or values and he linked this explicitly to a legal system.  The effect of 
his shift in thinking on his view of law can be seen in the way he approaches 
the problem of  equity. 
In his  1945 article on justice (Perelman 1963), equity is used in cases where 
application of the rules of the  system would lead to a result that is  seen as 
unjust.  This  sense of injustice is  not related to the working out of the rules 
and is  arbitrary and subjective.  Perelman explains that it occurs in cases in 
which the rules fail to take into account certain characteristics which are felt 
to be important to considerable sections of the population. It arises from  a 
conflict between values  held by the  community and the rules  applying the 
values that have been built into the legal system. (1963,30-35) 
Following his shift in thinking (perelman 1979) equity remains a tool that is 
used to ensure that the order itself is seen as just, but Perelman's view of  the 
34 (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 62) 
35  Abott  (1989)  suggests  that  law  is  Perelman's  model  rather than rhetoric  and  certainly 
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sense of injustice that triggers this resort to equity has changed. It no  longer 
results  from  the  clash between rational  and  irrational justice but between 
formal justice, justice in the sense of  impartial rule-application, and justice as 
defined by the core values of  the system which are reasonably held. Equity is 
used to protect the core values, but it does not simply void the rational result 
Instead equity interacts with formal justice: 
... the idea ofthe reasonable in law corresponds to an equitable solution, 
in the absence of all precise rules of adjudication.  But it can be that 
recourse to the reasonable only gives a provisional solution, waiting for 
the  elaboration  of a  new  legal  construction  which  would  be  more 
satisfying. The reasonable guides this endeavour toward systematization 
toward the rational systematic solution. (1979, 123) 
Law is neither a wholly rational nor a wholly reasonable structure. Instead it 
is  both and legal  systems have to  find a balance between the formal  rule-
application that insures equality and impartiality which are  important legal 
values  and a  specific,  reasonable response to the concrete  situation before 
them. 
Perelman sees the relationship between these two forms of reasoning as both 
complex and reciprocal. This means that the demonstration of  legal reasoning 
is never as scientific as that of  the sciences, and its persuasive reasoning can 
appeal to a judge other than the audience - legal rules.
36 
36 In Logique juridique Perelman focuses mostly on law but he does use the work to rethink 
the relationship between science and  argumentation.  (1976,  113-114) He refers to the 
works of Kuhn and  others which had put scientific reasoning under the same pressure 
that the social sciences had been and concludes. "Si l' on rejette ce nihilism,  si l'  on croit 
que tout ce qui concerne les valeurs n'est pas arbitraire,  et que les jugements de realite 
n'  ent sont pas entierement independants,  on ecartera, comme non fonde,  Ie fosse etabli 
par Ie positivisme entre Ie jugements de realite et les jugements de valeur." (1976,  114) 
This brings science in to his structure of general reasoning but does not require a radical 
rethink of the relationship  between the rational and the reasonable in  his  view of legal 
reasoning.  Science, although now a form of argumentation can still have a very different 
methodology to law.  "On arrivera, au contraire, it la conclusion que, au sein d'une etude 
generale  des  raisonnements  practiques,  des  considerations  propres,  it la  methodologie 
feront  prevaloir certains modeIes et certains criteres dans les sciences,  et,  que d'  autres 
considerations caracteriseront Ie  raisonnement juridique et  la methodologie propre aux 
differents systemes de droit." (1976, 114) Malloch VA 2002  Contemporary theorists  47 
This  mixed form  of reasoning  is  not  distinct to  law.  The  rational  and the 
reasonable  appear  in  other aspects  of human thought.  Law,  as  a form  of 
reasoning about values, sits alongside philosophy and morality and like these 
two  it is  a form  of practical reasoning.  Practical reasoning for Perelman is 
reasoning in situations where the answers are not necessary, the reasoning is 
not conclusive but persuasive or convincing and the reasoning has to do with 
action. Practical reasoning is, in short, another way of  saying argumentation. 
Perelman sees  law as  the  prime  example of this  mixed  sort  of reasoning, 
which is a clear development from the Traite and brings us back to his early 
work which set out the rational  approach.  Law,  like these other fields,  has 
developed techniques and methods for reasoning about values that allows it to 
appear impartial and rational as  well as  reasonable but does  so  in a highly 
developed way  and in his  last article,  published posthumously in  1984,  he 
goes  as  far as to say that law has the same place in practical reasoning as 
maths does in science. (Perelman 1989) 
What makes  law different  is  its  specific  context which helps  to  solve the 
problem identified at the end of  the exploration of  the Traite. Legal reasoning 
has  a  fixed  goaL  It has  to  arrive  at  an  answer.  Philosophers  may  seek  a 
decision but they are not time-limited in the same way that judges are and, 
whilst they may want to  enforce that decision or close the debate in some 
way,  they cannot.  In legal reasoning, once the decision has been made, the 
authoritative nature of  law ensures that this decision is carried OUt.
37 
In some ways, it is strange that Perelman is so enthusiastic about law. Legal 
reasoning is backed up by authority and by force.  Surely this would disconcert 
Perelman? Yet Perelman never even seems to see this as a problem. It could 
be that he  sees legal authority as fundamentally different from forcing other 
people to accept opinions. Perelman, though, never makes this clear. He does 
37  The  implications  of the  way  in  which  law  seeks to make  its  decisions  compellable  are 
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though set out a detailed analysis of legal reasoning - Logique juridique - in 
which he sets out his views both as to why legal reasoning is so significant 
and why argumentation is the only form of reasoning acceptable in a legal 
context.  In Logique Juridique  (Perelman  1976),  Perelman links  historical, 
theoretical and practical studies of  legal reasoning. He uses all these different 
techniques as  a way of testing his own and other theories against practice, 
both historical and current. This contrasts with his purely empirical approach 
to general reasoning in argumentation. 
As a result of this study, he believed that he had drawn attention to the heart 
of  legal reasoning: 
Les pages qui precedent ont suffisamment attire l'  attention sur Ie  fait 
que  Ie  raisonnement judiciare vise it de  gager et it justifier la solution 
autorisee d'une controverse, dans laquelle des argumentations en sens 
divers, menees conformement it des procedures imposees, cherchent it 
faire valoir,  dans des  situations variees, une valeur ou un compromis 
entre valeurs, que puisse etre accepte dans un milieu et it un moment 
donnes. (1976, 135) 
For Perelman than,  legal reasoning is  reasoning under pressure.  There is a 
need to justify the decision according to core values and to make the decision 
within strict time limits. As Perelman's view of reasoning is person-led, this 
means that legal reasoning puts a person under pressure. He makes this clear 
at the very start of  his exploration of  legal reasoning: 
Celui  qui  est  charge  de  prendre  une  decision  en  droit,  qu'il  soit 
legislateur, magistrat ou administrateur, doit prendre ses responsibilites. 
Son engagement personnel est inevitable, quelles que soient les bonnes 
raisons qu'il puisse alleguer en faveur de sa these.  Car rares  sont les 
situations ou les bonnes raisons, qui militent en faveur d'une solution, 
ne soient pas contrebalancees par des raisons plus ou moins bonnes en 
faveur d'une solution different: c'est l'appreciation de la valeur de ces 
raisons - que I' on ne peut que tres rarement reduire it un calcul, une 
pesee ou une mesure - qui peut differer d'un individu it un autre, et qui 
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Whatever the law, it is the person who applies it that makes the decision and 
must  justify  that  decision  by  reasoning.  Perelman  shows  that  even  in  a 
situation where law is regarded as divinely given, the Talmud, there are times 
when the law is seen to be open to numerous interpretations and the judge has 
to make an authorised decision: 
Quand  les  autorites  s'opposent,  on  peut  etablir  une  hierarchie  entre 
elles, ou l'on peut tenir compte du nombre des avis autorites, mais rien 
ne prouve que la decision devant laquelle il faudra bien s'incliner soit 
effectivement la seule solutionjuste du probleme souleve. (1976, 7) 
As  a  result  of this,  formal  logic  is  always  insufficient  to  describe  legal 
reasoning.  Formal  logic  may  control the  inferences made in judging but it 
does  not  deal  with  the  value  of the  decision  which  is  the  core  of legal 
reasorung: 
C'  est Ie rOle de la logique formelle de rendre la conclusion solidaire des 
premises,  mais  c'est  celui  de  la  logique  juridique  de  montrer 
I' acceptibilite  des  premises.  Celle-ci  resulte  de  la  confrontation  des 
moyens de preuve, des arguments et des valeurs qui s'opposent dans Ie 
litige;  Ie juge doit en effectuer I' arbitrage pour prendre sa decision et 
motiver sonjugement. (1976, 176) 
The judge is  not though  completely free  in the  choices he can make.  The 
authority he uses to enforce his/her decision is based on traditions or laws that 
bind the judge's use of that authority.  The judge does not solve problems by 
simply using his/her authority to prefer one argument to another. The judge is 
aware of his/her responsibilities towards the law that has given himlher that 
authority and needs to justify the decision in a manner acceptable to the legal 
system that s/he works within. 
The  key  to  this  for  Perelman  is  his/her  view of the  relationship  between 
society and law.  In the very final  paragraph of Logique Juridique Perelman 
states that: 
La logique juridique, et specialement judiciare, que nous avons cherche 
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particulierement des Cours de cassation, se presente, en conclusion, non 
comme  une  logique  formelle,  mais  comme  une  argumentation  qui 
depend de la maniere dont les legislateurs et les juges conc;oivent leur 
mission,  et de  l'idee qu'ils se  font du droit et de  son fonctionnement 
dans la societe. (1976, 177) 
This  sense  does  not  belong  to  the judge  alone,  in  coming to  a  decision 
informed by this sense the judge has to persuade not one but three audiences, 
a complex form of  epideictic rhetoric: 
II  ne  faut  pas  oublier,  en effet,  que  les  decisions  de  justice doivent 
satisfaire  trois  auditoires  differents,  d'une  part  les  parties  en  litige, 
ensuite les professionnels du droit et, enfin, l'  opinion publique, que se 
manifestera  par  la  presse  et  les  reactions  legislatives  aux  arrets  des 
tribunaux. (1976, 173) 
There is a form of communal values at work here and in his historical study, 
Perelman  identifies  the  dominant  views  of the  function  of law that have 
existed  in  continental  Europe  and the  impact of this  theory  on practice.  38 
These views have affected the way legal reasoning has been undertaken and 
presented  and  individual judges  would  have  evolved  their  own  particular 
sense of  the function of  law within these dominant paradigms.  39 
Perelman identifies three phases in the continental view of legal reasoning. 
The first saw law as: 
mettant  l'accent sur  Ie  caractere juste de  la  solution,  et  n'accordant 
guere d'importance it la motivation, etait neanmoins lie par la regIe de 
justice exigeant Ie  traitement egal  de  cas  essentiellement semblables. 
De lit l'importance accordee aux regles coutumieres et aux precedents. 
(1976, 136) 
This  changed  considerably  under the  impact of the French revolution  and 
38  Although,  Perelman speaks about the whole continent,  he shows a francophone bias and 
most of  his examples come from the French and Belgium systems. 
39 A parallel process can be seen occurring in other jurisdictions. See the study of Scottish and 
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enlightenment philosophy. 
Enlightenment theory led to the doctrine of the separation of powers which 
Perelman describes thus: 
La doctrine de la separation des pouvoirs est liee it une psychologie des 
facultes, ou volonte et raison constituent des facultes separees. En effet, 
"la separation des  pouvoirs"  signifie qu'il y a un  pouvoir,  Ie  pouvoir 
legislatif,  qui  par sa volonte  fixe  Ie  droit  qui  doit  regir une  certaine 
societe; Ie droit est I'  expression de la volonte du peuple, telle qu'  elle se 
manifeste  par  les  decisions  du  pouvoir  legislatif.  D'autre  part,  Ie 
pouvoir  judiciare  dit  Ie  droit,  mais  ne  l'  elabore  pas.  Selon  cette 
conception Ie juge applique tout simplement Ie droit qui lui est donne ... 
Cette  conception  conduit  it une  vision legaliste;  la passivite  du juge 
satisfait notre besoin de  securite juridique. Le  droit est un donne,  qui 
doit pouvoir etre  connu par tout  Ie  monde  de  la meme  fayon.  Cette 
vision du droit conduit it un rapprochement du droit avec les sciences. 
Qu'on Ie  considere comme un systeme deductif ou qu'on assimile Ie 
fait  de  rendre  la justice it une  pesee,  Ie juge semble participer it une 
operation  de  nature  impersonelle,  qui  lui  permettre  de  peser  les 
pretentions des parties, la gravite des delits.  etc ...  Mais pour que cette 
pesee  se  fasse  d'une fayon  impartiale, depourvue de  passion - ce  qui 
veut  dire  sans  crainte,  sans  haine  et aussi  sans  pitie  - il  faut  que  la 
justice ait les yeux bandes, qu' elle ne voie pas les consequences de ce 
qu'elle  fait:  dura  lex  sed  lex.  Nous  voyons  ici  une  tentative  de 
rapprocher Ie  droit sout d'un ca1cul,  soit d'une certaine pesee, en tout 
cas de  quelque chose dont I' exactitude rassurante devait pouvoir nous 
proteger  contre  les  abus  d'une justice corrompue  d'  Ancien  regime". 
Cela nous  donnerait  l'idee que  nous  ne  sommes  pas  it la merci  des 
hommes,  mais  it I'  abri  des  institutions,  plus  ou moins  impersonelles. 
(1976,24)40 
40  The extended quote in this passage is  cited as:  Perelman, Chalm.  1973. Droit, logique et 
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This philosophy not only impacted on French legal theory but also on French 
legal  practice.  Following  the  French  revolution,  it  was  adopted  by  the 
legislature. Laws were seen to embody the will of the people and were to be 
applied and not interpreted by the judges. Judges were servants of  the law and 
their job was seen as purely logical and rational. The person of  the judge was 
not to be involved in the decision-making process and if  a situation arose that 
had not been foreseen by the law then the judge had to refer that matter back 
to the legislature. In effect, the judges had lost their authority to decide. 
In  practice  this  was  unworkable  and  the  legislature  was  flooded  with 
references.  In  the  Code Napoleon this problem was  solved by  article  four 
which expressly states that the judge must give a decision: 
Le juge qui refusera de juger sous pretexte du silence, de l'obscurite ou 
de  l'insuffisance de  la loi, pourra etre poursuive comme coupable de 
deni de justice. (1976, 17) 
Perelman sees in this justification for his view that a purely logical law could 
never deal with the complexity of  practical legal reasoning. 
The  third  phase  of continental  legal  theory  brings  us  to  the  present  day. 
Perelman  sees  the  reaction  against  the  view of law that  characterised the 
enlightenment continuing to  the point where continental theorists are being 
led to accept the common law view of  legal reasoning: 
Nous  assistons  depuis  quelques  dizaines  d'annees it  une  reaction qui, 
sans aller jusqu'it un retour au droit naturel,  it  la maniere propre aux 
xvn
e  et  XVIIr siecles,  confie  neanmoins  au  juge  la  mission  de 
rechercher,  pour  chaque  litige  particulier,  une  solution  equitable  et 
raisonable, tout en lui demandant de  rester,  pour y parvenir, dans  les 
limites de  ce  qui  son systeme  de  droit l'  autorise  it  faire.  Mais on lui 
permet,  pour  realiser  la  synthese  recherchee  entre  l'  equite  et  la  loi, 
d'assouplir celle-ci grace it l'intervention croissante des regles de droit 
non ecrites, representees par les principes generaux du droit et la prise 
en  consideration  des  topiques  juridiques.  Cette  nouvelle  conception 
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Ie  complement  indispensable  du  legislateur:  elle  raproche 
inevitablement  la conception  continentale  du  droit  de  la  conception 
anglo-saxonne, regie par la tradition de la common-law. (1976, 137) 
This move requires a new form  of reasoning and Perelman argues that the 
form of reasoning that is  most appropriate for this new situation is his own 
new rhetoric or argumentation. 
Common law reasoning, which he identifies as a form of  argumentation, does 
exist  within  a  similar context to  that which  he  is  describing.  It does  not, 
though,  yet  exist  in  continental  legal  reasoning at least not in the written 
records of decisions with which this thesis is primarily interested.
41  Although 
Perelman set out to describe legal reasoning in Logique Juridique,  what he 
has done is set out the contexts within which legal reasoning can occur. This 
fits with his theory of reasoning which is heavily context-based. However, in 
looking at the reasoning appropriate for the  contemporary legal  context he 
does  not  look at what  happens  within  that context,  as  he  has  done  in his 
general theory, but suggests a form that is more appropriate.
42 
Despite this tension between description and explanation the implications of 
Perelman's study are clear.  Thus in looking at the history of legal reasoning 
Perelman suggests  that argumentation is  inevitable in a legal  context.  This 
means that there must be aspects of  the legal context that solve the problem of 
the  why  of argumentation,  why  undertake  such  reasoning.  Perelman  has 
already suggested that education could encourage people to do so but in law 
such reasoning is inevitable which suggests that in law the perfect or optimal 
41  John Bell  (1991)  has pointed to the similarities in  reasoning styles between what occurs 
behind the scenes in the Conseil d'Etat and the common law which suggests that common 
law reasoning may occur in this civilian tradition but he also points out: "If  the content of 
justifications  and  legal  arguments  put  forward  in  the  course  of the  decision-making 
process have great similarities to common law judgments, then the source of  difference in 
the content of the judgment relates essentially to tradition and,  more importantly, to the 
function of  the judgment itself"  (1991, 227) 
42  The  tendency  of legal  theory to become  normative  as  well  as  descriptive  is  a  common 
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circumstances for argumentation are created. 
The aspects of  the context which Perelman has concentrated on are two-fold, 
the sense of social roles and values which are akin to epideictic rhetoric and 
the presence of  rules and situations to which they need to be applied to within 
a time limited process of reasoning which brings us  back to his first works 
and  his  attempts  to  be  scientific.  The judge combines  the  two,  reasoning 
about values that can use  some of the appearances of a science. It could be 
argued  that Perelman,  for  all  his  denial  that  argumentation  needs  such  a 
structure ultimately recognises its power. 
It is notable that Perelman, although recognising the limitations of authority 
does  not  deal  with  laws'  violence.  Previously  argumentation  prevented 
violence and extremes because of the priority given to the other but in legal 
reasoning violence is  ever present and even exists in the way in which the 
individual and the problem are depersonalised and classified in the process of 
reasoning  itself.  This  return  to  an  "objectifying"  view  brings  back  the 
problem he first identifies, that where one view is  considered correct, or in 
legal terms enforceable, the time for debate is over and yet it is this that gives 
law its power and makes it the paradigm view because the person exercising 
the violence is not free but controlled by a wider community view, the judge 
has  to  persuade  others  that  his  convincing,  rational  argument  contains 
appropriate  legal  values.  Perhaps  Perelman  finally  accepted  the  place  of 
violence  in  reason  but  felt  the  limited  and  constrained  nature  of legal 
reasoning controlled that. 
4. Conclusion 
Perelman's return to  rhetoric allowed him to concentrate on the role of the 
individual within reasoning.  This allowed him to dignify the individual and 
places ethics at the heart of  his theory. His turn towards law though signals a 
desire to find a way to ground this theory in something other than the choice 
of  an individual, whether encouraged by education or not, to treat the views of Malloch VA 2002  Contemporary theorists  55 
another with respect. He wishes to show that this argument is inevitable and is 
not dependant on the individual by stressing the importance of  the community 
point of view and the limitations on the judge. Yet he does not fully develop 
some of  these aspects of  his theory, he refers to the importance of  the judge's 
own sense of  role but not how this is formed. He recognises the importance of 
the wider communities view of law but not how this relates to the judicial 
role.  His use of the judge as a model is  undermined by the way he fails to 
focus on the judge and thus shows how the judge is constrained but not why 
the judge accepts these  constraints.  His  resurrection of the rational  is  also 
intriguing.  After seeking to  get away from  a scientific, hierarchical style of 
reasoning, he praises law for its ability to combine the two.  This use of the 
rational  gives  law legitimacy and makes  it  seem  impartial.  Perhaps  law's 
appeal for Perelman lies in part in the opportunity it gave him to return to his 
goal to see values understood in a scientific manner. 
Perelman's theory does though begin to attempt to understand what it means 
to be involved in seeking to be persuasive. His explorations of  rationalisation 
and epideictic rhetoric start to set out a model which could describe why an 
individual finds arguments persuasive and compellable even in circumstances 
where no one has the authority to impose a form of  reasoning. His description 
of the universal audience is an interesting concept with which to explore the 
way  apparently  impartial  standards  can  be  created  by  individuals  within 
certain contexts but he remains bound to his own need to persuade others that 
his view of reasoning is compellable and this leads him to placing limitations 
around the individual reasoner without considering how that conflicts with his 
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Bernard Jackson 
Bernard Jackson's  work  on  legal  theory  is  predominantly  concerned  with 
legal meaning. Legal meaning is the process by which law makes sense - the 
process  that enables  it to  understand and structure the world.  This  section 
concentrates on Jackson's narrative theory.43  It follows  a similar pattern to 
that taken with Perelman. It looks first at the problems that Jackson wants his 
theory  to  solve  and then at  his  general  theory before  looking at  his  legal 
theory.44 Jackson's work contrasts with Perelman's in that he sought to draw 
on one of  the new philosophical theories, semiotics, as a way of dealing with 
the issues raised by contemporary philosophy. As a result he is less interested 
in the problems philosophy poses which he feels he has dealt with but rather 
the  problem he  identifies  lies  with the failure  of legal theory,  specifically 
positivism to face up to them and incorporate their insights. 
Jackson has found traditional theories of sense making in law unsatisfactory 
because  they  do  not  take  into  account  developments  in  the  theory  of 
knowledge  and  truth  that  have  rendered  some  of  their  assumptions 
43  Jackson has not only turned to semiotics but has sought to find answers in everything from 
linguistics to cognitive development.  This study will concentrate on his use of semiotics 
rather than  attempting to explore the full  breadth of his  work.  In particular his  most 
recent  work on  semiotics  and  Jewish law (Jackson 2000) will  not be  dealt with as  its 
interpretation  of Jewish  law  is  still  being  evaluated  and  would  have  dominated  the 
discussion of the Talmud in the next chapter without adding greatly to this study of his 
view of  contemporary legal reasoning, though, some aspects of his interest in Jewish law 
will be dealt with.  A good introduction to the many other aspects to Jackson's work is 
Making Sense  in Law.  This  is  based  on a course Jackson gave in law,  linguistics and 
psychology.  (1995, x) This includes a brief section on rhetoric (1995,  60-67) which he 
describes as a speech act without illocutionary force ie that does not claim that their very 
utterance performs  some  action but that  has  a perlocutionary effect - a psychological 
effect which the utterance seeks to produce but cannot guarantee by its mere utterance. 
This  could  be  simply  described  as  words  which  aim  to  have  effect  but  do  not  have 
authority, a concept which will return throughout the rest ofthis thesis. 
44  Unlike  the  study of Perelman's theory,  this  study will  not look at  the development  and 
evolution of Jackson's work.  Jackson's published works on semiotics and legal theory, 
although showing signs of development,  do not display the same rupture that occurs in 
Perelman's work. In looking at his theory of  reasoning, therefore, the cumulative effect of 
his work will be considered rather than the process. This means that although Law, Fact 
and Narrative  Coherence  (1988)  will  remain  the  focus  of this  exposition,  it  will  be 
supplemented  with  later works,  especially  where  these  show  a  shift,  development  or 
refocus of  ideas presented therein. Malloch VA 2002 
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In contrast to this, Jackson takes the problems created by linguistic scepticism 
seriously and,  although he finds  directions within contemporary legal theory 
interesting, he chooses to look outside legal theory to find answers. (Jackson 
1995) The core of his narrative theory lies in his adaptation of Greimasian 
semiotics. (Jackson 1997) 
1. The problem with positivism 
Jackson has specific problems with what he identifies as three of the central 
tenets of positivism: the concept of the unified legal system; the belief that 
there  is  a  strong  and  indeed  determinative  connection  between  decision-
making and interpretation which normally consists of  the interpretation of  law 
determining its application to facts;  and the doctrine that there is  a specific 
legal form of  interpretation. 
In identifying these  problems  Jackson  is  attacking positivism  at  the  point 
where it understands its subject and its relationship to the world.
46 He is thus 
attacking the way positivism understanding legal meaning. His attack on the 
concept  of  a  unified  legal  system  is  based  on  his  argument  that  it 
demonstrates that positivists are actually accepting a metaphysical claim that 
law exists somewhere out there. As Jackson puts it: 
"the law" or "the norms" are not objects external to particular forms of 
discourse, to  which those discourses refer; they are constructed within 
those forms  of discourse, and form part of the system of signification 
which makes such discourse meaningfuL  Of course, the content of the 
message includes the claim that "the law" or "the norms" do have some 
form  of metaphysical  existence  external  to  particular forms  of legal 
45 Many of  these are echoed in the discussion in the previous chapter on methodology. 
46 The philosophical tendency to attack foundations will be discussed in more detail in chapter 
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discourse. But that is simply part of  the message of  the discourse, which 
we have to study; it is not a condition of  accounting for the meaning of 
the discourse itself (1988, 141) 
The idea that there is something "external" or "out there" which the theorist 
can objectively view has been one of the first casualties of philosophy's own 
concern  with  how  meaning  is  created  and  Jackson's  own  critique  of 
positivism  is  grounded  in  his  acceptance  of a  "non-referential"  theory  of 
language  which  makes  any  claim  to  either  an  autonomous  form  of legal 
reasoning or to a unified legal system impossible. 
As  a  student  of discourse  Jackson  does  not  though  dismiss  the  way  law 
describe itself but instead argues that it has been misunderstood. These tenets 
are reunderstood as part of how law imagines itself, they are not part of the 
way that legal sense is created. This can be seen in his critique of  the concept 
of the  unified legal  system.  For Jackson,  the  idea of the unity of the legal 
system is founded on a simple error. The positivists have believed the image 
put forward by those who work in the system. This image is not a description 
of how the system operates but is projected by the system and is designed to 
generate dignity.  It fulfils a goal of the system.  Legal theorists who support 
this image have failed to dissociate what law says it is from its real nature. 
Law can refer to itself as an object but given the philosophical world in which 
Jackson is operating this can not be true, this statement therefore needs to be 
evaluated not as how law makes sense but as part of  the stories generated by 
the sense-making process. 
This  argument  is  used,  with  a  little  variation,  against  the  third  tenet  of 
positivism  that  Jackson  finds  problematic  - that  there  is  a  separate  and 
autonomous form of  reasoning. The variation lies in a shift in focus, from the 
discourse itself to the source of  the discourse. (1988, 147) 
Jackson  sees  legal  decision-making  as  exemplified  by  the  judge  in  a 
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professional  community  within  which  s/he  works  as  to  what  reasoning  is 
acceptable  in  that  context.  The  decision  will  also  reflect  the  forms  of 
reasoning that are recognised by the wider community within which the judge 
lives and ultimately it will also contain a mix of conscious and unconscious 
elements. The judge as an individual cannot block off these different parts of 
himlherself from influencing each other. As long as there is no such thing as a 
purely  legal  person,  there  will  be  no  such  thing  as  purely  legal  reason. 
Semiotics for Jackson is  not purely language in the abstract but language as 
used. 
The  place of the  individual in reason lies  behind his attack on the second 
tenet of  positivism, the way it portrays the relationship between interpretation 
of law and the  determination of facts.  Specifically,  Jackson's target is  the 
normative syllogism. As this is the subject of a later section in this chapter it 
will not be dealt with here in detaiL It should be noted, though, that Jackson 
feels that this view of interpretation excludes the place of the person who has 
to make a decision: 
Interpretation,  at  least  as  it  is  conceived  in  the  positivist  tradition, 
depends  exclusively upon the relationship between propositions (their 
semantic and syntactic relations); decision-making contains a necessary 
pragmatic element: what to do with people. (1988, 144) 
Though he rejects these views, he does point out that they fulfil the important 
doctrinal  purpose  of justifying  interpretation  by  suggesting  that  it  is 
predictable and a matter of logic rather than a subjective process and show 
the areas where he believes his own work can be more effective. (1988, 131) 
Jackson expands his critique by arguing that the failure of legal theorists to 
recognise the semiotic nature of  law has led them into confused debates about 
the  nature  of hard  cases,  a  core jurisprudential  debate.  This  confusion  is 
caused by the fact that they have not been considering why cases are hard but 
have been creating strategies for solution: 
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persuasion,  a rhetoric,  relevant to the resolution of cases,  and it thus 
provides  an  answer  to  the  questions  of the  second  type.  Similarly, 
Dworkin's  particular  form  of justificatory  argument  is  a  rhetoric  of 
persuasion in relation to the solution to problems; it does not tell us why 
these problems are generated in the first place. (1988, 146) 
Positivism  here  is  confusing part of the  discourse  of law,  which is  about 
solving problems, with the "reality" of  the creation of legal meaning. Indeed, 
in this area, positivism has become part of  the discourse. 
In rejecting these three aspects of positivism, Jackson is committing himself 
to seeing the legal system as complex, legal reasoning as an aspect of  general 
reasoning and to finding a new non-syllogistic way of describing the process 
oflegal reasoning. 
2. General theory of  reasoning. 
2.1 Truth 
In turning to  semiotics Jackson confronts the problem of whether discourse 
has  anywhere  to  stand,  whether  there  is  any  viewpoint  which  can  be 
privileged as true. In accepting the semiotic view that language is a construct 
Jackson has rejected the view that language relates to something "out there". 
This means that he cannot accept a correspondence theory of  truth, that things 
are  true depending on how accurately they relate to the "real world" or to 
"facts". If  truth is not to be found somewhere out there, then where does it lie, 
or does semiotics presuppose a rejection of  the concept itself? 
Jackson  accepts  that  a  strong  reading  of semiotics  could  lead  to  this 
conclusion but he prefers a weak reading and supports a coherence theory of 
truth. Truth relates to how things are fitted into the semantic narratives. It has 
to  do  with  how plausible  the  presentation  is  and  how well  the  story  fits 
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but a relative concept 
Jackson is aware that this view of truth has led to him being criticised as a 
nihilist He seeks to counteract this argument by bringing into this structure 
the notion of  integrity: 
"integrity"  ...  may now be viewed as  an alternative to the truth.  The 
focus here is in trust in people not in the relationship between what they 
say and eternal reality. (1988, 193) 
In introducing the concept of  integrity, Jackson highlights four elements: truth 
telling; telling the whole truth; honesty in seeking out the values implicit in 
the material; and honest communication. This is similar to Steiner's structure 
of  interpretation though its basis is not trust but faith:
47 
We  have  an  interesting  model  for  this  form  of  activity.  Many 
theologians doubt the literal truth of the Bible. Yet they write as if  the 
Bible were literally true. We may understand such activity in a number 
of different ways.  One might be to distinguish the degree of fulfilment 
of  the sincerity-conditions of  the act of  making a truth-claim as between 
such a theologian or our historian and the enunciator of a truth-claim 
about an event which s/he has actually perceived (such as the witness in 
court).  Alternatively,  the  theologian might  simply respond that truth 
here is a function of faith, not reason. Moreover, s/he would assuredly 
add, it is useful to propagate such a faith, in that it adds to our cultural 
heritage and has beneficial effects on society. Essentially, I believe, the 
claims  which  may  legitimately  be  made  by the  historian  are  of a 
comparable order. (1988, 167) 
Jackson argues that truth telling in this context simply means telling the truth 
that the individual is capable of, the truth about his/her own feelings about the 
process: 
In  short,  we  are  telling the  truth  of the  fulfilment  of the  sincerity-
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condition of the particular performative act in which we  are engaged. 
(1988, 173) 
Integrity is very much an "academic" virtue in the sense that it is perhaps best 
exemplified  by  the  work  of academics.  Jackson  uses  the  example  of a 
historian to  explain its  practical  implications.  For the  historian this  would 
mean  explaining how believable  s/he  thought the  evidence before himlher 
was  and  how  well  it  fitted  with  his/her  experience  of other  historical 
documents and hislher interpretation of  standards accepted by the profession. 
Telling the whole truth in this context would mean that the historian would 
reveal  all  the  data presented to himlher,  including that which may conflict 
with hislher theory  of events.  The historian should try to be  aware  of the 
political and power relations that may influence hislher views and be honest 
that there are value assumptions in hislher work. 
Finally, the historian should be honest about the importance of what is being 
said.  In communicating hislher view of the truth, the historian needs to  be 
honest about the value of  that communication. 
There is  a great deal of similarity between Jackson's view of integrity and 
some of  the discussion in the previous chapter in methodology. Jackson even 
calls his process an "ethics of  reading". (1988, 193) 
This  similarity  occurs  because,  like  the  theorists  considered  in  the 
methodology  section,  Jackson takes the current scepticism about truth and 
knowledge seriously and like them he wishes to see a way forward. Perelman, 
who  for  different  reasons  finds  himself dealing  with  the  same  problem, 
similarly places his faith in people and bases his persuasive reasoning on their 
abilities. This concept of truth requires a great deal of self-awareness on the 
part ofthe individual which at times may seem to conflict with Jackson's own 
general theory of reasoning which stresses that we are often unaware of the 
way we  use language and that we  are bound by the discourses in which we 
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This, though,  is  not Jackson's final  word on the subject.  In considering the 
role of  truth in the criminal verdict he focuses not on individuals and whether 
or not we can trust their relationship to facts but on pragmatics. Pragmatics is 
part of  Jackson's narrative theory and will be dealt with more fully in the next 
section but what should be noted here is that it contains more detail on the 
performative  conditions  that  an  individual  needs  to  achieve  for  his/her 
propositions to be accepted as true. 
In stating that «truth is not a quality inherent in propositions, but is attributed 
to those propositions in accordance with the perspectives of  the users of  these 
propositions." (1998, 259). Jackson directs attention to what influences those 
perspectives and these are found in socially generated narratives of the way 
we expect the truth to be told: 
The persuasiveness of  a story is a function not only of  the narrative told 
in the story (the semantic level), but also of  the narrative of the telling 
of the story.  We have narrative typifications of persuasive story telling 
which involve  not  only  such factors  as  style  and setting but also the 
ascribed authority of  the story teller. (1998,265). 
These typifications  are  internalised and to  an extent will  be unique to  the 
individual but the dominant influence will be the discourse within which the 
individual is making truth claims and thus it is possible that in one situation 
different discourses and different perspectives will lead to different standards 
of truth claims which may well conflict. Integrity, thus, would simply mean 
that an individual had fully internalised and understood the standards required 
in that discourse.  This, of course, may well be inevitable given the semiotic 
perspective  from  which  Jackson is  considering truth and  perhaps  then the 
truth  of his  theory  of legal  reasoning  should  be judged by  how  well  his 
description  fulfils  the  truth  conditions  of semiotics.  Jackson  though  is 
engaged not only in semiotics but in legal theory and is seeking to show that a 
semiotic theory can fulfill the truth conditions of legal theory and in a more 
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2.2 A narrative theory of  reasoning 
Semiotic theory regards sense as  a construct Sense is a creation of humans 
and not something that exists "out there." Although sense is created through 
all forms of communication, it is essentially a linguistic value and is created 
primarily in and through language. 
Greimas,  a  foundational  semiotic  theorist,  argued  that  narrative  structures 
were  fundamental to  this form  of sense making and it is  this aspect of his 
theory that Jackson has used.  Jackson is  not the only contemporary theorist 
who is interested in narrative theory. He himself cites MacCormick, Twining, 
White and Van Roermund but he finds all of  these theories lacking to varying 
degrees and argues that he pursues a very different form of narrative theory. 
(Jackson 1988, 18-26) certainly although these others see a place for narrative 
structures  it  is  only  Jackson  who  has  placed  them  so  centrally  and 
foundationally in his work 
Jackson's  theory  is  based  on  the  works  of Greimas  and  Saussure  and  he 
accepts  their  basic  assumption  of semiotics  that  the  relationship  between 
words  and meaning and words  and reality as  matters of social convention. 
There is no reason why one word should refer to one object or concept It is 
merely  social  convention  that  keeps  the  relationship  between  words  and 
meanings  stable.  Words,  therefore,  do  not  exist  on  their  own  and  do  not 
simply  relate  to  individual  pre-existing  concepts.  They  relate  primarily to 
other words and their value comes from this relationship. 
According  to  Saussure,  two  principle  types  of relationship  exist  between 
words:  syntagmatic,  and  associative  or  paradigmatic.  Associative  or 
paradigmatic relationships look at what other words are associated with that 
word in memory - what words are brought to mind by that word. 
Theorists, following Saussure, have argued that these associative relationships 
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semes.
48 The content of a seme is limited by its semantic field.  The semantic 
field  links  the  phenomena  normally  associated  together  in  a  particular 
context.  The  example  Jackson  uses  is  of boy  which  in  a  seme  could be 
associated with not man or not girl or both dependant on its semantic field or 
context.  Opposition is not the only relationship of association, Jackson also 
refers  to  hyponymy.  In  a  hyponymatic  seme  classes  are  structured  by 
subordinate relationships, man and boy would both belong to the seme - male 
- and would be related by age. 
The context tells us which relationship is being communicated. This context 
need not be  outside the langue.  Sentences  and larger textual  structure  can 
provide the context and this is what Saussure called the syntagmatic sphere or 
aXIS. 
Greimas wanted to see how these micro features combined to produce large-
scale effects and, from Saussure's theory, he generated a universal model. In 
this model, sense is constructed at three levels. The most foundational level is 
a universal level and is essential for sense making to exist at alL It  reflects the 
structure of  meaning at word level and has both syntagmatic and paradigmatic 
levels. 
At this  deep level the  syntagmatic axis - the  contextual  axis - consists of 
underlying  patterns  that  make  sense  of all  discourse.  Greimas  used  the 
analysis  of Russian  folk-tales  by  Vladimir  Propp  to  show  what  these 
underlying patterns would look like. Jackson summarises this: 
Every human action,  for  Greimas,  begins with the establishment of a 
goal, which thereby institutes a semiotic object as "subject". In realising 
the action, the subject will be helped or obstructed by other actions of 
other social  actors.  The desired action itself will be  achieved,  or not 
achieved.  But it is  a characteristic of human action that the sequence 
does not finish there. Man, as a thinking being, reflects on past actions. 
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As a consequence, the syntagmatic axis of Greimas concludes with the 
concept of recognition (or "sanction"). Human action (whether real or 
fictional)  thus  appears  meaningful  in  terms  of a  basic  ("narrative") 
sequence,  which  consists  in  the  setting  of  goals  ("contract"), 
"performance" (or non-performance) of those goals, and "recognition" 
of that performance (or non-performance). These goals may be of any 
kind. (1988,28) 
Although this  deep  level  is  essential  for  sense,  it  is  not enough and  only 
contains the broadest and most foundational aspects of  sense making. The top 
two  levels  provide  much of the  content  of sense  making.  The  second  or 
middle level is called the thematic level and deals with the social aspects of 
sense  making.  It  consists  of social  knowledge  organised  into  narrative 
structures. These socially generated narrative structures help us to make sense 
of  the environment, both "natural"  and "man made." They are also associated 
with social evaluation and arrange  stories  according to  type,  e.g.,  a funny 
story, a sad story. The first level is the level of  manifestation and, as the name 
would suggest, this is the level that covers language as it is used and brings us 
back to Saussure's description of  language use. 
These three levels; deep, thematic and manifestation combine and interact to 
generate sense. In an article published in 1996, Jackson suggests that only the 
top two levels of manifestation and thematics may be strictly necessary for 
sense making. (Jackson, 1996) Though he accepts that the universal level of 
narrative  structures  obviously  plays  an  important  structural  role  it  is  the 
interaction of  these two top levels of  meaning that generates sense making in 
everyday life. 
This process is not mechanical, a case of slotting one structure into another.  49 
Language  and  sense-making  structures  are  affected  by  the  way  they  are 
49  In Law,  Fact and Narrative  Coherence,  (Jackson  1988,  170) Jackson suggests that this 
comparison  would  be  based  on  a  loose  resemblance  and  would  have  similarities  to 
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presented and used and how this process is understood.  To get a full picture 
of sense  making  in  practice  rather than  at  an abstract level  this  semantic 
structure needs to be combined with an understanding of the pragmatics of 
discourse. As Jackson puts it, is it is not enough to understand the story in the 
trial, there is a need to understand the story ofthe trial. (Jackson 1988, 84-88) 
Pragmatics  mediates  the  narrative  structures  that  process  linguistic  sense. 
Jackson considers how people are persuaded to do something new, something 
that almost  seems  precluded by  the  structure of sense  making that he has 
related. He argues that individuals are only open to new ways of  acting if  they 
are  persuaded  to  do  so  in  a  way  that  they  recognise.  The  mode  of 
communication of this new knowledge must fit into a pragmatic pattern that 
they recognise as a way that new knowledge is communicated.  50 This suggests 
that there is  something similar to  second level narrative typifications in the 
pragmatics oflanguage. (Jackson 1996, 186) 
Jackson  does  not  deal  in  any  great  detail  with  the  relationship  between 
pragmatic  and  semantic  narrative  structures  but he  does  suggest  that  this 
relationship  will  not  be  a  purely  mechanical  one.  Instead  he  prefers  the 
"negotiated interactional model" presented by Sbisa and Fabri in an article in 
the Journal a/Pragmatics. (Jackson 1996, 186) 
If the  how  of presentation  is  important  then  so  is  the  who  and  another 
important part of sense  making covered by  pragmatics  is  the  existence of 
semiotic groups. A semiotic group will have its own discourse: 
networks  of people who  communicate messages to  each other,  using 
codes and other semiotic devices particular to those groups. (1988, 31) 
This  discourse  will  differ from  standard discourse  not only at the  level  of 
50  Jackson  does  not  deal  with pragmatics,  the  story of the trial,  in  the  same  detail  as  the 
narrative structures of semantics. He does use the phrase "narrativisation of pragmatics" 
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manifestation but the group will also have its own social typifications at the 
thematic level. This does not mean that each semiotic group is closed to all 
the  others - an individual may be part of several  groups  and there will be 
substantial overlap between these groups. A scientist will be part of a larger, 
culture-wide  semiotic  group  as  well  as  part  of a  more  specific  scientific 
semiotic group. 
Thus,  although  Jackson  rejects  the  positivist  stance  that  law  is  totally 
separate,  he  can  accept  that  there  could  be  a  distinctive  form  of legal 
discourse.  It is  not enough,  though,  that lawyers  say they  have  a  separate 
discourse.  Their  claims  need  to  be  empirically  investigated  and  he  does 
consider whether law contains one or more semiotic groups when he looks 
more closely at legal theory. (Jackson 1997,283-310) 
3. Legal discourse 
In discussing the possibilities of a separate legal discourse, which suggests 
specialisation  of  meaning  rather  than  separation  of  meaning.  Jackson 
considers two aspects of language use by lawyers that suggests that legal use 
of language may be sufficiently autonomous to justify the identification of a 
separate legal discourse; language used by lawyers and closure rules. 
Jackson uses socio-linguistic studies of legal language to show that lawyers, 
in legal settings, use a higher number of  multi-member semes and that there is 
a greater degree of mono  semi  city than would be seen in normal language. 
(Jackson 1997,39-46) 
Multi-member semes and monosemicity are aspects of the paradigmatic axis. 
They restrict what can be substitutable at points along the syntagmatic axis. 
They, therefore, deal with what vocabulary is understandable within different 
sentence structures. 
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vocabulary is understood in that context. The most common seme relationship 
is the binary or oppositional relationship. Take the sentence "It was dark." A 
semiotician could say that the seme dark/light is present. This simply means 
that we  understand dark by opposition to light. Multi-member semes do not 
use oppositional relationships but are structured by "hyponymy." Hyponymy 
puts  the  components  of the  seme  into  a hierarchy.  These  components  are 
understood  according  to  where  they  fit  in  that  hierarchy.  To  use  a  legal 
example, rules created by delegated legislation will be understood according 
to the legislation which creates the power to make those rules. 
Monosemicity simply means words that have only one meaning. Most words 
have  polysemicity  and  will  mean  different  things  in different contexts.  In 
legal  language,  though, words are often given a very definite meaning that 
applies no matter what the context. For example, the word "partner" can have 
a number of different meanings but in a legal context it always refers to a 
particular business relationship that is governed by specific rules. 
In using more of these law does differ from the every day use of language, 
and this use of specialised vocabulary almost suggests a code.  This is  even 
more so in the case of  closure rules. 
The closure rules which constrain the construction of  sense in particular 
forms  of legal discourse may be regarded as part of the "code" which 
defines the identity of  particular communicational systems. (1988, 135) 
Closure rules limit what meaning is possible. Jackson shows the importance 
of these  rules  by  using  them  to  illuminate  the  debate  between Hart  and 
Dworkin. Not only are they part of  legal discourse but even more they are part 
of  subdiscourses: 
The  Hartian  model  fitted  legislative  discourse  in  the  sense  that  it 
reflected  the  intentions  of the  draftsmen  of  legislation,  and  the 
determinacy and finitude  of their intentions.  The Dworkinian account 
fitted  doctrinal  as  opposed to  judicial  discourse,  in the  sense  that it 
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(despite  considerable  evidence that the judges do  indulge  also  in the 
latter), and utterly neglected to take account of  the strictly adjudicatory 
aspects of judicial discourse, namely its  necessary inclusion (whether 
explicit  or  implicit)  of consideration  of the  possible  impact  of any 
decision in the particular circumstances of that case, for the particular 
parties before the court. (1988, 139) 
Legal  discourse  can  first  be  identified  by  legal  language  but within  this 
closure rules allow us to restrict this even more. These semiotic groups do not 
work in splendid isolation. The same legal texts and the same communication 
may  be  received  by  different  groups  simultaneously.  Jackson  identifies 
judicial discourse as the most complex discourse within law as it addresses at 
least three  different audiences  - litigants,  other judges and  the wider legal 
audience.  Each of these can be seen as  comprising a separate discourse or 
semiotic group but this is recognised: 
We  may  therefore  expect the  discourse  of the judgement to  mediate 
between (set  constraints to,  impose  closure  rules  upon)  the  relations 
between the different discourses which it contains.  The judgement is 
thus both a discourse and a meta-discourse, and to understand the latter 
we need a theory of  meta-discourse. (1988,96) 
This theory of  meta-discourse is likely to resemble much of  Jackson's general 
semiotic theory. 
Despite the  specialised vocabulary and closure rules,  it is  the place of the 
unconscious  in  rationality  that  further  undermines  the  argument  that  law 
could be autonomous. Jackson argues that it shows that law can never isolate 
itself from other forms of  reasoning: 
Legal  rules  are  linguistic  expressions  of narrative  models,  the  latter 
loaded with tacit social evaluations.  The translation of these narrative 
models  into  conceptual  language  may  conceal  their  origins,  but 
interpretation based upon the language of the propositions is  likely to 
prove unstable to the extent that it runs counter to the social evaluations 
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rationality,  reflecting  social  knowledge  and  values,  may  actually 
threaten to subvert legal doctrine. (1988, 103) 
In place of a unified legal system,  Jackson presents a model of interacting 
semiotic groups and instead of an autonomous system of legal reasoning, he 
presents a form of reasoning that is general and will apply whenever people 
reason. 
The question for Jackson's theory is whether he has himself been persuasive 
in  the  discourse  of legal  theory.  Jackson  has  criticised  positivism  for 
confusing the strategies of  persuasion with structure of meaning but could be 
argued much of what he describes as meaningful could also be described as 
persuasion,  not  in  what  stories  are  told  but  in  the  way  that the  narrative 
pattern is  used to  make  arguments  inevitable.  Jackson would probably not 
dispute  this  but would  argue  that  he  understands  why these  strategies  are 
used, how they relate to the structure of language and meaning itself and that 
he is not falling in to the mistake that positivists make by regarding them as 
telling the truth about law.  It seems from  his work that the standards he  is 
trying to achieve is that of increased clarity. This then for Jackson is the goal 
of legal theory, to clarify the legal process and this is not a purely scientific 
goal,  returning  to  the  concept  of integrity,  the  academic  virtue,  the  legal 
theorist would be expected to be aware of the impact of prejudices and of 
perspectives  on his/her  study  and this  could be  seen as  an  ethical  goal.  It 
would also  mean that  slhe  would have  to  have some  understanding of the 
social  typifications  that  had  been  internalised  and  how  they  operated  on 
hislher thinking. 
This  could lead to  the  problem of infinite  regress  but it  is  likely that the 
ultimate discourse would be semiotics and that these assumptions would be 
the  ones  that  could  not  be  questioned  if a  theorist  wanted  to  play  this 
particular game. 51 
51  Thus although it is possible to translate almost any structure into Jackson's terminology this 
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4. Conclusion 
Jackson turns to semiotics because of its descriptive value. He is arguing that 
it  explains  the  process  and  experience  of legal  reasoning  better  than 
traditional  positivism.  His  theory  is  certainly  all-encompassing  and  can 
contain much not only of legal practice but legal theory. It thus fulfils one of 
the core aims of any philosophical theory - the ability to describe everything. 
The disadvantage of such attempts are though clear. All a critic has to do to 
reject this as  compelling is  to  deny the validity of the basic assumptions.  52 
Jackson's theory also contains a dichotomy at its core it is dependant on his 
own integrity and yet this appears to be created by the structures he describes. 
The individual is  both made responsible for being aware of his/her part in 
discourse and is controlled and limited by it. There are clearly ways in which 
this  could  be  understood  in a  complex manner but Jackson  is  seeking to 
clarify and the  result is  that real  individuals disappear and become simply 
carriers  of discourse.  His  view of legal  discourse  portrays  it  as  almost as 
autonomous and unified as the positivist view that he criticises and it is not 
clear how it can deal with time. He seems to be taking a snapshot of  discourse 
but cannot explain how it evolved or how it could develop. It makes law and 
discourse philosophically acceptable but at the cost of  making it seem unreal. 
Like Perelman he  seems to be happier when seeing it as  almost scientific, 
structural and unemotional. 
52  The implications of this for philosophy and theory in general are considered in chapter 5 
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Neil MacConnick 
Neil MacConnick is also playing the legal theory game and like Jackson and 
Perelman is  responding to  the concerns of contemporary philosophy but he 
seeks  to  improve  the  work  of legal  positivism  not  bypass  it.  This  section 
follows the structures of the last two and primarily considers two aspects of 
Neil MacConnick's theory, his institutional theory of law and his defence of 
the nonnative syllogism. 53 
These  two  aspects  of his  theory  reveal  MacConnick's  central  goals.  His 
defence of  the nonnative syllogism is based on his belief in the ethics of the 
rule of law and the need for government to be subordinated to rules while his 
institutional theory seeks both to establish a "respectable" theory of law and 
to fulfil the ethical goal of providing a reconstruction of law to  which it is 
possible to be committed. 
1. The problem with legal theory 
Unlike Jackson and Perelman, MacConnick's work is not founded on a strong 
sense  of the problems of legal theory.  His  work is  a continuation of legal 
theory and seeks in his defence of the nonnative syllogism to defend aspects 
of positivism. He does though see his work as a development of theory and 
his nonnative theory of law is based on a sense that theorists have tended to 
extremes.  Idealists have seen nonns as non-factual, as entities separate from 
the natural world and purely human constructs. Reductivists have taken the 
opposite  approach.  They  have  seen  nonns  as  purely  factual  - a  way  of 
describing human behaviour and views.  What is  more,  reductivists tend to 
argue that nonns get in the way of understanding the human behaviour that 
they describe and should be replaced with a sociological analysis. This split is 
reminiscent  of both  Perelman's  earlier  work  and  Jackson's  adoption  of 
53  These are the aspects that are most relevant to this theory.  They  do  also  provide a good 
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semiotics  and  has  been  a  response  to  the  problems  with  discussing  the 
reasonable  that  Perelman  discusses.  MacCormick,  writing  with  Ota 
Weinburger,54  criticise  both  of these  views  for  failing  to  appreciate  the 
complexity of  social life. 
Idealists, they maintain, fail to fully appreciate the importance of the social 
setting  in  which  norms  operate  whilst  reductivists  fail  to  appreciate  the 
importance of  norms to the social setting. In trying to put forward a '"socially 
realistic  development  of normativism,"  MacCormick  and  Weinburger  are 
explicitly  seeking  a  middle  route  between these  two  theories  in  order to 
consider both together.  This,  therefore,  accepts,  that to  an  extent previous 
theorists were right in identifying important aspects of law but were simply 
too exclusive.  They also argue that seeing law in this way invests sociology 
with  meaning  and  rehabilitates  the  view  of law  put  forward  by  legal 
academics: 
Thus  we  can  claim  that  our  aim  is,  precisely,  to  present  a  socially 
realistic  development  of normativism;  ...  As  a  development  of a 
nonnativism theory,  then,  ITL  offers  to  the  sociology of law (and to 
sociology more generally) an ontology which we claim to be essential 
for any realistic analysis, explanation or description of  the legal sphere 
and  indeed  all  of those  distinctly  human  and  social  institutions  and 
phenomena which correlate with, depend upon, or presuppose legal or 
other rules or norms. At the same time, however, our ontological theses 
also  lead  on to  a  suitable  theory  of knowledge  for  legal  dogmatics 
('black letter law') as a wholly respectable and indeed valuable domain 
of  human knowledge. (MacCormick and Weinburger 1986, 7) 
This institutional theory of law then claims not just to provide a legal theory 
but  a  general  theory  of normativity  and,  specifically,  a  theory  that  sees 
54 In 1986 MacCormick and Weinburger published a series of articles which they had written 
separately in the decade before but which they felt showed a similar understanding of  law. 
They  also  wrote  a  joint  introduction  and  that  is  cited  here  as  MacCormick  and 
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normativity as an important aspect of  social life. 
2. General theory of  reasoning 
MacCormick's institutional theory has evolved through a series of  essays that 
were written over a number of years. 55  In them MacCormick is guided in his 
central belief: 
All  human  life  is  implicitly normative,  in the  sense  that whatever  a 
person is doing at any time, either as an individual or in common with 
others, it is an open question whether she or he is doing the right thing, 
or doing it the wrong way. (2000, 39) 
This suggests that at the core of human nature is the tendency to judge and 
this requires "grounds of  judgment" - norms. Further MacCormick's desire to 
understand normativity beyond the narrow confines beyond law comes from 
his belief that positivists have been too statist, too focused on only on state 
law and instead "once we  clarify the concept of the  institutional normative 
order, we are able to see that state law is simply one species of this genus". 
(2000, 43) This allows him to reject the views of those such as Derrida who 
see violence as implicit in the very structure oflaw. (2000, 45-46) 
MacCormick's  understanding  of normativity  appears  in two  forms.  In his 
earlier  work  including  that  published  with  Weinburger  his  approach  is 
strongly  analytical  whereas  in  more  recent  institutional  theory  it  is  more 
practical and ethical. These are not necessarily incompatible as will be seen in 
the consideration of his ethical upholding of the rule of law. First though to 
his early exposition. 
2.1 Normativity 
In seeking to  avoid the  dangers  of reductivism and idealism, MacCormick 
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adopts  what  he  describes  as  a  hermeneutic  approach.  (MacCormick  and 
Weinburger 1986, 15) 
Hermeneutics  evolved  out  of biblical  interpretation.  The  reformation  had 
challenged traditional interpretations of the Bible and encouraged a focus on 
the  text  and  how  it  should  be  understood. 56  Schleiermacher  and  Dilthey, 
reflecting the concerns of  nineteenth century philosophy, extended the sphere 
of hermeneutics  by  concentrating  on  meaning  itself  (Warnke  1987,  5-6; 
Bleicher 1980, 12-26) The goal of  these early explorations of  meaning was to 
generate  objective  interpretations,  to  make  the  process  more  rigorous. 
Gadamer's  Truth  and Method (1994),  reflecting the  concerns  of twentieth 
century  philosophy,  reinterpreted  hermeneutics  by  making  clear  the 
impossibility  of  objective  interpretation.  This  view  has  since  become 
dominant and contemporary hermeneutics no  longer seeks to find  a way to 
produce objective interpretations but to achieve a clearer understanding of  the 
process of  interpretation itself  57 
Contemporary  hermeneutics  seeks  to  understand  the  world  in  an 
intersubjective manner. It seeks to find a middle ground between subjective 
and objective  approaches  and to  formulate  a method of understanding that 
recognises that knowledge  can never truly be one or the other.  As  such,  it 
concentrates on the boundaries at which individuals interact with the outside 
world and places interpretation; the way individuals structure and understand 
their experiences, at the heart of  knowledge. 
What this means for a legal theorist is that when attempting to understand law 
s/he needs to look at how the legal process is understood by the people who 
56  This is  a  complex process because the Bible is  authoritative but needs to be applied to 
everyday life.  A similar, though less philosophical, exploration of meaning occurs in the 
Talmud's interpretation of the Bible and of the Mishnah another authoritative text that 
needed to be applied. 
57  See Warnke (1987) for a brief history of hermeneutics and a consideration of Gadamer's 
role in this process. Bleicher (1980) considers the history in  more detail. Both consider 
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apply, interpret and follow the rules and not simply to consider the texts. This 
should avoid the two extremes because in relating to the everyday use of  rules 
it avoids  abstraction  and the  rules  are  not  simply  a  code  for  behavioural 
patterns. 
The most fundamental requirement of rationality in action is this: that 
every act or forbearance to act ought to be justifiable by reference to 
some reason for action. (1986c, 190) 
The most basic form of reason is desire.  These reasons are so primitive that 
MacCormick describes them as non-rational. To simply follow these with no 
further reasoning would lead to chaos. This is why reasoning is needed: 
Such  purposes  have,  therefore,  to  be  subjected  to  the  discipline  of 
higher orders of rationality, that is,  to  the business of setting them in 
order  through  higher-order  principles  of  preference  sustained 
consistently  over time  and  universalisability  over  persons  and  cases. 
(1986c, 195) 
Reasoning, then, is based on an innate aspect of human nature. This does not 
mean that it is  simple,  there  is  a hierarchy  and this  structure needs to  be 
consistent and applied universally.  This  can seem like rather a large jump 
from simple desire. MacCormick builds the structure by first identifying two 
basic  forms  of reason,  reasons  which  are  good  in  themselves  or  'value-
rational',  and  reasons  which  tend  to  bring  about  a  desired  goal  or  are 
'purpose-rational' .  These  two  forms  of reasons  can  be  used  to  help  us 
organise  our  desires.  Clearly these reasons  may  collide and thus,  a higher 
level is needed and soon a system is formed with higher reasons providing a 
rational  way  of  choosing  between  conflicting  lower-order  reasons. 
Underpinning all this is the simple fact that this order is better than chaos. 
Reasons are used in everyday life.  They have a temporal aspect and need to 
adapt over time. Rationality requires that the long-term pattern of reasons is 
also rational. So, from a simple structure which just requires reasons for every 
action, MacCormick generates a structure of rational action which requires a 
hierarchy of  reasoning that is applied consistently in the long-term: 
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case,  must  exhibit  the  qualities  of consistency  over  time  and  of 
universalisability over cases, and must accordingly be systematic. In my 
opinion the province of formal logic is none other than the elaboration 
of the  detailed  implications  of these  requirements  of consistency,  of 
universalisability and of systematic quality in discourse. It accordingly 
follows that formal logic is no less applicable to the topics of practical 
reasoning  than  to  those  of theoretical  or  speculative  reasoning.  In 
neither case however does consistency mean or imply non-revisability; 
... (1986c, 193) 
This again echoes Perelman's early work, to apply one system of rationality 
throughout the field of human knowledge.  The system of rationality has its 
own structure and system goals. These system goals relate to different parts of 
the system.  Consistency is a logical system value whilst coherence relates to 
the «standing ends" of  the system and allows them to be evaluated: 
This depends on treating the standing aims or ends legitimated within 
the system as constituting general justifying aims of the system; that is, 
as values or goods which its observation in practice tends to realise. In 
cases  of  difficulty,  adjustments  to  or  corrections  in  lower  order 
principles or rules may be justified in view of  the desirability of  further 
or more firmly upholding such values. (1986c, 196) 
If these  standing  aims  are  treated as  values,  it appears  that value-rational 
reasons form the highest point of the hierarchy, the highest purposes being 
transformed into the highest values: 
Hence our principles cannot be deemed merely instrumental to realising 
some extraneous or ulterior end; rather, they are means only in the sense 
of that whose realisation is  an intrinsic part of the overall good to be 
realised.  At this level, the initial analysis of two distinct categories of 
rational  grounds  for  action is  better seen as  revealing two  aspects  of 
what  is  in  reality  a  complex  unity.  For  a  fully  rational  being,  the 
capacity to adopt means which are well adjusted either instrumentally 
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reflection  upon  the  value  of  ends,  and  of  taking  a  coherently 
systematised view of a variety of ends valuable in themselves within a 
system of  practical reason. (19 86c, 197) 
The hierarchy of  reasoning is generated by society and culture. The individual 
reasons  within  this  system  and,  the  individual  desires  must  clearly  be 
constrained by the system,58 is  still capable of criticising the system.  This is 
because the  system  itself creates room for  critique.  It does  so  through the 
system goals of  consistency and coherence. Such a system, however complex, 
can not have all the answers to every question: 
So  far as  one  can judge at present, from the best and most thorough 
accounts  of practical  discourse  or  practical  reasonableness  hitherto 
achieved,  it  is  not  in  fact  the  case that the  requirements  that we  be 
rational  generates  for  any  given  individual  or  group  but  one  single 
system  of practical  principles.  Thus  the  most  significant  limit  of 
rationality is that, although it may exclude many putative principles of 
action as 'discursively impossible', it yet leaves open the possibility that 
there  may  be  a  plurality  of equally  rational  schemes  of practical 
reasoning,  different  in  their  practical  substance  though  not  in  their 
rational form.  Rationality is then a common element in all acceptable 
systems of  practical reason, but not one which can determine the choice 
among equally rational possibilities. (1986c, 199) 
This is where MacCormick ceases to be a traditional philosopher and echoes 
the  problems  that  Perelman  identifies  as  part  of  all  post-descartesian 
philosophy. Unlike Perleman, though, MacCormick does not see this problem 
as  so  unsurmountable that there is  a need to  reconsider the entire project. 
Instead  MacCormick  argues  that  there  may  be  virtues  beyond  rationality 
which help to choose between rational choices. 
58 It should be noted that MacCorrruck simply sets out the start and then goes on without too 
much more explanation, having established a basic context he becomes more interested in 
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There are four virtues which MacCormick feels would be valued within any 
rational  system  and that could go  beyond that  system  to  fill  the  gap  that 
rationality alone cannot fill.  These virtues are wisdom, farsightedness, justice 
and humanity: wisdom is the ability to learn from experience; farsightedness 
is the ability to see consequences; justice is the ability to balance values; and 
humanity allows us to see things from the point of  views of  others: 
That it is rational to cultivate such virtues, that they themselves generate 
rational grounds of choice, and that their value can be expressed only 
within rational systems of practical reason,  does  not imply at all that 
these  virtues  are  in some  deep  sense  either identical with,  or simply 
aspects of, rationality. (1986c, 200) 
MacCormick makes it clear in his own work that law should be understand 
from  one point of view that of the committed participant.  This is  a person 
who  regards  the  law as  real and valid and slhe  is  central because it is  the 
committed participant who provides structure to law, legal knowledge resides 
in them.59 
Legal knowledge is knowledge of what for the committed participants 
are the norms of the order, and of the institutional facts constituted by 
the  interpretation  of natural  events  within  the  schemata  which  the 
norms provide. (1986a, 105) 
This privileging means that the views of these "committed participants" are 
central to  legal  knowledge but this  does  not mean that the person seeking 
legal  knowledge  needs  to  share  that  view.  As  MacCormick  puts  it,  the 
59 MacCormick's acceptance of hermeneutics may suggest that there is more than one form of 
legal knowledge,  which may vary from society to society.  Yet he is trying to create an 
ontology of normativity.  This suggests that norms fulfil  similar roles wherever they are 
found  and that there is  a form of understanding that is  peculiar to norms.  These two 
positions  are  not  necessarily  incompatible.  It could be argued that  a large  degree of 
variety of  legal knowledge could occur within a structure that recognises only one way of 
understanding norms.  Law is  after all  about the interaction between norms and society. 
There is  nothing about the goal of institutional theory that implies that this interaction 
could not be complex enough to generate many forms of  legal knowledge. MacCormick 
does not follow this line and it should be noted that he seems to assume the existence of  a 
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observer who seeks to understand law can remain "volitionally external" but 
not  cognitively  externaL  What  this  means  is  that  the  observer  needs  to 
understand what the committed participant understands but need not choose 
to accept the value structure that that knowledge may contain. For example, 
the  observer may  accept that the  committed participant is  committed to  a 
certain definition of  justice that affects the way slhe applies norms. In doing 
so s/he cognitively enters the reasoning of  the participant. However, slhe need 
not agree that this is a valid definition ofjustice.
60 (MacCormick 1986a) 
MacCormick uses the "committed" participant to link together the normative 
reasomng  and  institutional  facts  in  creating  the  legal  system,  normative 
reasomng  comes  from  hislher  own  nature  (see  next  section)  while 
institutional facts come from hislher interpretation of  the real world. 
3. Legal reasoning 
For MacCormick the reason legal reasoning exists is because of the problems 
with  normativity.  Law  exists  to  deal  with  the  point  at  which  reasoning 
becomes problematic: 
Alexy's  theory  of  rational  practical  discourse  is  a  refutation  of 
scepticism which shows that we have discursive procedures and criteria 
for discriminating between sound and unsound practical arguments.  . .. 
The  trouble,  however,  is  that too  much remains  possible.  For  many 
courses of action,  more than one outcome is justifiable. In a political 
setting this can mean that two or more conflicting courses of action are 
equally reasonable - but then the conflict will have to be resolved.  .  .. 
The  upshot is  that one  discovers from  general practical discourse the 
incompleteness of general practical discourse and the necessity of  some 
institutionalised  forms  of  practical  discourse,  most  notably  legal 
discourse.  The  relative  indeterminacy  of  general  practical  reason 
60  This is not MacCormick's only view oflaw as shall be seen later when he roots his theories 
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determines  a need for  law,  constitution and constitutionalist politics. 
(1989, 187) 
As  an institutional order law reflects the basic normative structure but goes 
further,  MacCormick  describes  the  difference  between  informal  an 
institutionalised orders  as  the  institutional  order is  authority  the  ability to 
make  authorised  interpretations  and  at the  base  of this  is  not simply  raw 
power but an acceptance of  that authority: 
All institutional order has in fact a customary foundation, in the sense 
that  the  ultimate  reason  for  accepting  some  ultimate  source  as 
authoritative must be a shared sense of  the nonnative among those who 
acknowledge the ultimate authority. (2000, 41 )61 
What this means is that the committed participant must regard legal norms in 
a certain way: 
They provide  a standing set of exclusionary reasons  excluding acting 
even upon purposes which at the first  level it would or might appear 
rational to act. (1986c, 202) 
The impact this has on the system is that as well as  applying the basic rules 
that apply to all rational systems, the rules and structures of legal reasoning 
need to fulfil the requirements of  rationality. Norms need to be consistent and 
coherent.  Like  other forms  of reasoning,  though,  legal  reasoning  is  rarely 
simple. Norms can conflict and where this happens there is a need for second-
order justification. The reasons that are acceptable will come from within the 
legal  system and its principles.  When there is a conflict between low-level 
legal  norms,  the  participant  looks  to  a  higher  level  where  norms  are 
generalised: 
What has to be done is to evaluate the merits and demerits of the types 
of decision in other similar cases to which the court will be committed 
by its ruling in law upon the disputed point in this case. Weare thus out 
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of the  realm  of the  particular  purposes  and  into  the  realm  of those 
generalised  values  which  are  supposed  to  be upheld  by  the  general 
observance of legal rules and principles. Nevertheless, as  legal values 
they are  in effect generalised statements of the purposes which under 
law it is  legitimate  to  pursue,  as  moral  values,  they  are  generalised 
statements of the purposes which the norms of our general system of 
practical reasons authorise us to pursue.  Their appeal to us,  as distinct 
from  their  legitimacy  within  a  scheme  of practical  rationality,  is  a 
matter of  the strength of our emotional or affective commitment to this 
within  the  constraint  of our  presupposed  commitment  to  rationality. 
(1986c, 204) 
Like  all  systems  of rationality,  law will  eventually come to  a point where 
rationality is not enough to solve certain problems and in law this occurs at 
the point of  the judicial decision.  This is not surprising, it is the judge, after 
all  who  has  to  apply  the  law to  daily life.  Following Alexy,  MacCormick 
considers that legal reasoning is primarily concerned with the justification of 
decisions but legal decisions can rely on the authority of the judge. This puts 
specific pressure on legal reasoning and limits the place of  rationality: 
As with general practical rationality, we come to that point at which it is 
values  or  virtues  other  than  rationality  itself which  furnish  us  with 
rational but not conclusive grounds of choice.  The virtues we  seek in 
those who make such choices include of  course practical rationality and 
high intelligence in appreciating complex arguments (and disentangling 
their  strength  from  their  rhetorical  trappings).  But to  those  must  be 
added also wisdom and far-sightedness, together with a sense of  justice, 
humanity,  and  the  courage  of  one's  convictions  (or  considered 
preferences). (1986c, 205) 
In applying law, the judge needs to possess these virtues so that they can be 
used when s/he is deciding between interpretations of  norms. This brings us to 
an aspect of  legal normative structures that differentiate them from other such 
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authoritative way to fill the gap. 62 
Although the place of authority will limit the need to reason, judges have only 
circumscribed  authority.  (MacCormick  1982)  They  are  required  to justify 
their decisions  and the scrutiny that those  decisions  are  given means that, 
although outcomes can be determined conclusively by an individual judge, 
the judge cannot decide what is or is not a good reason for justifying that 
decision.  This  is  why  their  pronouncements  are  'discursive'  as  well  as 
authoritative.  (1982,  277) MacCormick argues  that in discursive  dialogues 
arguments are accepted by the authority of speaker's reason not by reason of 
speaker's authority.63 
What then are good reasons for justifying such a decision? Clearly, judges 
will work within the general system of reasoning described above. They also 
need to work with the core value of  any legal system -justice.  64 
Justice  leads judges to  treat like  cases  alike.  This fulfils  one of the basic 
requirements of rationality by ensuring consistency.  It also  means that the 
judges tend to universalise their decisions.65  This occurs because judges have 
to determine what similarities between cases are to be regarded as important 
not just for  the  case  before them but for  future  decisions  as  well.  In the 
simplest cases, though: 
The norms of the legal system supply a concrete conception of  justice 
which is  in ordinary circumstances - where  deductive justification is 
sufficient in itself - sufficiently fulfilled by the application of relevant 
62  Although he  accepts that the context does  affect  legal reasoning,  MacCormick does not 
believe that there is a separate and autonomous form of legal reasoning.  (MacCormick 
1993) 
63  The role  of authority in law will be explored more fully  in  chapter 3 when systems with 
different forms of authority are considered. MacCormick borrows this terminology from 
Habermas and Alexy. (MacCormick 1982) 
64 Justice is used in two ways in this section. There is the general, formal value which requires 
that all  normative systems be coherent and consistent and the more specific legal value 
which relates to a specific conception of  the rule oflaw. 
65  In the new edition of Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory,  MacCormick states that he has 
moved away from his early views on the centrality of universalisability of  law and needs 
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and applicable rules according to their tenns. (1986b, 73) 
This  view  of justice  is  closely  linked  to  the  rule  of law which  requires 
impartial  application  of  the  rules.  MacConnick  maintains  that  in 
straightforward  cases  this  occurs  through  deductive  reasoning  or  the 
nonnative  syllogism.  This  point  will  be  considered  in  detail  in  the  next 
section, but what should be noted here, is that MacConnick feels that, where 
the  case  is  straightforward,  the  judge  simply  needs  to  apply  deductive 
reasomng. 
The legal system works within a generalised theory of  nonns but also within a 
generalised  sense  of social  morality  that  links  it to  the  wider  society and 
which  will  help  the  committed  participants  to  be  committed to  the  legal 
structures and institutions. By making the focus, a person, in whom can reside 
a  number of systems  and  non-rational  elements,  MacConnick absorbs  the 
non-rational into his theory, explaining the emotional element, after all at root 
of all reason is desire. Thus, although MacConnick refers to a legal system, it 
should not be argued that he means a closed system. 
Law,  for  example,  has  a very  close relationship with the  non-legal  world. 
Judges, to justify their decisions fully,  need to show that they are consistent 
with the non-legal world as well as with the legal system. MacCormick calls 
such  arguments  consequentialist.  66  These  ensure  that  law  is  coherent  and 
consistent with the judicial experience of the  world as  well  as  the judicial 
experience of  law. 67 
Although MacConnick has grounded his theory in the nature of an individual 
it could still be argued that it remains in the field of ought, that it remains an 
66 Bernard Rudden (1979) has argued that MacCormick seems to limit such arguments to their 
normative effect. He maintains that such arguments are used in a much wider way by the 
judiciary. 
67  More  recently,  (2000,  52)  MacCormick  argues  that  following  comparative  studies  in 
contemporary legal systems three sorts of  arguments are used in interpreting statutes and 
precedents,  (1)  arguments  that  deal  with  the  meaning  of the words,  (2)  arguments 
focusing on the legal context (coherence), and (3) arguments concerning justice or utility 
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idealistic system.  MacCormick himself accepts this and further that more is 
needed than reasoning, to avoid idealism he needs facts. 
MacCormick argues that if it is not possible to show that such facts exist legal 
knowledge itself is not possible: 
If there are no legal facts it is our duty to admit candidly that there are 
none,  resign  our  posts  and  deliver  ourselves  to  the  mercy  of public 
prosecutors,  confessing freely  and openly the  imposture in which we 
have hitherto been engaged. (1986a, 96)68 
Bringing facts into law creates another problem. 
The  embarrassment of accepting the  other conclusion,  that there  are 
legal facts is of a different sort.  It does not expose us to the charge of 
fraud, but to the charge of intellectual confusion. For it is an accepted 
truism that laws  are normative,  indeed that laws  are  norms.  Yet it is 
equally a profound article of analytical faith that norms are not facts; 
that norms  express the sollen, the devoir etre, the ought to be, which 
must be rigorously distinguished from the sein, the etre, the is.  (1986a, 
96) 
He  argues  for  a  different  sort  of fact,  institutional  facts.69  According  to 
MacCormick facts are simply things that have an existence and about which 
statements can be made which can be described as true or false.  Using this 
definition of  facts, MacCormick argues that this can include the non-material: 
They are facts in virtue of  being statable as true statements. But what is 
stated is not true simply because of the condition of  the material world 
and the causal relationships obtaining among its parts. On the contrary, 
it is true in virtue of an interpretation of what happens in the world, an 
interpretation of events in the light of human practices and normative 
68  See chapter 4 for a consideration of the way in which the judiciary seek to use facts  to 
ground their decisions in the "real" world. 
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rules. (MacCormick and Weinburger 1986, 10) 
Institutional  facts  form  the  foundation  of legal  knowledge.  Such facts  are 
identified by an act of interpretation.
70 This is an act that links natural events, 
which  clearly  would  include  social  behaviour,  with  the  norms  already 
recognised.  This  means  that institutional  facts  straddle the  divide  between 
norms and social behaviour and this places them at the core of  Mac  Cormick's 
normative ontology. 
These facts are true or false according to a complex process that involves not 
simply observation but interpretation. Norms are used to interpret facts  and 
this  allows  them to  become  institutional but, though  dependent  on  norms, 
institutional facts are distinct from them. 
In contemporary legal terminology, what MacCormick would identify as legal 
institutions  are  often  described  as  legal  concepts.  He  cites  contract, 
ownership,  trust,  marriage  and others  as  concepts  which,  under his theory, 
would be termed institutions: 
Let  me  try  to  say  what  those  concepts  have  III  common.  Most 
importantly,  they  all  denote  things  which  for  legal  purposes  we 
conceive of  as existing through time. (1986b, 52) 
Institutions are not ideal but factual. Institutions have a starting point, an end 
point  and consequences,  all  of which are  regulated by rules.  MacCormick 
calls  these  institutive,  consequentialist  and  terminative  rules.  These  rules 
create  and  regulate  the  institution  but  do  not  exhaust  the  limits  of the 
institution. 
A general  institution can be created simply by legislation and law-creating 
rules but a particular institution is  created by acts in the world that activate 
70  Committed participants do  not recognise  all  social norms as  legal  norms.  There must be 
something that distinguishes legal norms from other norms.  MacCormick does not deal 
with  this  point  in  depth,  but  it  is  likely  that  there  is  some  kind  of Hartian  rule  of 
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the law-creating rules in specific circumstances. These particular institutions 
will not be exact copies of  the institution created by legislation. 
This flexibility is  not unique to creative rules and both helps the system to 
achieve the goals of  constancy and coherence and to regulate the nature of  the 
relationship  between  people  and  norms.  Legal  norms  provide  reasons  for 
action and if  too precise will fail to foresee all circumstances. Norms, though, 
can  be  too  flexible  for  if they  are  too  imprecise  they  will  fail  to  direct 
behaviour. 
This is  not left to chance instead there are recognisable limits to flexibility 
which  MacCormick  argues  are  ordinarily  necessary  and  presumptively 
sufficient conditions. 
Ordinarily  necessary  conditions  are  the  conditions  that,  in  ordinary 
circumstances, will ensure that rules apply.  For a creative rule, they will lay 
down  conditions  in  which  an  instance  of the  general  institution  will  be 
created.  There  are,  though,  circumstances  that  legislation  will  not  have 
foreseen and in some cases, even though the ordinarily necessary conditions 
are  present,  these  conditions  will  not generate  an institution.  This  usually 
occurs when a legal principle conflicts with the rules. The principle, higher in 
the legal structure, will then apply.  MacCormick uses administrative law to 
show how this works in practice: 
It would scarcely be an exaggeration to say that the whole of the law of 
judicial  review  of  administrative  action  consists  in  the  judicial 
elaboration and use  of wide principles of law which are presented as 
justifying an open-ended range of implied exceptions to the expressed 
statutory  institutive  rules  of  administrative  adjudication,  decision-
making and legislation. (1986b, 70) 
As  well  as  ordinarily  necessary  conditions,  rules  lay  down  presumptively 
sufficient ones: 
Presumptively  sufficient  conditions  are  sufficient  unless  and  until 
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recognition  of  some  new  vitiating  circumstances  on  grounds  of 
principle. (1986b, 72) 
This brings facts into line with values and MacCormick's structure of norms 
can thus be created as dependant not only on the nature of  the individual but 
also from the nature of  institutional facts and the rules that apply to them  . 
.... the necessary flexibility of  the law depends upon the elaboration and 
acceptance of arguments from policy and from principle, we see at the 
same time why the concept of law cannot be tied down to being simply 
an institutional concept in the philosophical sense, covering simply the 
criteria of validity and the rules valid in terms of them.  .  ...  The legal 
principles are the meeting point of  rules and values. (1986b, 73) 
MacCormick's  theory  keeps  returning  to  boundary  points,  this  is  perhaps 
inevitable with his concern to avoid extremes and his interest in hermeneutics 
which in itself deals with boundary points. This concentration continues with 
his  defence of the deductive syllogism which is the boundary between facts 
and law which for MacCormick is at the core of  legal reasoning. It deals with 
the moment when the judge has to make and justify hislher decision. 
3.1 The deductive syllogism 
The deductive syllogism is  only one part of MacCormick's theory of legal 
reasoning  but  it is  for  his  defence  of the  normative  syllogism  that he  is 
perhaps best known. In Legal Reasoning and  Legal Theory (1994) he places it 
at the centre of  legal theory which he describes thus: 
It accounts  for  legal  reasoning as  one  branch of practical reasoning, 
which is the application by humans of their reason to decide how it is 
right  to  conduct  themselves  in  situations  of choice.  It expresses  a 
simple, widely denied, but essentially sound idea.  The idea is that the 
process of  applying rules is central to legal activity and that studying the 
rational structure of this process is central for explaining the character 
of legal reasoning as a branch of practical reasoning. Despite recurrent 
denials  by  learned  persons  that  law  allows  scope  for  deductive 
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idea that a form of deductive reasoning is central to reasoning.  (1994, 
ix). 
The deductive syllogism is, therefore, central to all normative reasoning and 
not just legal reasoning. It sits at the point of contact between the norm and 
the world outside the norm. It has particular significance in the legal context 
because it is linked to the process of  justification: 
...  logic does not determine what we decide to do or say; it determines 
only  the  relation between the  content of our  sayings  - what do  they 
entail,  are they self-contradictory,  or tautological  or whatever?  Logic 
concerns not what we  can say,  but what we  can justifiably say,  given 
respect for a certain very basic form of  rationality in discourse. (1992a, 
218) 
MacCormick is  suggesting that if our reasoning is  to be rational it must be 
justified according to a form of logic.  Many aspects of this logic have been 
seen  in  the  discussion  of his  view  of legal  reasoning  above  and  include 
consistency and coherence. At its core, though, reasoning that uses norms will 
apply the deductive syllogism. It is the simplest way of applying rules and is, 
logically, the most convincing form.  Even in cases of legal reasoning where 
the structure is not immediately present it can still be found: 
Thus a rational reconstruction of the reasoning in a strictly deductive 
form is well adapted to showing why it is compelling, even though the 
informal  presentation  is  more  elegant  and  persuasive  rhetorically. 
(1992b, 184 fl 
At its most basic, MacCormick defines the deductive syllogism thus:72 
71  See chapter 3 for a similar point made in considering Aristotle's Rhetoric. 
72  MacCormick's  definition  of the  syllogism  has  evolved  over  the  years  from  its  first 
appearance in Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory.  The version portrayed here is  that 
which  comes  from  his  more  recent  articles  in  the International Journal of Semiotics 
(MacCormick  1992a and  MacCormick  1992b)  in  which  he  carried on  his  most recent 
debate with Jackson (1992). This version is much more complicated than the original. In 
the most recent edition of  Legal Reasoning and  Legal Theory, MacCormick accepts that 
his  original  description  of the  deductive  syllogism  was  too  simple.  In  fairness  to 
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you  postulate  a  general  hypothetical  rule,  you  establish  facts  III  a 
particular case subsumable within the rule's hypothesis, and you draw 
the  logical  conclusion  for  the  particular  case  from  rule  plus  facts. 
(1992b, 182) 
This makes deduction appear simple but the process of generating statements 
to fit into the deductive syllogism also has to be considered: 
Certainly, my thesis  is  only that once certain information is  supplied, 
the process of reasoning with that information is a deductive one. That 
it is  supplied by a process involving judgement does not entail that it 
lacks truth-value as supplied, or therefore that it cannot form a premise 
or premises of deductive reasoning. Moreover, even information about 
"brute facts" requires a process of  determination or judgement to supply 
it. It does not follow that the information-providing function requires its 
own justification, and that this justification cannot itself be wholly (or, 
in some cases, at all) deductive.  But that is  perfectly compatible with 
my thesis that legal reasoning can be and always is  in part deductive. 
(1992b, 194) 
Deduction happens  after information finding,  evaluation,  interpretation and 
other  forms  of legal  reasoning.  This  complex  process  of reasoning  that 
precedes the syllogism and that ends by providing predicates that can be used 
as major and minor premises. (1992a) These premises are predicates and legal 
reasoning  can  be  distinguished  from  other  forms  of deductive  reasoning 
because  it  only  admits  four  types  of predicate  as  premises;  descriptive, 
departure. Though he argues that the deductive syllogism is central he has always seen it 
as  part  of a  wider  structure  and  the  development  of his  theory that  is  seen  in  the 
International Journal of  the Semiotics of  Law does fit  the syllogism into this structure 
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descriptive-interpretative, evaluative and normative.  The major premise will 
generally consist of a normative predicate and state a legal rule.  The minor 
syllogism will generally consist of a number of premises and will be of the 
other three forms of  predicates. The simple case, where all that is needed is a 
deductive justification, appears to be an impossibility. 
Jackson  argues  that MacCormick's  places  the  normative  syllogism  at  the 
heart of his legal theory because he believes in a very specific conception of 
the rule of  law: 
that legal decisions are justified insofar as they conform to the rule of 
law as the (deductive) application of  rules to facts. But to this, there are 
two major types of objection: the first, that the deductive syllogism, as 
applied to the judicial application of law, cannot in fact justify in terms 
of the ideal  of the rule  of law; the second, that there are alternative, 
perhaps preferable, models of the justification of the judicial decision, 
which  are  suggested in part by  MacCormick's own work elsewhere. 
(Jackson 1992,211) 
Jackson maintains that MacCormick is mistaken in seeing the rule of  law, the 
impartial application of  law to facts, as the only possible form of  justification 
and  further  that  even  if the  rule  of law was  accepted  that  the  deductive 
syllogism can not fulfil its requirements. 
This latter point is central to the argument between Jackson and MacCormick 
and  is  based  on  Jackson's  rejection  of reference.  In  rejecting  reference, 
Jackson accepts that language does not refer to objects outside of itself. The 
syllogism, though, requires reference for  it to fulfil the requirements of the 
rule  of law.  The  problem  is  a  temporal  one.  The  rule  of law  requires 
predictability. The application of a law must be determined in advance if it is 
to fulfil its behaviour-guiding function but the relationship between the major 
and  minor premise  in the  syllogism  is  a-temporal.  In order for  the minor 
premise to be valid it needs to be intended by the major premise but the major 
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occurred. It cannot predict that a certain set of  facts will be interpreted in this 
way. 
Jackson does not totally exclude the syllogism from legal reasoning, it may 
have a place in doctrine where it could be a-temporal, but he strongly argues 
that it has no place in adjudication.  73 
In replying  to  Jackson,  MacCormick  agrees  that his  view of reasoning  is 
linked to his view of  the rule of  law: 
The  Rule  of Law,  with  all  that  it  entails  in  terms  of stability  of 
expectations,  Rechtssicherheit,  and  the  rest  of  it,  require  that 
prosecutors,  police  and  citizens  at  large  direct  their  interferences  in 
other people's lives to the prosecution of  wrongs and the vindication of 
rights  pre-established  through  the  system  on  some  reasonable 
interpretation  of it,  and  above  all  that the judges who  decide  upon 
charges laid and claims made relate these rigorously to the rules of the 
system so understood. (1992a, 222) 
Elsewhere he has described this as providing an ethical basis to law, and in 
accepting this, the normative syllogism becomes inevitable: 
This leads to a normative conception of justification of decisions.  On 
the given understanding of  law and legal system, a decision is justifiable 
only if it is  supported by a well-grounded proposition of law,  at least 
stating a general principle but preferably a more concrete rule, and if 
facts can be proven or otherwise established so as relevantly to connect 
the  decision  to  the  legal  proposition.  The  deductive  model  of 
justification  is  reconstruction  of justificatory  argumentation  which 
exhibits  with particular clarity the connections between the  law,  the 
facts and the conclusion that the decision proposed is the right one, that 
73 Jackson makes a related point on Jewish law which he argues is not a unified system though 
it is often taught as if  there were one: "Intellectual unity, at the level of  human doctrine is 
required, even while it may be inappropriate for divine epistemology on the one hand, and 
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which  legally  ought  to  be  handed  down.  The  deductive  element  in 
justification is thus indeed central to it. (MacCormick 1992a, 223) 
MacCorrnick feels that the problems that Jackson has with reference simply 
do not exist: 
...  it is  claimed that I  fatally  overlook the  distinction  in both cases 
between abstract theory and particular application. I do not think this is 
sound  as  an  objection.  Nobody  doubts  that  logical  relations  obtain 
among abstract theological propositions. But there is simply no reason 
to suppose that logic ceases to be applicable the moment that we move 
from abstract law-like universals to the deictic sentences of  particularly-
referring statement of fact,  the  statements that establish instantiation 
here now of a relevant universal. Applied engineering discourse can be 
illuminatingly reconstructed in those terms, and so can the discourse of 
law-application.  There is  no need to  repeat this.  (Mac Cormick 1992a, 
220) 
MacCormick and Jackson are working within profoundly different paradigms 
of thought. MacCormick, despite bringing complexity into the old structures 
by turning to hermeneutics and institutional facts, remains within a paradigm 
of thought  that  is  recognisably  that  of twentieth  century  positivists  from 
Kelsen  to  Hart.  Jackson  has  turned  away  from  this  structure  and  into 
semiotics. All the criticisms that Jackson makes of MacCormick and indeed 
that MacCormick makes of  Jackson relate to this fundamental difference. 
Jackson  does  though  identify  the  ethical  element  in  MacCorrnick's  work 
which he has explored in more detail recently. 
3.2 Law and ethics 
Neil MacCormick's work has evolved over time and generally been set out in 
a series of essays.  This means that it can be difficult to set out his definitive 
views.  For example, the study of normative reasoning based on institutional 
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and that his study is purely descriptive but when considering the ethics of  law 
he states: 
There  ought to be a descriptive  science  of law which  describes  and 
rationally  reconstructs  the  legal  order  as  (in the  sense  indicated)  an 
order distinct from  that of ideal  morality  or political  ideals.  But the 
order  so  rationally  reconstructed  should  not  be  represented  as  a 
predetermined  necessity  which  exists  wholly  independently  of the 
descriptive science.  Perhaps even more than usually, here is indeed a 
science which constitutes its own object. (1989, 189) 
What does  this  mean for  his  own reconstruction of law as  an institutional 
order? MacCormick maintains that that representations of law have political 
effects and these effects come from their nature:  74 
The  kind of object which  law  is  or law are,  ...  is  that of "thought 
objects," or "ideal objects" .... In a significant sense, they exist by being 
believed in, rather than being believed in by virtue of their existence. 
Theories therefore do not stand or fall on the issue of  their independent 
existence  or  non  existence.  We  have  to  ask:  Should they  then  be 
believed in and brought into existence by our beliefs? (1989, 191) 
This does not contradict his own reconstruction. After all it is based on the 
way in which human beings interpret the world, but it does raise the question 
why should the committed participant be committed. 
MacCormick's support of  the rule of  law is his answer to this question: 
The  point  of law  is  to  generate  adequate  determinacy  in  practical 
discourse  in community or polity.  . . . . The  ethics of legalism as  I 
propound them are simply a restatement of well known versions on the 
case for the Rule of Law as a moral and political value. For me as for 
Lon  Fuller  this  crucially  involves  subjecting  human  conduct  to  the 
"governance of rules" and these rules count for the ethical purposes in 
74  See Peters (1997) who seeks to justifY judicial decision-making by showing its participative 
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issue only if they combine clarity with generality, constancy over time 
with coherence in time .... (1989, 188) 
In reconstructing law he is  seeking to  show why the  committed particpant 
should be committed nor does he forget the need to avoid both idealism and 
reductivism: 
.  "  legalism  does  not  have  to  postulate  the  existence  of a  world  of 
reportable  rules  absolutely  independent  of the  activity  of reporting 
them.  Legislation,  judicial  precedents  and  doctrinal  ("dogmatic") 
writings  about  the  legislation  and  the  precedents  and  the  general 
background theories thereof are all part of the legal world, and none is 
comprehensible or perhaps even imaginable apart from the others. Legal 
certainty and clarity are  systemic virtues which certain approaches to 
each of the relevant activities can help to generate. Reconstructions of 
law which are its rational reconstructions generate in a high degree law 
with these virtues. The ethics of legalism are the principles and values 
which advocate and commend us to those elements in the professional 
and academic tradition which promote them. (1989, 192) 
This  suggests  MacCormick is  undertaking a form  of epideictic rhetoric  to 
reinforce  the  values  of the  rule  of law  and  the  audience  to  whom  he  is 
speaking is a doctrinal one. A reconstruction of law to generate these rational 
virtues may well be different in a judge and this may be why he refers to the 
difference  between  rhetorical  and  logical  forms  of  persuasion  when 
discussing the normative syllogism.
75 The more persuasive form may be more 
appropriate for a more general audience but this would not rule out a logical 
reconstruction  for  a  scientific  purpose.  This  would  not  be  simply  for  the 
purpose of scoring point in academic  discourse  as  for  MacConnick all  of 
these help to generate an atmosphere in which the rule of  law is accepted and 
his reconstructions are simply one part of  that. By showing law as logical and 
rational he is helping to support judges who argue that their decisions are not 
75  Such a difference is explored in Aristotle's work and is set out below. Malloch VA 2002  Contemporary theorists  97 
simply the result of  personal whim or prejudice. 
4. Conclusion 
MacCormick's ethical  turn helps  to  save  his  theory  from  appearing to  be 
simply a reconstruction of  traditional legal theories. It also allows the theorist 
to appear within the theory and sets out clearly the gap between him and the 
material he is describing. MacCormick does not set himself out to be distant 
from the material instead he defines himself as a committed participant, he is 
one for whom the law has a normative force and his structure is an attempt to 
justify it to a philosophical or theoretical audience. Specifically, he wishes to 
protect law against the charge that it is subjective, to protect the rule of law. 
He does so by showing the structures of  reasoning that surround law. This, to 
an  extent,  undermines  his  argument  that  it  is  possible  to  cognitively 
understand law while remaining uncommitted to its basic tenets. It could be 
argued that this does not commit him to any specific law but rather to law as 
structure.  It is  certainly true that not  any  content could be fitted into this 
structure though Perelman does point to the danger of  arguing with those who 
espouse extremest views, MacCormick does not see the danger of  using these 
tools to legitimate and justify law in the absence of any way of assessing the 
individual laws and people who apply them. Yet MacCormick requires judges 
to have virtues.  The virtues that MacCormick is committed to - consistency 
and  impartiality  reveal  him  to  be  at  heart  still  a  philosopher.  These  are 
philosophical rather than theoretical goals and perhaps suggest that beyond 
the structures of  law it is a philosopher who is allowed to judge. Malloch VA 2002 
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As philosophers all three theorists are seeking to satisfy Perelman's audience 
of all  reasonable  beings  and  to  be  convincing.  Their  commitment to  this 
philosophical  goal  is  revealed  in  the  tendency  of all  three  to  start  with 
definitions  of human  nature,  to  try and  describe  their theory  in  universal 
terms,  and  in their preference  for  structural  models.  In doing  so  they  are 
describing not only law but how the phenomena that they define as law can be 
translated  or  reunderstood  in  a  philosophically  acceptable  manner.  This 
means that they are  subject to  the  problems and concerns of contemporary 
philosophy and in seeking to solve these they find it difficult to comprehend 
areas of  legal reasoning, such as judicial decision-making which deal not with 
conviction but persuasion. 
In this context persuasion is being used to refer to the way in which a judge 
demonstrates hislher commitment to the law and seeks to persuade others in 
an individual decision that hislher reasoning is legally and not philosophically 
acceptable. Perelman's description of the context within which a judge must 
make that decision is the most successful but he does not take the opportunity 
to explore this in any detail.  Jackson's theory could be used to explain why 
certain arguments make sense semiotically but he does not seek to detail the 
pragmatic structures which would make that legally meaningful. MacCormick 
shows how his theory could be used to justify law but not why this would 
make sense in a legal context. In seeking to be philosophically acceptable all 
three lose  sight of the need for  a judge to  produce arguments that will be 
acceptable to the legal system within which slhe operates. 
All three do though place a person at the heart of  the structure but this person 
is less a participant in the system than a construct of  that system which is used 
to  fill  in  certain gaps,  usually to  prevent the  problems of infinite  regress. 
MacCormick is perhaps the most radical in his reconstruction of  the law in a 
philosophically acceptable manner as ultimately he steps into the gap that is 
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such to  a view of law as  structural  and  strongly rooted in  a defInition of 
human nature as  reasonable is understandable but does it explain the actual 
committed  participant,  the judge?  Jackson's  man  of integrity  performs  a 
similar role and again it is a philosophical or academic person whom Jackson 
uses to ground his theory.  Lawyers and judges appear to be trapped in their 
own discourse  and to  be legally acceptable must simply apply its  semiotic 
rules. Perelman does use the judge but again this is an attempt to fulfIl a gap 
in his own system rather than to fully understand the way in which a judge 
relates to a specifIc system or structure of  law. 
The chapter that follows seeks to develop a theory that can explain why and 
how a judge generates legally acceptable arguments. It  tries to take a different 
approach from  these theorists by  avoiding the tendency to universalise and 
abstract from the law and instead uses the details of  two models of  reasoning 
in practice. It concentrates on areas of law which, though recognised by one 
or more of the theorists at times as important, are usually not fully explored, 
this includes the role of authority and compulsion in the system and the way 
in which character and identity or role  are  constructed within the  system. 
Issues that have arisen in this chapter concerning the nature of philosophical 
arguments  and how this  can be understood in relation to judgment will be 
considered in chapter 5. Chapter 3 
Historical studies 
The aim of  this thesis is to understand the role persuasion plays in the judicial 
decision. It is thus concerned with the methods judges use to legitimate and 
ground their decisions. This relates persuasion to the perceptions individuals 
have of their place in the legal system. In the last chapter it was shown that 
legal theory often has problems with dealing with real people. 
This  chapter uses  two  studies  of law and judicial decision-making in very 
different contexts to provide a more complex awareness of  the experience of 
the individual who makes  decisions in a judicial area.  This is then used in 
chapter 4 to provide a framework for an analysis of  judicial decision-making 
by common law judges. 
The Talmud is a series of volumes which structures the concerns of a whole 
culture around a legal text.  Aristotle's work on rhetoric, the Ars Rhetorical 
attempts to provide a theoretical understanding of  the place of  rhetoric within 
Athenian society. 
In  exploring  these  very  different  subjects  this  chapter  both  reveals  how 
traditional  reasoning  can be used  to  provide  an  individual  with  access  to 
authority  by  allowing  him  to  hide  his  particularity  and  how,  where  the 
particularity  of an  individual  is  all  important,  the  relationship  between 
emotions and character can playa decisive role. 
It begins  by  considering  the  Talmud which  as  the  core  text  of Rabbinic 
Judaism
2  is an example of traditional reasoning both in the way it structures 
1 Rhetoric in italics is used to refer to this work 
2 Rabbinic Judaism was the dominant form of  Judaism for nearly a millennium from the fifth or 
sixth  century CE to the eighteenth century.  As well as  including many aspects of the 
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the  relationships  of its  readers  and  in  the  way  they  relate  to  the  text.  It 
considers the way this structure generates acceptable and authoritative legal 
rulings in the absence of  any state structures to enforce those rulings. 
3 
The Rhetoric contains Aristotle's attempts to both understand this important 
social  phenomena  and  provide  his  students  with the  skills  required to  be 
persuasive in Athens numerous public forums where citizenship both required 
participation  and  centred  around  public  speaking.  Athenian  democracy 
provided a strong state structure but one within which all could be said and no 
one individual could gain authority without persuading others to follow him. 4 
The  chapter  concludes  by  considering  the  relationship  between  the  two 
studies and showing how this exploration can provide a useful supplement to 
legal theory and generate the methodology for the study of  the common law in 
the next chapter. 
themselves in relation to it. It is therefore suitable when a representative form is sought. 
It should be remembered,  though,  that it is not an  exclusive representative of Jewish 
thought and equally that, although still influential, that it is an historic form of  Judaism. 
For more information on contemporary forms of  Judaism see Jacob Neusner (1995) 
3  This is an absence caused by external factors.  The Talmud itself contains the details of a 
complicated court structure complete with hierarchy. It can though survive without this 
structure. It should though not be forgotten that its authors would prefer it to be part of  a 
state sponsored legal system. 
4  The original bias in these texts which dealt  with woman but did  not see them as  active 
participants and spoke only to men will be reflected in the language used in this chapter. Malloch VA 2002 
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The Talmud reveals the structure of traditional reasoning which evolved to 
generate authoritative interpretation of the laws within this context. To do so 
it had to ensure that its methodology was both grounded and compellable in 
the absence of  state imposed sanctions. This introduction briefly describes the 
text itself and then the traditional structure within it. In this the main themes 
of identity, responsibility and character which will be explored in more detail 
in the sections which follow are set out. 
1. The Talmud - an introduction
6 
The Talmud is not a single book but a series of  volumes: 
The Talmud is not a book, it is a literature. It contains a legal code, a 
system of ethics, a body of ritual customs, poetical passages, prayers, 
histories,  facts  of science  and  medicine,  and  fancies  of folklore. 
(Abrahams 1975, 17) 
The problem the Talmud sets out to solve is a complex one. From the earliest 
days laws were central to the identity of  the Jewish people and their religious 
life. These laws were regarded as divinely given but included reasons which 
allowed future  generations to  adapt them to  new circumstances.  When the 
monarchy existed there was a single authority which could issue authoritative 
rulings  on the  adaptation of these  laws,  however,  conquest after conquest 
destroyed not only the monarchy but the courts and religious structures and 
institutions. This meant that no one group could rely on power to enforce their 
5  There are two Talmuds,  one of which was produced in Palestine and one in Babylon.  The 
Babylonian Talmud is more developed than the Palestinian and is referred to simply as 
the Talmud. 
6 I am using the 1948 Epstein translation of  the Talmud. The letter T before the tractate name 
will identify quotes from the Talmud.  Quotes from the Mishnah will be cited simply by 
tractate  name  and,  unless  stated  otherwise,  will  come  from  the  Neusner translation 
(1988). I am not using the translation of  the Mishnah in the Epstein translation to try and 
recreate better the sense of these being texts in different languages and idioms. Biblical 
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interpretation and the expulsion of the community from Palestine meant that 
they  had  lost  even the  link of proximity.  Paradoxically this  increased the 
importance of  the laws, religion and education, as these were all institutions 
which could move  with the people.  The  Talmud needed to provide for the 
authoritative development of  laws without a state or other authority to impose 
interpretations.  This was  made easier by its own history as  part of the oral 
torah. 
7 
The word Talmud itself means teaching or study and it combines the text of 
the  Mishnah  - a  law  code  - with  commentary  or  Gemara.  For Rabbinic 
Judaism it is the central part of  the oral torah. The oral torah consists of  texts 
which have the status of  the written torah, the Bible, and are regarded as holy 
works  but which unlike the written torah form part of a living tradition to 
which each generation is  expected to  add and was  first transmitted in oral 
form. 
The Talmud is only part of this oral tradition and was collected and compiled 
over six centuries by generations of scholars.
8 The first known as the tannaim 
or  teachers  compiled the  core  text - the Mishnah  (from  the  word  shanah 
meaning to repeat completed c.  200 CE) and later generations known as the 
amoraim (commentators) added to this by a series of debates and arguments 
based on the text.  (220  CE to the  end of the  fifth  century CE)  The [mal 
generation the savoraim (sixth century) or thinkers added the debates to the 
text of the Mishnah.  They did so by physically combining the debate to the 
text,  if you  look at  a  page  of the  Talmud in the middle  lies  a  section in 
Hebrew. That is the Mishnah. The commentary or Gemara is in Aramaic and 
physically  surrounds  it in on  the page  and  sometimes  continues  for  many 
pages. The names given to the generations is telling and describes a decline in 
the  authority of the  scholars.  The  first  generations could set out definitive 
7  See Neusner (1985) for a full  analysis of  the complexities of  this term and the way it was 
understood at this time. 
8  See Stemburger (1996) and Lifschitz (1996) for an introduction to the history of  these texts. 
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teachings - later generations could only add to this using the reasoning of  the 
teachers as a starting point and thus absorbing some of  their authority. 
9 
The  Mishnah
lO  the  core  of the  Talmud and  from  which  later  generations 
derived authority comprises a series of  tractates  1 
1 on various aspects of  Jewish 
law. It  is a very simple text consisting of  code-like statements oflaws and is a 
summary of the attempts of generations of scholars and judges to apply and 
adapt the laws written in the Bible. It was the fIrst part of  the oral torah to be 
written in an authoritative form after a revolt against Roman occupation led to 
a massacre  of scholars  leaving the  original  oral  system  of transmission in 
tatters.  It became the  law code  for  the  community under the Patriarchate. 
Having  achieved  written  fonn  the  interpretation  of the  oral  torah  itself 
became the focus for future legal development and interpretation and despite 
the  range  of literature  contained within it,  the  Talmud remains  a work of 
interpretation
l2  of laws  and primarily  its  authors  were jurists  whose  core 
concern remained the application of  the basic code: 
The  Talmud is a commentary written by philosopher-lawyers, men of 
extraordinary power to explain and amplify legal words and phrases, to 
generalize  about  rules,  to  theorise  about  matters  of law  as  about 
mathematics. The reason that the sages deemed it urgent to do so, and 
with  such  extraordinary  vigour  and  energy,  must  surely  be  that the 
document  in hand,  the Mishnah  was  the  authoritative  code  for  their 
courts. (Neusner 1991, 67) 
Yet, although the roots of  the Talmud and its complex legal structure lie in its 
use  in courts at times the laws it contains needed to be applied where there 
were  no  courts  or those  courts  had  no  power  beyond  social  pressure,  as 
9 The system of  precedent absorbs authority in a similar way - see chapter 4 below. 
10  See  Goldberg  (1987)  for  a  detailed  introduction  to this text  and  an  exploration  of its 
historical context. 
11  Tractate simply means treatise and is the name generally used for sections of  the Mishnah. 
The Mishnah is divided into six main sections; sedarim lit. orders. These are divided into 
63 subsections; massektoth literally texts or tractates. 
12 "Interpretation" is a term which has been the subject of  much discussion (see Marmor 1995) 
in  this context it is  being used to refer to a form  of reasoning which is  based on an 
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Menachem Elon states at the start of  his monumental study of  Jewish law: 
Not only did the Jewish legal system not shrivel and die in the absence 
of a homeland, but its most vigorous development occurred during the 
period where the people were widely scattered throughout the diaspora. 
(Elon 1994,2) 
It is the ability of the Talmud to remain persuasive and to develop in these 
circumstances that is at the core of its significance for a study of persuasive 
reasoning. It did so primarily by creating a traditional system of  law and legal 
reasoning that was built on a strong sense of individual responsibility for the 
laws. Although no individual had authority the Talmud creates a space where 
an  individual  can,  by  showing  the  correct  character  and  virtues  and  by 
applying  rules,  make  authoritative  rulings  that  will  be  accepted  by  the 
community. 
1.1 The Talmud's traditional structure 
The  roots  of  this  tradition  predate  the  Talmud  and  evolved  as  the 
interpretation of  laws became problematic in times when there was no central 
authority.  The  biblical  codes  themselves  were  written  down  in  an 
authoritative form following the loss of  state structures and the collapse of  the 
monarchy in the Babylonian conquest of  587 BeE and it is from this time that 
the oral torah itself evolved as a way of  coping with problems in that text. 
A nation thirsting for unity could not tolerate divergences in religious 
behaviour. It was  crucial that unequivocal and binding instructions be 
given.  At  the  same  time,  craving  continuity,  the  nation  would  not 
tolerate  editorial tampering with the texts  of its  inheritance,  even if 
these  texts  diverged  from  the binding  instructions  of the  leadership. 
Therefore,  the  several  textual  strands  - gathered  from  the  various 
quarters in which they were considered holy - were preserved, each in 
its  own peculiar form,  even as  corrective instructions were  issued to 
smooth the textual differences.  .  ... Uniformity of practice and a sense 
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divergences  caused  by  dissimilar  histories  - these  were  the  guiding 
concerns  of Ezra's  canonisation.  Ezra's  work  retained  the  people's 
torah  even  if that  meant  canonising  a  given  law  in  two  or  more 
divergent  forms.  Such  occasional  inconsistencies  were  overcome 
through  oral  instruction,  fostering  unity  while  preservmg  holy  writ 
intact. (Halivni 1998, 201)13 
As has been pointed out the Mishnah was also redacted in response to a crisis 
and  ultimately the  Talmud was  compiled  at the  end  of a  long  period of 
persecution and coincides with the start of  the diaspora. There is thus a direct 
link between the importance of  the text to the peoples identity and the need to 
issue authoritative interpretations.  This is  a circular structure as  in tum the 
tradition within the Talmud creates the identity of  the people. 
The Talmud is founded on a system of education which transmits knowledge 
and authority by a series of hierarchical and historical relationships and it is 
primarily this which defines it as traditional. The dominant relationship is that 
between teacher and disciple.
14 This relationship is  designed to make each 
subsequent generation of  scholars feel bound by the one that came before and 
also  provides  a  basic  stability  to  the  structure  as  in  such  a  system  rapid 
changes are unlikely. Thus although the structure is circular its roots lie not in 
the current but previous generations and this prevents it from appearing too 
obviously  tautological.  Indeed  one  of the  strengths  of this  structure  is  its 
ability  to  hide  its  dependence  on  the  consent  of the  community.  The 
teacher/disciple relationship was not limited to talmudic scholars as all male 
members  of the  community  were  educated  within the  same  system.  This 
ensured that the system of reasoning used to generate authoritative rulings of 
law was understood and accepted by the wider community. This combination 
13  Guttman (1970) shows how the Ezran reforms fit into the history of  Rabbinic Judaism. See 
Cohen (1937, XX) for a discussion ofthe traditions associated with Ezra and Westbrook 
(1996) for a discussion of  the history of  biblical law and the role of  Ezra within this. 
14  This is  not the same as a teacher/pupil relationship as it implies a much stronger sense of 
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of a hierarchical structure which encourages incremental rather than radical 
change, where knowledge is passed down in a way where authority is retained 
by teachers and a community where all have a place within this system of 
transmission  provides  a  way  of ensuring  the  current  generation  of the 
community consent to the application and interpretation of laws while hiding 
the extent to which the structure is based on that consent. 
The relationships set up by the system of education impact on the individual's 
own  sense  of identity  and  create  a  sense  of responsibility  for  the  laws 
throughout  the  community.  The  Talmud itself impacts  on these  levels  of 
context by giving itself a religious history and ensuring that to be understood 
it  requires  external  information  and  therefore  cannot  be  completely 
decontextualised  These  structures,  traditional  and  textual,  increase  the 
likelihood that the interpretations of  the Talmud will be persuasive by directly 
affecting the context within which they will be heard. 
The structures of  reasoning themselves impose further limitations and rules of 
interpretation  are  then used to  ensure  both structure  and  a  consistency to 
reasoning.  They limit what can be said and ensure that scholars will present 
their interpretations in a standard manner, this makes them appear less partial 
and more  likely to  seem  like  a logical  outcome  from  the  text and almost 
automatic. 
It is the subtle interaction of all of  these factors that ensured that the Talmud 
remains a highly influential and persuasive text for those who believe in its 
fundamental precepts. It also provides a very dense model of legal reasoning 
in an environment without a state structure. 
This  study  concentrates  on  the  aspects  which  generate  this  persuasIve 
structure.  Under  the  heading  creating  a  tradition  it  considers  identity, 
responsibility  and  relationships.  Then,  under  the  heading  content  of a 
tradition, it looks at the way memory and the dominance of  the particular help 
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conclusion this structure will be compared with Aristotle's understanding of 
persuasion  within  the  Athenian  legal  system  and  be  used  to  generate  a 
complex understanding of  the role of  persuasion with law. 
2. Creating a tradition 
The Talmud is part of  a tradition that forms the communities sense of  its own 
identity. This section considers aspects of  this which can be seen in the text 
itself It starts with the nature of  the laws which impact on every aspect of  life 
and  specifically  on  aspects  of life  that  set  the  community  apart,  before 
showing  how  all  members  of the  community  are  encouraged  to  take 
responsibility for the application and development of these laws and finally 
describing how their relationship to these laws are constrained by a system of 
education which seeks to generate not only a  system of reasoning but the 
character of  each member of  the community. 
2.1 Identity15 
From the earliest times laws were to playa definitive role for the community. 
The earliest law codes are contained in the Pentateuch
16  and contain both 
laws which were "natural" and covered all humanity and specific laws which 
related to the ways in which the community defined themselves as separate 
this included the mosaic laws which defined clean and unclean but also dealt 
with clothing and with religious imagery.17  Bernard Jackson has suggested 
that: 
It is these dimensions of sense construction - the construction of the 
sacred through the dimensions of  loyalty, visual images, body language, 
15 For reasons of clarity identity in this thesis will be used primarily to denote an individual's 
own awareness of themselves whereas character will be used for the way in which that 
identity is seen by others and is a mediated version of  identity. 
16  See Cambridge Companion to the Bible for a more detailed analysis of  the Pentateuch (Klee 
et al,  1997) and Westbrook (1996) and Walzer (1989) for an introduction to the codes 
themselves. Walzer considers the importance of  the reasoning style within the codes. 
17 Holiness in Jewish culture implies separation of  the clean and the unclean, as such it can be 
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smell,  taste,  speech  and  time  - which  the  Bible  here  VIews  as 
constituting the particular identity of  the people of  Israel, rather than its 
ethical teaching. (1995, 191) 
Law then was central to the way people looked, ate and interacted with each 
other.  It is  this  that  set the  people  apart.  The  importance  of the  laws  to 
identity led to  a stress on the practical application of the laws.  Indeed, the 
Talmud makes it clear that the practical implications of commandments are 
much more significant than the theoretical ones: 
R.  Eleazar said: When the Israelites gave precedent to we will do over 
we  will hearken a heavenly voice went forth and exclaimed to  them, 
who  revealed to  my  children this  secret,  which  is  employed by the 
Ministering Angels (T Shabbat 88a) 
The Talmud expands the laws of  the Bible by emphasising rules that bring the 
practical  elements  into  everyday  life  and  further  strengthening  their 
importance.  The altar in this vision of Israel, is identified as much with the 
kitchen table, as with the temple. In Jackson's terms it extends the limits of 
sense construction, every aspect of  life is now used to define and separate the 
community. This was to prove its strength when the laws needed to be applied 
following a loss of institutions which occurred at the time of the compilation 
of  this material and would previously have provided additional support to the 
communities sense of  its own identity. 
The Talmud is divided into six orders
18 
- 1 Seeds, agricultural law relevant 
only to the holy land of Israel; 2 Festival days which regulates behaviour on 
the sabbath and other holy days  and gives the community a calendar which 
defines time as separate from that of the seasons; 3 Women, which includes 
family law and succession; 4 Damages which deals with civil law, criminal 
18  Sternberger (1996,  109-114) sets out the structure of  the Mishnah and  considers whether 
the structures were original and whether any  structuring principle can be seen.  I have 
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law  and  procedure;  19  5  Holy  things,  the  law  relating  to  temple  dues;  6 
Purities, laws relating to the purity of persons, things and places (including 
the best known laws which limit what can be eaten). 
The laws do  not only regulate every  day  life but are strongly linked to  the 
religious life of  the community and retain an aspirational quality. This can be 
particularly  seen  if the  law  code,  the  Mishnah  is  briefly  considered  as  a 
separate  text.  The  Mishnah  is  a-historical.  Everything is  expressed  in the 
present  tense.  Individual  events,  however  dramatic,  are  not  significant. 
History is only considered when there appear to be patterns emerging.
20 This 
is particularly notable because of  the time of its compilation. The Mishnah is 
the most important work produced in the aftermath of a disastrous attempt to 
overthrow the Roman occupation, yet it ignores it completely. In the midst of 
what  must  have  been a chaotic  situation,  it  portrays  a motionless,  perfect 
Israel.
21  This Israel clearly did not exist but what is implicit in the Mishnah is 
the responsibility of  those who accepts its precepts to bring this world about. 
...  the God of Israel acts and wills only in reaction to the action and 
intention of his Israelite partner on the Land.  ...  As  in the time of the 
Temple, then, God remains Lord of the Land of Israel and owner of its 
fruits.  But when His Temple no  longer stands and His Land has been 
defiled, His  status as  Lord depends  upon the action of His remaining 
people.  Those  who  impose  upon  themselves  the  task  of 
reconstructing  the  human  and  social  fabric  of Israelite  life  make 
effective the holiness of the Land and make real the claims of its God. 
19 This includes details of  the court structures as well as substantive law. 
20 E.g. Satah 9:15 There is a list of  important sages, each of  their deaths corresponds to a loss 
i.e.  "When R  Meir  died  makers of parables  came  to  an  end.  When Ben Azzai  died 
diligent students came to an end.  When Ben Zoma died exegetes came to an end."  The 
list goes down the generations showing a gradual decline in holiness. This is therefore not 
a historical pattern but a spiritual one. 
21  This interpretation of the laws in the Mishnah is heavily dependant on Neusner who points 
out that though the text is based on a tradition the structure of  the Mishnah itself is anti-
traditional  in  founding  everything  in  an  eternal  present.  (1989) It also  does  not  put 
forward a conservative picture, it is a contemporary book this is demonstrated in its use 
not  of Biblical  but contemporary Hebrew and  its  reference to Rabbis  from  the most 
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(Neusner 1989, 174)22 
This  combination  of laws  which  regulate  everyday  expenence  alongside 
moral and religious  elements are a powerful source of identity in that they 
dictate how the community sees itself, its sense of  time and place the way in 
which it becomes visible not only to itself but to others. By setting the people 
apart it allows them to define and describe themselves.  The Talmud further 
embeds itself within the community by also ensuring that all feel responsible 
individually for the system. 
2.2 Responsibility 
It has already been stated that in the structure of the Mishnah is rooted the 
idea that the community is responsible for creating the world described in the 
laws,  as  well  as  following  rules  which  defme  them  as  separate.  This 
responsibility is extended down to each individual member. 
The Talmud itself describes the moment when all individual members of the 
community became responsible for the law. It relates the biblical story of  the 
entrance by the people into the land promised by God to Moses.
23 The people, 
which included woman and foreigners,  all  face  each other and accept the 
law. 24 The Talmud takes this story and makes a complex series of  calculations 
to find exactly how responsible every individual was for each law. It describes 
how for  each commandment there  was  a  curse  and  a blessing,  a positive 
obligation to obey the command and a negative one not to breach it.  It goes 
22  In  his  essay  on the  oral  torah,  Safrai  (1987)  deals  with  conflicts that  arose when  the 
Mishnah was written. 
23  The biblical source text is in Joshua (Jos 8:30). Moses is portrayed in Deuteronomy (Deut 
27:11) telling the people that they must perform this ceremony once they have entered 
the promised land and this is the fu1£l1ment of  that command. This is therefore linked to 
the Deuteronomic code and to the founding of  the Jewish state. It is in accepting the law 
in the land that the state is founded. 
24 This is not portrayed as God giving the law (and each time God gave the law there were 
different codes).  Instead this is portrayed as in obedience to a command without God 
having to intervene and this perhaps explains why it is this giving that is associated with 
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further and argues that for each command there was a general and a particular 
form of obligation and four distinct duties, to learn, teach, observe and do. 
This comes to sixteen duties and aspects to each law and as they were given 
not once but three times during the wandering this equals 48. One Rabbi goes 
further and argues that there were 48 times 603,550 commandments made 
and accepted: 
it  follows  that  for  each  Israelite  there  are  603,550  commandments. 
What  is  the  issue  between  them  - R.  Mesharsheya  said:  The  point 
between them is that of personal responsibility and responsibility for 
others. (T.Sotah 37b) 
Emmanuel Levinas has said: 
The real meaning of  this apparently particular ceremony performed by a 
people whose members  can all look upon one another, a community 
which one gaze can encompass is that all human beings are included in 
the legislation in whose name the pact is concluded. (1989,217)25 
The  individual is  responsible not only for their own obedience but for  the 
others and indeed it is this shared responsibility under the law which binds the 
community together. 
in the society which fully deploys all the dimensions of  the Law, society 
becomes a community. (1989,226) 
The community then is defined by the acceptance of the individual member 
for the laws which in turn defme the community and, given the nature of  the 
laws, the way the individual relates to others within that community and the 
world.  The  sense  of responsibility  for  not  only  one's  own  but  others 
submission to the laws helped to generate social sanctions which applied even 
where  the  community  had  no  formal  court  structures  and  a  sense  of 
25 Levinas (1989) points out that the question in the Mishnah that prompts this Gemara has to 
do with the correct language to be used in matters of  ritual. This example is used because 
as foreigners were present during this recovenanting it was believed that all  70 known 
languages were used.  Levinas interprets this as meaning that the responsibility extends 
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disapproval  within the  individual  themselves,  they  are  encouraged  to  use 
these as standards to judge their own behaviour. 
This responsibility extends not only to the laws as they are but to  ensuring 
that  they  remain  relevant  to  the  community.  This  can  be  seen  in  the 
description of a similar moment of acceptance of the biblical Deuteronomic 
code. Moses is portrayed reading the laws to the people before they enter the 
new land. These laws are described as those given to the previous generation 
who left Egypt. Moses makes it clear to those present that these laws are the 
responsibility of  not just one generation: 
The LORD our God made a covenant with us at Horeb. It was not with 
our fathers that the LORD made this covenant, but with us, the living, 
every one ofus who is here today. (Deut. 5:2-3) 26 
It is  notable  that the  laws  Moses  gives,  although similar to  and clearly a 
version of the earlier laws contained in the Covenant code also in the Bible, 
are not the same as the earlier laws. They have been expanded and adapted to 
better suit life in a state whereas the earlier laws were more concerned with a 
nomadic existence. These are laws which though seen as identical have been 
adapted to the new context. This point, that responsibility for the law lies with 
the  current community and that the law can be reunderstood for each new 
context is emphasised frequently within the Talmud  A phrase often used to 
express this is that on the one hand, it is a basic article of  faith that "the Torah 
is from Heaven"; and on the other, it is also a basic principle that "the Torah 
is not in Heaven." The source of  the law is heaven, but the place of the law 
and its life and development, are not in heaven but in human society. (Elon 
1994,242) This helps to extend the responsibility not just for the current laws 
but for its future development to all members of  society. 
Although  these  laws  which  generate  a  sense  of communal  identity  and 
individual responsibility allow the law to be fully grounded it does create a 
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problem that can be seen when the court structure, which generated definitive 
rulings  and  which  had  been  supported  by  successive  imperial  rulers, 
collapsed.
27  Shortly thereafter the schools of Hillel and Shammai, two rival 
schools with rival interpretations of law, appear. To begin with this plurality 
was tolerated but, over time, it became clear that it was unsustainable. It was 
particularly difficult when the two groups diverged on practical matters and 
there were dire warnings about what would happen if one, authorised ruling 
was not found. It was said that there was a risk of  losing the torah itself  - "the 
words of God would not be found throughout the land." (T.  Shabbat.  138b) 
Given the close link between law and identity this would mean the end of  the 
community. The problem was that, in the absence of  the Sanhedrin, there was 
no  authority. No one group had the power to impose its interpretation. It is 
related  that  this  problem  was  resolved  by  divine  intervention  which 
authorised the decisions of  Hillel but carefully did not condemn Shammai. 
The words from heaven are reported as having been: 
The words of both are the words of the living God,  but the law is  in 
accordance with the School of  Hillel! (T. Erub 13b) 
This  statement  makes  a  clear  difference  between  a  true  decision  and  an 
authorised one. The authorised decision is the law but contradictory opinions 
can come from God.  This means that they can both be true. By allowing the 
status of truth to divergent opinions, the "voice from heaven" only insisted 
that there be conformity in practice not in ideology and this allows a large 
degree  of intellectual freedom.  It also  explains why the Mishnah  and  the 
Talmud like the Pentatuech record contradictory and dissenting views. These 
are  part  of the  truth.
28  This  allows  a  distinction  to  be  made  between 
responsibility for the law's development which all can still contribute to and 
contribute to as  individuals with different opinions and the ability to make 
27 Perelman argues that the Sanhedrin provided the authority that allowed the Rabbis to be 
creative,  following  the  abolition  of the  Sanhedrin,  there  was  a  return  to  stricter 
interpretation.  Certainly shall  see later the rules of interpretation did become more and 
more prescriptive. (perelman 1976, 153) 
28  It is the flexible attitude to truth that has led to a recent interest in Rabbinic interpretation. 
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authoritative rulings. The individual is allowed to express himself within the 
structure and to reveal aspects of  truth but is still expected to obey authorities 
in practical matters. 
2.3 Relationships 
The authorisation of  Hillel over the school of Shammai privileged one line of 
transmission  over  another  and  turns  the  focus  towards  the  structure  of 
relationships by which the laws and the authority to interpret the laws were 
passed on. 
If  the laws themselves generated a sense of identity by regulating the way the 
individual and the community related to the world this was further reinforced 
by the relationships through which the laws and the sense of  responsibility for 
them was passed down by generation to generation and it is notable that the 
last section to be added to the Mishnah and which could be described as its 
first section of  commentary provides it with a history and a tradition.  29 
Abot, or the sayings of the fathers, moves the a-historical mishnah towards a 
traditional structure by describing its history as  a line of transmission of the 
oral tradition starting with Moses at Sinai.  Clearly not all of the torah was 
passed down from this point.  One passage in an early rabbinic text explains 
how the whole of this structure, not only the written was given to Moses by 
saying that "God taught Moses the general principles." According to Abot, 
each generation was expected to add to it but any additions made needed to 
be authoritative. 
Abot itself does not deal with the methodology of the oral torah but it does 
deal with who can apply it, this is not limited to Rabbis but it is limited to 
those  who  have  had  a  specific  education,  the  scholars  and  a  specific 
29 Abo! is placed at the end of  the legal section, linking the virtues expected of  judges close to 
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relationship between teacher and pupil. 
Rabban Gamaliel says: (1) Set up a master for yourself (Abot 1: 16) 
Even the relationship to God is mirrored in attitudes to teacher and to the 
torah: 
R. Eleazar b.  Shammua says, "the honour owing to your disciple should 
be as precious to you as yours. And the honour owing to your fellows 
should be like the reverence owing to your master. And the reverence 
owing to your master should be like the awe owing to heaven." (A bot. 
4:12) 
Outside the teacher-disciple relationship is the wider community.  Attitudes 
towards it are more ambivalent. 
Two aspects of communal life are regarded as positive. The community is a 
place for learning.  (nWho  is  a sage? He who learns from everybody," Abot 
4: 1) It also provides opportunities to carry out torah precepts. It should be 
remembered that the student of the torah would not have seen a distinction 
between  theory  and  practice.  As  to  say  implied  to  do,  to  study  implied 
practice. Indeed to study the torah without practice was futile: 
Anyone  whose  deeds  are  more  than his  wisdom - his  wisdom will 
endure. And anyone whose wisdom is more than his deeds - his wisdom 
will not endure. (Abot 3:10) 
The  first  step  to  gaining  authority  IS  to  show  that  one  understands  the 
practical implications of  the principles: 
The Halakha is bound to actual practice, and a precedent established by 
a sage who is recognised for his wisdom and for his practical behaviour 
in the eyes of most or all of the community has the power to establish 
and determine halakha. (Safra 1987, 180) 
Those seeking to enforce new interpretations would have had to show that 
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Danger came from inappropriate relationships. (This is the reverse side to the 
stress  placed  on  finding  the  appropriate  relationship.)  The  danger  is  of 
contamination, of being infected by something unholy.  Thus contact with an 
evil  neighbour,30  all  women
3
!  and  the  ruling  power  are  to  be  avoided.  It 
should be remembered though that this was not written for a small bookish 
elite. Education evolved at the same time as the courts and legal reasoning 
and they are  closely linked.  It was  in the  schools that the future  decision-
makers would have learnt how to make acceptable interpretations. All adult 
males would have been expected to have been educated in this structure and 
brought  into  these  relationships.  Abot goes  further  and  seeks  not  only  to 
regulate relationships but to impose a specific character and virtues on those 
who seek to study the laws. 
Abot uses analysis of  character types to show which virtues were expected of 
the  scholar.  It generally  does  this  by  a  fourfold  comparison  of different 
examples of  each type. E.g.: 
There are four sorts of personality: (1) easily angered, easily calmed -
he loses what he gains; (2) hard to anger, hard to calm - what he loses 
he  gains;  (3) hard to anger and easy to calm - a truly pious man; (4) 
easy to anger and hard to calm - a truly wicked man. (A bot. 5: 11) 
That there are positive attributes in those who fall short suggests that Abot 
seems  to  wish  that  those  who  follow  its  precepts  should  do  so  with  an 
awareness of  complexity. It is clear though that certain virtues are expected of 
talmudic scholars and that having made the people responsible the Talmud 
now seeks to generate character and ethics which again would impact on the 
communities sense of identity and how the Talmud is regarded and applied. 
The virtues encouraged,  piety and patience are  both virtues that would be 
expected of  a good judge. 
30 "Keep away from an evil neighbour." (Abot.  1:6) 
31  "In this regard did sages say, 'So long as a man talks too much with a woman, (1) he brings 
trouble upon himself, (2) wastes time better spent on studying Torah, and (3) ends up an 
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The relationship between teacher and disciple was used then to reinforce the 
commitment of  the community to the text and ensures not only that all those 
who obeyed the law would have been able to understand the reasoning used 
by  the  judges  in  their  interpretations  of the  law  but  would  have  had  a 
character which encouraged them to be do  so.  This though again raises the 
issue of  authority. If  all are capable of  making reasoned interpretation why are 
some privileged over others? 
The next step was to have been handed down the authority to make decisions. 
After the conflict between Hillel and Shammai the authority to make binding 
interpretations  of law was  passed  down  and transmitted  separately and in 
practical matters only halakhic authorities could interpret laws in ways which 
required  to  be  followed  and  their  authority  was  absolute.
32  In  a  biblical 
midrash it is said that "even if  they point out to you that right is left and left is 
right, obey them." (Sifre Section 154/
3 
Tractate  Sanhedrin describes  how authority is  held and passed down from 
one scholar to another in a process that parallels Abot'  s passing of  knowledge. 
"I hold it from my father who had it from Rab, and he from R  Hiyya, son of 
R  Huna."  The  passing  of  authority  from  teacher  to  disciple  is  not 
straightforward, a person who has authority can withhold some aspects and 
allow others and there are also geographic restrictions. The reason for all of 
these is the need to avoid contradiction not in theory but in practice: 
Since he was learned in the law, what need had he to obtain permission? 
- Because of  the following incident, for it has been taught: Once Rabbi 
went  to  a  certain  place  and  saw  its  inhabitants  kneading the  dough 
32 Elon (1994) uses the phrase halakhic authorities throughout his work on Jewish law to mean 
those people who can make authorised rulings both in court and without. These would be 
scholars probably Rabbis who would generally have had community support in their role. 
33 (Hammer 1986, 190) The full quote is as follows with the biblical phrase being considered in 
italics. " ... and according to the judgement which they shall tell they to do - a negative 
commandment - to the right hand,  nor to the  left - even if they point out to you that 
right is left and left is right, obey them." Later scholars have found this phrase difficult. 
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without  the  necessary  precaution against  levitical  uncleanness.  Upon 
inquiry,  they told him that a  certain  scholar  on a visit taught them. 
Water of  bizeim [ponds] does not render food liable to become unclean. 
In reality, he referred to bezim [eggs] but they thought that he had said 
bizeim [ponds]. ... There and then it was decreed that a disciple must 
not give decisions unless he was granted permission by his teacher. (T 
Sanhedrin 5a-5b) 
This may seem a minor point but in a community with such strict rules of 
cleanness  and  where  these  performed  the  central  role  of defining  the 
community there was a need to ensure that all would be able to eat the food 
prepared  by  other  members  without  fear.  This  became  an  even  greater 
problem  in the diaspora when without a state this  was  the  central way  of 
defining membership.  Although  all  would have  the  knowledge  transmitted 
down  to  them  only  selected individuals  were  given the  authority to  make 
decisions.  They though would have been constrained by the knowledge that 
all members of the community were well aware of the standards they were 
expected to live up to. 
2.4 Conclusion 
The tradition created by the Talmud is designed to place it at the heart of  the 
community. The laws it seeks to interpret describe and dictate the relationship 
of the  community  to  the  world.  The  Talmud then  supplements  these  by 
seeking to  generate  specific character and moral values in the  people that 
follow the  laws,  embedding the laws  even deeper in the individual's own 
sense  of identity.  The  relationships  it  describes  control  the  way  that each 
individual receive this knowledge and the power that they have in relation to 
it. By ensuring that all the community will be scholars it also allows them all 
to judge and in doing so to be open to being judged. All the community at this 
level are equals even though there is a distinction made between those who 
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This  power  is  though  very  circumscribed  not  only  by  the  need  of these 
individuals to demonstrate a certain character which would tend to encourage 
moderation but by structures of  reasoning which ensure that their reasoning is 
not individual but communal. 
3. Content of  a tradition 
The individuals who have the authority to make decisions within the tradition 
of the  Talmud can only make decisions based on acceptable reasoning and 
justification and this brings us to the reasoning contained within the tradition. 
Reasoning developed alongside the loss of authority, those who have power 
do not need to give reasons, and become increasingly complex. The Talmud is 
almost more concerned with the process of debate than the answers that are 
produced.  Many  sections  of the  Talmud will  search through related issues 
before  coming to  a  conclusion.  Incorrect arguments  are  explored in depth 
simply  to  show why  they  are  wrong.  For the  Talmud,  the  answer to  the 
question is not the only reason for asking it. The Talmud is not just a guide to 
behaviour. According to Neusner (1991, x): 
its importance ...  lies in supplying us with a model of how to use our 
minds in thinking about our lives: the rigorous intellect in search of the 
well-criticised life through the instrumentality's of  practical reason and 
applied logic. 
By studying the Talmud, the student acquires a way of thinking. This way of 
thinking corresponds to the talmudic view of  the truth. The Talmud states that 
the  divine  will  can be known  only through the  constant interpretation of 
sacred texts: 
The  Rabbinic  Tradition,  ... based  itself on  the  principles  of multiple 
meaning and endless interpretability, maintaining that interpretation and 
text  were  not  inseparable,  but  that  interpretation  - as  opposed  to 
incarnation - was the central divine act. (Handelman 1982, xiv) 
Interpretation is not only the practice but the meaning of  the Talmud. As well 
as providing a law code with a memory it impacts on the context by showing 
not only what to remember but what to forget. Malloch V.A 2002  Historical studies  121 
These structures of interpretation apply not only to rules that were  legally 
binding such as  halakhah but also to aggadah, the moral rules and stories 
contained in the Talmud, thus this was a form of  reasoning that applied to all 
aspects of life and this in turn allowed these other aspects of life to support 
the legal reasoning: 
the fact that legal norms and moral imperatives both have a common 
source  and  background  in  the  halakhic  system  has  an  important 
consequence: the legal system itself functioning as such, from time to 
time invokes,  even though it does not enforce, the moral imperative. 
(Elon 1994, 144) 
This section looks at four aspects of  this system of interpretation; sources of 
law; memory; the dominance of  particulars and rules of  interpretation. 
3.1 Sources ofla~4 
the tannaitic innovation of the creation of halakah - a system in which 
the force of  law is given to norms based upon rational deduction from a 
legal  source,  without  relying  upon  the  institutional  authority  of the 
medium through which the law is expressed even the authority of the 
supreme court  .... This then is the method by which the Tannaim laid 
the foundation of the jurisprudence of the halakhah,  and gave binding 
authority  to  the  corpus  of law known  as  "the  oral  law'  which they 
themselves  ruled to be based upon rational  scholarship.  (Segal  1996, 
108) 
Using rational  scholarship as  a basis not only grounded the reasons of the 
scholars  but was  in part a  rejection of the  long tradition of prophecy.  In 
rejecting prophecy,  the idea that only  special individuals touched by  God 
could interpret the law, they reinforced the idea that all subjects of the law 
could and should understand and be able to teach the law. The law itself was 
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based not in an interpretation of mystic signs but in closely defmed sources 
accessible to all.  Elon argues that there are six primary legal sources in the 
talmudic  system:  tradition,  interpretation,  legislation,  custom,  rna 'aseh  and 
legal  reasoning.  Tradition  refers  to  the  rules  which  are  transmitted  from 
generation to generation and are believed to have been given at Sinai and is 
linked  to  the  system  of traditional  relationships.  Interpretation  relates  to 
textual interpretation and is seen in the rules dealt with below. Legislation and 
custom are self-explanatory.35 Ma'aseh is case law. All of  these systems root 
the  reasons  within  the  system  and  the  community.  Individuals  thus  are 
prevented from bringing in reasoning extraneous to the structure.  The rules 
around the use of  Ma 'aseh shows that these sources were also understood in a 
complex manner. 
Ma 'aseh  were  the  individual  judgements  of the  courts.  Though  these 
judgements were  made  by  authorised  persons,  they  were  not  regarded  as 
binding for future  decisions.  For a rna'  aseh to become binding it needed to 
contain  a  legal  norm,  a  halakhah, that could be used  in future  decision-
making. Halakhah was the legal reasoning or instruction within the decision. 
'Instruction'  (hora'ah)  is  the  legal  source  for  those  laws  that  the 
Supreme Court established as the result of its own legal scholarship or 
interpretation (midrash)  as  a precedent or instruction (i.e.  either as  a 
result of a case or on the basis of  teaching promulgated by the court not 
in the context of  a particular case.) (Segal 1996, 112)36 
Instruction can be seen as classical legal reasoning - the judges are using legal 
skills as the basis for halakhah. Therefore for a decision to become binding it 
was not enough that it was made by a court, it needed to provide reasons and 
reasons that would be regarded as legally meaningfuL It is the construction of 
35  Custom is linked to community consent and cannot overrule laws but was used to allow for 
local  variations  in  interpretations  reflecting  that  the  community  often  lived  in  very 
different circumstances. 
36 Instruction and legal reasoning are often used as virtual synonyms. The difference appears to 
be that legal reasoning passed down in a decision is  instruction but in formulating that 
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these reasons through the use of memory and rules of interpretation that will 
be considered next. 
3.2 Memory 
Memory operates  in two  ways  in the Talmud.  A  memory is added to the 
Mishnah by the way it is linked to other texts and to reasoning and it seeks to 
affect the memory of  those who seek to add to its reasons. In this way it lays 
the foundations for the system of  reasoning. 
The Mishnah, as a book of halakhah, would logically consist of rules based 
on the  sources  identified  above.  It  does  not  though  make  this  clear.  Its 
standard form is generally a simple, almost code-like statement oflaw: 
He who leaves a jug in the public domain, and someone else came along 
and stumbled on it and broke it - [the one who broke it] is exempt. And 
if  [the one who broke it] was injured it, the owner of  the jug is liable [to 
pay damages for] his injury. (Baba Kamma 3:1) 
The statements are almost all of practical examples, some are very specific 
and there is little attempt to generalise into principles. Note the absence of 
any reference to authority or case law. Authorities, in the sense of recognised 
scholars,  do  appear but only where areas appear to have been a matter of 
some controversy: 
Two [terraced] gardens, one above the other - and vegetables between 
them - R.  Meir says, "[They belong to the garden] on top." R.  Judah 
says "[They belong to the garden] below." Said R. Meir, "If  the one on 
top wants to take away his dirt, there will not be any vegetables there." 
Said R. Judah, "If  the one on bottom wants to fill up his garden with dirt 
there will not be any vegetables there." Said R. Meir, "Since each party 
can  stop  the  other,  they  consider  from  when the  vegetables  derive 
substance [which is from the dirt]." Said R.  Simeon, "Any [vegetables] 
which the one on top can reach out and pick - 10, they are his. And the 
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The  Mishnah  does  use  enactment  and  precedents  but  biblical  midrash  is 
strikingly absent Although the Bible is rarely quoted in the Mishnah, Jacob 
Neusner  argues  that  it  underlies  the  statements  therein  which  are  often 
restatements of  the Bible: 
To  state  matters  simply:  all  of scripture  was  authoritative.  But only 
some  of scripture  was  found  to  be  relevant  .... That is  to  say,  they 
brought  to  scripture  a  program  of questions  and  inquiries  framed 
essentially among themselves. (1983,27) 
This  restatement  of earlier codes  can be  seen as  part  of a  long tradition 
relating back to the deuteronomic restatement of  the covenant code. Like the 
deuteronomic code the earlier code is not specifically mentioned. Indeed the 
relationship between the two is not made clear and this was to cause problems 
with the  acceptance  of the  Mishnah  as  authoritative  and  was  one  of the 
reasons that the material contained in the commentary section of  the Talmud 
was  created It seeks to  show that within the codes of the Mishnah lies the 
memory of the debates and arguments and the sources of law that led to their 
creation. This links it to a tradition not only of  relationships but of  reasoning. 
These two aspects are combined in the way in which the Talmud is written. 
The  Talmud is  in shorthand.  A teacher is  needed to  explain the  technical 
terms that are used and to decipher the structures that are revealed by the use 
of  language. The nature of  the Talmud means that to understand it you need to 
recreate  the  debate  and  this  encourages  you to  take  part and  add to  it,  to 
comment on the commentary.37 To join the conversation, the reader needs to 
reconstruct  the  reasoning.  Only  certain  techniques  are  acceptable  though 
these are not often made explicit and most of  the techniques of interpretation 
used are deeply embedded in the structure of  the Talmud itself These would 
have  been  absorbed  almost  subliminally  as  the  student  was  engaged  in 
recreating the  debate.  This  is  further  reinforced  by  the  oral  nature  of the 
materiaL  The  laws  in the Mishnah  were  originally transmitted  orally and, 
even after it was written, it was expected that students would not just study 
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but memorise the statements.  This meant that the reasoning would become 
automatic and ingrained. 
Neusner (1989, 18) suggests that: 
The  technology  of  mnemonics  (i.e.,  the  technology  of  memory) 
therefore  forms  the  surface  of  a  deep  texture  of thought  about 
communication,  as  well  as  thought  about  thinking,  that  is  about 
conveying principles through details. 
This can be seen in the Mishnah which uses techniques that are designed to 
make  this  memorisation  of the  material  easier.  Its  patterns  are  generally 
simple and it does not use general principles but groups detailed examples 
together. 
Consider,  for  example, the first line of the legal  section:  "[There are]  four 
generative causes of damage (1) ox [Ex. 21:28], (2) pit [Ex. 21:33], (3) crop-
destroying beast [Ex.  2:4], and (4)  conflagration [Ex.  22:5]." (Baba Kamma 
1.1)  These  four  examples  of injuries  are  the  details  through  which  the 
principle, that, if  you are responsible for something which may cause injury 
then you are liable for  any injury that it causes, is expressed.  (This general 
point is made in the text but never supersedes the details, which still retain 
descriptive importance.) 
The dominant structure is thematic, sayings are linked together by common 
theme. This occurs not just at the tractate level which divides the book into 
six  thematic  sections  but  within  each  tractate,  sayings  are  linked  by 
subthemes.
38 To make it easier for the student to identify a change of  theme, 
38  Neusner has  identified three other structuring devices.  These are limited in their use and 
Neusner  suggests  that  they  represent  formats  that  were  experimented  with  but later 
rejected. These list sayings according to the author; or pattern of  linguistic use; or group 
topics that relate to one underlying principle.  (Neusner 1989,  10-13) Elon (1994, 1055-
1056) has also  considered why on occasion the Mishnah does not follow its dominant 
thematic pattern. He believes that this may be because these rules had been passed down 
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patterns of  language are used. 
For example Baba Mesia (6:15-6:16): 
He who carried an ass to carry wheat on it and he carried barley on it. 
He is liable. 
[If he hired it to carry] wheat and carried straw on it. 
He is liable, 
since the [greater bulk] is hard to carry. 
[If he  hired it]  to  carry  a  letekh of wheat and it carried a letekh of 
barley, he is exempt. 
But ifhe added to its burden, he is liable. 
All craftsmen are in the status of  paid bailees. 
But any of  them who said, "Take what is yours and pay me off [because 
the job is done]" [enters the status of] an unpaid bailee. 
[If one person said to another] "You keep watch for me,  and I'll keep 
watch for you," [both are] in the status of  a paid bailee. 
"Keep watch for me," 
and the other said to him, "leave it down before me," 
[the latter] is [in the status of] unpaid bailee. 
It  is clear that there is a major shift oflanguage use and theme with the phrase 
"All craftsmen." 
Neusner  identifies  only  six  patterns  of sentence  structure  throughout  the 
Mishnah. The first part of this extract is in the simplest form and is made up 
of declarative  sentences.  The  second  part  of the  extract  is  in  the  most 
complex form: 
...  we  have  a  contrasting complex predicate,  in which case we may 
have two sentences, independent of one another, yet clearly formulated 
so as to stand in acute balance with one another in the predicate, e.g., 
"He who does ... is unclean, and he who does not ... is clean. 
Neusner argues that these patterns reveal the underlying logic of  the work: 
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rest  upon  philosophical  bases,  e.g.,  the  proposal  of a  thesis  and  the 
composition of  a list of  facts (such as a group of  traits shared by certain 
categories  of people)  which  prove the  thesis.  The  Mishnah presents 
rules and treats stories (including history) as incidentaL And of merely 
taxonomic interest Its  logic  is  prepositional, and its intellect does  its 
work  through  a  vast  labor  of classification,  with  comparison  and 
contrast generating rules and gneralizations. (Neusner 1989,26)39 
The  six patterns that Neusner identifies  all  link facts  by comparison and, 
therefore, the reasoning of  the Mishnah is predominantly comparative.
40 It is 
concerned with  finding  not  generalities  but  similarities  between particular 
categories. This thematic and comparative structure is followed in the Talmud 
and though it has a much more complex structure it uses patterns at a number 
of  levels which help to both guide the reader through it in a particular way. 
At  its  meta-level  the  Talmud is  in  two/three  languages;  biblical  Hebrew, 
Mishnaic Hebrew and Eastern Aramaic.
41  Each language indicates a different 
source.  The two versions of Hebrew are used for quotes from the Bible and 
the Mishnah.  Aramaic is used to show the debate that occurred in the study 
sessions of  the amoraim. The language lets the reader know instantly at what 
level of debate s/he is looking at and whether it is a proof text, the starting 
point for the debate or the debate itself 
Language is also used to show how each debate progresses and the status of 
the person speaking.  Special phrases are used to show how each statement 
relates to the following one. Louis Jacobs (1991) identifies a number of  these 
formal terms that take the reader through the debate.
42 These are designed to 
trigger in the reader the memory of  the previous time that this word was used 
39 Neusner makes comparisons between mishnaic reasoning and Aristotle. This is dealt with in 
chapter 5. 
40 T.  Bava Bathra BOb "Surely, in the entire [domain of] the Torah comparisons are made!" 
41  See Sternberger (1996, 101-108) for a discussion of  the languages of  Rabbinic literature. 
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and provides a series of models of forms of reasoning. At no point does the 
Talmud itself identify rules  of interpretation instead it simply sets  out the 
process and encourages the reader to join the debate. Its reasoning is  made 
visible but not completely visible and this suggests that there is something to 
be gained by hiding aspects  of its  reasoning.  The  Talmud also  rejects the 
temptation to generalise or abstract its reasoning instead it stays close to the 
particular details of  the text. This allows it to absorb the authority of  the text 
and to appear like a natural progression rather than an imposition but it also 
reveals  a  deeper  view  of the  relationship  between  the  general  and  the 
particular. 
3.3 The dominance of  the particular 
To the Rabbis who formulated the Mishnah and later the Talmud a principle 
is best expressed through the particular. A particular instance of a principle 
provides a potent visual image that can be more helpful at understanding the 
principle behind it than an abstract formulation.  The general principle does 
not  tell  us  more  than  the  individual  expression  of it.  Elon  (1994)  has 
described the Mishnah as predominantly a casuistic work: 
The idea implicit in all the actual instances mentioned in the mishnah 
could  have  been  expressed  by  stating  it  as  an  abstract  legal  norm 
without examples.  The mishnah"  however,  expressed it in a series of 
illustrative  everyday  examples,  some  possibly  based  on  decisions  of 
actual cases, and others on hypothetical situations. (1994, 1074) 
Handelman (1982) argues that the form of classification that is used in the 
Rabbinic texts, where the particular is never separated from the general and 
the  general  principle  is  expressed through the  particular,  arose  because  in 
Hebrew there is no split between the essence and the thing, or the word and 
the thing. 
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could create what they described. The Hebrew for word implies deed.
43  Thus 
language,  particularly  spoken  language,  denotes  creation,  or  action.  A  lie 
occurs  when  what  is  said  is  not  done  or  does  not  occur.  It has  no 
effectiveness. Therefore, it is an illusion. 
Study of the text would always involve reading aloud, not just because this 
would lead to creation but because of the nature of the language that it was 
written  in  - Hebrew.
44  When  written,  Hebrew is  an  incomplete  language, 
lacking vowels.  It needs  to  be vocalised for  the meaning of the  words  to 
become clear. 
As speech is a form of creation, the reader, by reading a text aloud, helps to 
create it.  Thus,  the reader takes an active part in creating the world of the 
Talmud, even when not actively fulfilling the laws within it. At the time of  its 
compilation some laws could only be fulfilled by studying them, as the acts 
were not possible.  (Laws relating to the temple, for example) This explains 
why  the  education  stressed  that  all  were  responsible  for  learning  and 
understanding how to interpret these laws. 
This attitude towards language has a powerful effect on the formulations of 
categories. Abstraction, the distillation of the essence of something from its 
concrete form,  is profoundly alien to this concept of language. To be able to 
make  abstract concepts,  language  must be  separable  from  its  object.  This 
prevented the  Talmud moving away from  the practical implications of the 
individual  halakhah it contained.  Equally the  underlying narrative is  about 
being particular, the particularity of  the Israeli people and the need to define it 
to keep it separate. 
As  it was interested in the detail and in teaching reasoning by absorbing the 
43  Boman (1960) contrasts this with the Greek logos which implies thought. 
44 It  is contemporary Hebrew, not biblical Hebrew and thus shows traces of  Aramaic influence. 
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reader in the text, the Talmud nowhere sets out rules of  interpretation or seeks 
to be clear about its methodology.  This would be absorbed by practice the 
student being encouraged to first memorise and then having learnt the tone of 
the Talmud to add to it. It is possible that making such an explicit statement 
on reasoning would have conflicted with the talmudic tendency to teach by 
example. Rules of interpretation were though set out in other texts and these 
do clarify the structure of  reasoning used. 
3.4. Rules of  interpretation 
These rules set out what is and is not acceptable as a technique. They are not 
set out in the Talmud and were probably first used as teaching aids. They are 
still important, these techniques do appear in the Talmud and the lists appear 
in  the  daily  prayers  in  orthodox  synagogues.
45  These  are  designed  to  be 
memorised. The lists of rules lay down the techniques of reasoning that can 
be legitimately used when interpreting holy texts. 
In particular, the seven rules of Hillel which were expanded into the thirteen 
rules  of Ishmael  claim  to  lay  down  techniques  that  can  be  used  in  the 
interpretation of halakhah.  These rules were clearly regarded highly, as the 
thirteen  rules  of Ishmael  were  incorporated  into  the  daily  prayers  in  the 
synagogue.  46 
These rules evolved to deal with biblical interpretation but were extended to 
halakhic interpretation and became standard forms of  interpretation: 
The reason is clear and quite understandable. From the moment that any 
halakhic  collection,  any  enactment, or any  other authoritative rule of 
45 The texts that they are found in are regarded as central Rabbinical words. The seven rules of 
Hillel,  first  appear  in  the  Tosefta,  a  collection  of Halakhic  material  designed  to 
supplement  the Mishnah.  The thirteen  appear in  Sifra an  early Midrash  on Leviticus 
(Sternberger 1996, 16-19). 
46  The other major collection of  rules is the 32 rules of  R  Eliezer ben Y  ose ha-Gelili.  These 
are used in more general interpretation. Halakhic interpretation can lay down rulings that 
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Jewish  law became  an  integral  part  of the  Halakhah,  it  was  itself 
automatically transformed into a  subject of halakhic interpretation. It 
was only natural, and self-evident, that new legal rules being added to 
the corpus of the Halakhah themselves called for explication by means 
of  all the available methods of  interpretation. (Elon 1994, 401) 
The thirteen rules of  Ishmael are as follows.47 
1.  Inference a fortiori. 
2.  Inference from the similarity of  words or phrases. 
3.  Application of  a general principle derived from one or two biblical 
verses. 
4.  Inference from a generalisation followed by a specification. 
5.  Inference from a specification followed by a generalisation. 
6.  Inference from a generalisation followed by a specification that is 
in tum followed by a generalisation, in which case one must be guided 
by what the specification implies. 
7.  Inference  from  a  generalisation that requires  a  specification or 
from a specification that requires a generalisation. 
8.  Whatever is included in a generalisation, and is also specifically 
mentioned to teach us something new, is stated not only for its own 
sake  [lit.  "to teach about itself'] but to teach something additional 
concerning all the matters included in the generalisation. 
9.  Whatever is included in a generalisation, and is also specifically 
mentioned to  add another provision  similar to  the general  law,  is 
specified in order to alleviate and not to increase the severity of that 
particular provision. 
10. Whatever is included in a generalisation, and is also specifically 
mentioned to add another provision that is not similar to the general 
law, is specified in order to alleviate in some respects and to increase 
in other respects the severity of  that particular provision. 
47  This translation follows Elon (1994, 318).  Sternberger (1996,  15-30) discusses the source 
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11. Whatever is included in a generalisation, and is  also specifically 
mentioned to deal with a new matter, can no longer have the terms of 
the general law apply to it unless Scripture expressly declares that they 
do apply. 
12. An ambiguous word or passage is explained from its content or 
from a subsequent expression. 
13. When two  biblical  passages  contradict each other, they may be 
harmonised by a third passage. 
This list is clearly a summary of  the rules. Rules 1-5 need to be more specific 
before they can be applied and when used in practice they are (see below). 
Even when rules of reasoning are  made explicit, there is  still the need for 
either instruction by a teacher or close study of their use in the text before 
they can be fully understood. 
Elon (1994) divides this list into two categories; explicative and analogical 
rules.
48 Rules 1-3 are analogical rules and rules 4-13 are explicative. 
The rules reveal attitudes towards the texts that they are used to interpret. The 
explicative  rules  in  particular  are  clearly  designed  to  be  used  when 
interpreting a text where it is assumed that nothing in that text is there by 
accident,  it  is  all  by  design.  They  operate  like  statutory  forms  of 
interpretation. They help to deal with problems caused within the text itself. 
The analogical rules allow development of the laws by allowing them to be 
used to similar situations or categories. The use of these rules is essential to 
the future of  the system but as shall be seen they are strictly controlled. 
The first three explicative rules, rules 4-6, all show when something in the 
text  can  be  ignored.  For  example  rule  5,  in  full,  states  that  when  a 
specification is followed by a generalisation, the generalisation broadens the 
specification, (i.e.  the specification is  merely an illustration),  and does not 
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limit the rule.  Handelman (1988,  225) and Mielziner (1925,  165-166) both 
use the same example for this rule.  Exodus 22: 11  states that "When a man 
gives to another an ass, an ox, a sheep, or any other animal to guard ... ". The 
Rabbis interpreted this to  mean that any  animal is  covered by the law that 
follows,  the  specific  mention  of the  ass  and  ox  and  sheep  are  merely 
illustrations and do not limit the law.49 
The  explicative  rules  also  detail  when the positions  of words  do  have  an 
effect. The following phrase: 
In all charges of  misappropriation - pertaining to an ox, an ass, a sheep, 
a garment, or any other loss, whereof one party alleges, "This is it" - the 
case  of both parties  shall  come  before  God:  he  whom  God  declares 
guilty shall pay double to the other. (Exodus 22:8) 
Is interpreted using rule 6 in T.  Baba Kamma 62b: 
As  our  Rabbis  taught:  "In  all  charges  of misappropriation"  IS  a 
generalization.  "Pertaining to  an ox,  an ass,  a sheep,  a garment" is  a 
specification. "Or any other loss" generalizes again. We thus have here 
a generalization preceding a specification which is in turn followed by a 
generalization, and in such cases we include only that which is similar 
to  the specification.  Just as  the specification here mentions an object 
which  is  movable  and  which  has  an  intrinsic  value,  there  should 
therefore be included any  object which is movable and which has an 
intrinsic value.  50 
The problem that the interpreters faced in interpreting the rule in Exodus was 
what should be  included in the  list of things  for  which double payment is 
required. They could have simply asked what is similar about the three things 
specified and used this to define "any other loss." To an extent in deciding 
that the rule covers items that are moveable and of  intrinsic value, they do so. 
49  Given the prevailing  attitude towards generalisation it  is  not  surprising that these points 
should be made clear. 
50 The passage from the Talmud has been slightly altered. The biblical quotes used by Epstein 
have  been  replaced  by  the JPS  (1985) translation  to ensure  consistency between the 
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But this is not the reason that they give. The Rabbis instead explain that they 
are following a rule which is closely linked to the word order. The focus is on 
the details of the text and there is no  attempt to find  a deeper meaning or 
principle behind the decision. 
A particular problem arises when these texts are treated thus because they do 
contain ambiguities and contradictions.  One way around the contradictions 
has  been seen above,  they are  simply accepted and allowed to  generate a 
flexible concept of truth.  The final  explicative rules, rules  12  and  13  show 
how some of  the contradictions can be reconciled. 
Rule  12  reconciles  ambiguities  by  looking  at  the  context  of the  difficult 
phrase. Deuteronomy 19:6 states that: 
Otherwise, when the distance is great, the blood-avenger, pursuing the 
manslayer in hot anger, may overtake him and kill him; yet he did not 
incur the death penalty, since he had never been the other's enemy. 
In Deuteronomy, this is part of an exhortation to set up cities of  refuge where 
blood vengeance can not happen, but in the Talmud the question the Rabbis 
try to answer is who in this law "does not incur the death penalty," the blood-
avenger or the manslayer. This seems obvious from the context and, indeed, 
the Rabbis point to the final phrase in the law, since he had never been the 
other's enemy and deduce that it refers to the blood-avenger.
51 
It almost seems strange that a rule is needed for this, but this again arises 
because of  the status of  the text. Every phrase is deemed to be full of  meaning 
and therefore, there needs to be a reason for  going beyond the immediate 
words.  52  Rule 13  goes further and takes the Bible as a whole, so that where 
51  There is a dissenting voice which points out that it could refer to the manslayer who has 
after all killed by accident and not out of  enmity. 
52  See D.M.Walker (2001,402-403) where he discusses three principles of  interpretation that 
are used in statutory interpretation. The first noscitur a sociis is very similar to this rule 
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two verses conflict a third can be found to explain it This seems logical but it 
means that in such circumstances, interpreters cannot go behind the rules to 
an explanatory principle but must look else where in the text. 
The explicative rules deal with problems that arise from the status of  the text. 
The analogical rules allow the text to adapt and change. They start from the 
text and allow it to expand by using comparison. Analogy can be used without 
rules.  The rules are used to show what sort of analogy is legitimate when it 
comes  to  interpreting  laws.  They  act  as  a  restriction  to  analogical 
interpretation. In addition to this, the rules themselves are further restricted. 
The first  analogical rule is  the argument a fortiori.  It literally translates as 
light is to heavy. (Stemberger 1996) To give a biblical example: 
Well I know how defiant and stiffnecked you are: even now, while I am 
still alive in your midst, you have been defiant toward the Lord; how 
much more, then, when I am dead! (Deut. 31 :27) 
This rule hinges on the phrase 'how much more.' According to Handelman 
(1982,  54)  this  demonstrates  a  "perception  of  resemblance  despite 
difference." (Handelman 1982, 54)53 As this rule relates to halakhah its use is 
restricted. It cannot be used to increase the severity of the penalty applied
54 
and it cannot be used to create a completely new halakhah.  55 
The restrictions on the use of rule 2 are even stricter. Halakhah can only be 
created  using this  rule,  known  as  a  gezera  shawah,  if the  person putting 
forward the interpretation heard it originally from hislher teacher: 
A man may infer a ruling a minori ad majus on his own but he may not 
accompanying words." The other two principles expressio unius est exclusio alterius and 
ejusdem generis are similar to some of the other explicatory principles which deal with 
the general and particular. 
53  Handelman  (1982,  52-56)  explains  the difference  between  this  rule  and  the  syllogism. 
Syllogistic reasoning shows that the facts in the minor premise belongs to the class of  the 
major premise.  Instead here similarity is shown despite difference,  one is not subsumed 
into the other. 
54 Baba Kamma 2:5 
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infer on his own one that is derived from a Gezera Shawah. (T.  Niddah. 
19b)56 
A gezera shawah is used to link phrases together because they share the same 
word or phrase and it is this that distinguishes it from the first rule which 
concentrates on factual similarities. In the following extract from the Talmud, 
the word anger is used to link a saying from Deuteronomy concerning Moses 
with a phrase from Proverbs: 
R  Eleazar said: A man who gives charity in secret is greater than Moses 
our Teacher, for of  Moses it is written, For I was afraid because of the 
anger  and  the  wrath,  and  of one  who  gives  charity  [  secretly]  it is 
written, A gift in secret subdues anger. (T. Baba Bathra 9b) 
The  third analogical  rule  seems  to  suggest  that general  principles can be 
created. Instead what it actually does is limit the making of such principles. 
This rule allows a specific rule to be used to cover other situations. It makes 
the rule more general but, as this example shows, there is no move beyond 
this to an abstract level of  principle: 
He who seizes millstones transgresses a negative commandment, and is 
liable on the count of taking two distinct utensils, since it is said, He 
shall not take the mill  and the upper millstone alone did they speak, 
[Deut 24:6]. And not concerning a mill and the upper millstone alone 
did they  speak,  but  concerning any  utensil  with which they prepare 
food, as it is said, for he seizes a man's life as a pledge. (Baba Mesia 
9:13) 
In allowing  one  rule  to  cover a  new area,  the  Talmud allows the law to 
develop by using one part of the Torah to explain another. This is not used 
systematically and there remains a reluctance to go beyond the text and bring 
out general principles that could be seen in the laws. 
56  Elon's discussion of this rule (1994,  351-355) concentrates on whether it should only be 
applied when the words are superfluous. This has been considered by some to be another 
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Elon relates that traditionally the rules of  analogy have been ranked in order 
of priority. This could be seen as a ranking of  their persuasive power. Rule 2 
is  regarded as  the most persuasive followed by rule  1 and this may explain 
why rule 2 is more restricted and why the restrictions on rule 1 are more than 
those on rule 3 which is limited in itself  57 
Analogy  seems to be regarded as  potentially dangerous  if left unrestricted, 
particularly  analogy  that  is  highly  persuasive.  Yet  analogy  as  a  form  of 
comparison  is  the  dominant  fonn  of reasoning  in the  Talmud.  Even  the 
explicative rules deal with comparison, with when general and specific facts 
can be used to compare and contrast with each other.  Yet the preference for 
the particular remains. Indeed: 
The  Talmud also  states that  one  may  not base a legal decision on a 
halachic  statement,  unless  that  statement  was  applied  to  an  actual 
incident. Hence a lesson derived from  a story where the principle was 
applied  has  greater  substantiality  than  a  direct  statement  of the 
principle. That a lesson or law derived from a "story" in the Talmud has 
greater  validity  than  a  law  directly  stated  in  the  Talmud  firmly 
underscores the priority of the concrete embodiment of a thought over 
its abstract representation" (Handelman 1982,66) 
All  of the rules  of interpretation limit the creativity of those  scholars who 
seek to interpret and apply the laws.  Interpretations to be acceptable as  law 
that would affect people lives and be regarded as divine needed to fit very 
high  standards.  The  complex  structure  that  surrounded  the  reasoning  also 
lessens  any  sense of individual bias.  The  factors  that bind the scholars are 
subtle and shared by the rest of  the community and this clearly helps to make 
their  pronouncements  more  authoritative.  It  is  this  complex  and  often 
subconscious structure that is the key to the Talmud's success. 
57  Mielziner (1925,  150) argues that these restrictions were introduced because analogy was 
being abused by being extended too far  and thereby falling into disrepute. Restrictions 
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Arisotle's rhetoric 
1. Introduction 
If the  Talmud encourages  all  its  readers  to  become  judges,  Aristotle58  is 
seeking to understand how people can be persuasive in a structure where all 
are citizens and can say anything but laws have limited impact In this the 
phenomenon he is  seeking to understand is much closer to the world of the 
legal theorists in chapter 2 who have to deal with a space where everything is 
sayable.  This does  not mean that everything is persuasive and it is this that 
Aristotle seeks to understand. He also though seeks to improve upon the way 
in which rhetoric is used in Athens and there is a tension in his work between 
his desire to simply understand what is there and to change it This will also 
be considered in this study which concentrates on his work on rhetoric, the 
Ars rhetorica or Rhetoric.  59 
This book is a collection of lectures given by Aristotle to his pupils when he 
was teaching in the Lyceum.  At the time that Aristotle was teaching in the 
Lyceum, there would have been a number of people throughout Athens who 
would  have  been  promising  to  teach  young  men  to  speak  welL  Plato, 
Aristotle's teacher,  was  dismissive of these teachers and regarded them as 
little better than flatterers. (Plato 1953,551)60 He did not teach rhetoric at the 
Academy. 
Aristotle did teach rhetoric.  He  felt that speech was an inherent part of the 
nature of  man and a fundamental aspect of  life. In Politics he writes: 
Now,  that man is  more  of a political animal than bees or any  other 
gregarious animal is evident Nature, as we often say, makes nothing in 
58  For an overview of his work see Barnes (1995).  Evans (1987) describes why Aristotle's 
work is still influential as well as introducing basic concepts.  Chroust (1973) critically 
evaluates the evidence about his life. 
59 References to Aristotle's work are from the Barnes' Complete Works (1984) . 
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vain,  and  man  is  the  only  animal  who  has  the  gift of speech.  And 
whereas  mere  voice  is  but  an indication of pleasure  or pain,  and  is 
therefore found in other animals ...  the power of speech is intended to 
set forth the expedient and inexpedient, and therefore likewise the just 
and the unjust.  And it is  characteristic of man that he  alone  has  any 
sense  of good  and  evil,  of just  and  unjust,  and  the  like,  and  the 
association of living beings who have this sense makes a family and a 
state. (Pol 1253a6.tl 
Speech and choice are placed at the core of  the identity of  people and as will 
be seen the relationship between speech and identity is central to Aristotle's 
understanding of the role  of emotions and character in rhetoric.  Speech is 
always seen in relationship and this is certainly true of rhetoric. Rhetoric is 
though only one of these forms  of speech and Aristotle seeks to understand 
what it means in a very specific context - fourth century Athens.  62 
Aristotle  taught  rhetoric  because  it  was  an  important  part  of life  for  an 
Athenian  citizen.
63  Athens  had  a  form  of democracy  which  would  impel 
participation and to  an extent force  citizens to  approach each other on an 
equal footing.  The Athenian democratic structure was based on speech.  All 
citizens  could  participate  in  the  assembly,  the  centre  of government,  by 
making speeches. At public events display speeches would be at the heart of 
the proceedings and in the courts representation was not allowed, any citizen 
who wished to pursue or was pursued through the courts would need to speak 
to both accuse and defend. 
61  Interestingly,  when Aristotle defines  the three types of rhetoric,  they correspond to this 
passage.  They  deal  with just/unjust,  expedient/inexpedient  and praiselblame (good and 
evil).  It may  be  that  it  was  because  he  saw  rhetoric  as  not  purely  artificial  but  as 
corresponding to something instinctive about man that Aristotle regarded it as a separate 
form of  study. 
62  Trittle  (1997)  and  Garner  (1987)  provide  a  good introduction to the fourth  century in 
Athens. Aristotle's own constitution of  Athens is a primary source for information on the 
political institutions. 
63  Rhetoric  had  been  studied  before  - see  Grimaldi  (1996)  and  Poulakis  (1996)  for  an 
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Aristotle, though aware of the inevitability of the place of emotions in this 
structure, was also aware of their dangers particularly when the issue is not 
personal advancement but justice where he would prefer an impartial judge. 
He  seems to feel  that the open political space is somehow an inappropriate 
place to discuss such matters: 
The arousing of  prejudice, pity, anger and similar emotions has nothing 
to  do  with essential facts,  but is  merely a personal appeal to the man 
who is judging the case. (Rhet 1354a15) 
Aristotle's dissatisfaction with some aspects of rhetoric in practice led to a 
conflict within his work Aristotle did not simply want to pass on practical 
skills and attempts in the Rhetoric to give the first philosophical and detailed 
explanation for why this phenomena worked, why language used in a certain 
way could persuade an audience of an idea when expressed in another way 
the speaker would be less  assured of success.  This  led to  him giving two 
separate definitions of rhetoric.  The first  is  theoretical and links rhetoric to 
logic and reasoning: 
It  is clear, then, that the technical study of  rhetoric is concerned with the 
modes of persuasion. Now persuasion is a sort of demonstration (since 
we  are most fully  persuaded when we consider a thing to  have been 
demonstrated)~ the orator's demonstration is an enthymeme, and this is, 
in  general,  the  most  effective  of the  modes  of  persuasion~  the 
enthymeme is a sort of  deduction (the consideration of  deductions of  all 
kinds, without distinction, is the business of  dialectic, either of  dialectic 
as a whole or of  one of  its branches). (Rhet 1355a5) 
The second which is  practical includes not only argument but also emotion 
and character: 
Of the  modes  of persuasion furnished  by the  spoken word there are 
three  kinds.  The  first  kind  depends  on the personal  character of the 
speaker;  the  second  on putting the  audience  into  a  certain frame  of 
mind~ the third of  proof, or apparent proof, provided by the words of  the 
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These two definitions are not fully reconcilable.
64 It could be argued that they 
are designed to fulfil separate functions. The first is a justificatory argument 
designed to dignify the study of  rhetoric. The second is a practical description 
of how rhetoric works.  Aristotle does not acknowledge this point but in his 
study having introduced the object he proceed to concentrate almost solely on 
the second description and the way in which an individual can learn these 
methods of  persuasion: 
These are, then, these three means of effecting persuasion.  The man 
who is to be in command of them must, it is clear, be able to reason 
logically,  to  understand  human  characters  and  excellences,  and  to 
understand the emotions - that is, to know what they are, their nature, 
their causes and the way in which they are excited. It thus appears that 
rhetoric  is  an offshoot  of dialectic  and also  of ethical  studies.(Rhet 
1358a22) 
And although these methods which are particularly emotional may seem to be 
beneath logical analysis Aristotle takes these aspects seriously and seeks to 
understand them. 
It is with this that this thesis is particularly concerned, the way Aristotle seeks 
not to dismiss but to understand the role of emotions and character and in in 
doing  so  generates  a  complex  picture  of the  interaction  between  an 
individual's identity, the character portrayed and the way in which rhetoric 
not only reflects but helps to shape society. The next section of this chapter 
will look at this and why the context had such an influence on the role of 
speech, particularly in the courts. Aristotle did not though give up on his idea 
of rhetoric as logical and rational and the final section of  this study considers 
how he tried to relate rhetoric to his wider work on dialectic reasoning and 
what this reveals about the limitations of  logic but also its usefulness. 
64  There  is  much  debate  amongst  Aristotelian  scholars  on  this  point  and  any  work  on 
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2. Ethics, emotions and character 
This consideration of the role of ethics, emotions and character in rhetoric 
once again brings to light the way in which identity is created and understood 
by the wider society. This section looks first at the institutional context before 
considering Aristotle's  explorations of ethics  and character formation  and 
how this relates not only to the ability of  an individual to persuade but also to 
what a society will be prepared to consider persuasive. 
2.1 Institutional context 
Aristotle wrote the Ars rhetorica within a context where speech was central to 
political life. The political system was built upon the ability of  every citizen
65 
to present their views in  the Assembly. This system not only provided benefits 
but by a system of lots made it, at least in theory, possible that every citizen 
would be called upon to administer the city-state.
66  An individual Athenian 
citizen,  who  would  have  felt  responsible  for  the  maintenance  of the 
constitution, had access to both great power and authority but to achieve this 
had to persuade other citizens to support him.  The central political problem 
then was how to persuade other citizens. This was of special relevance when 
it is  considered that there were few limits to this persuasion, particularly in 
the courts as can be seen in Aristotle's description of the use of laws in this 
context: 
First,  then,  let  us  take  laws  and  see  how  they  are  to  be  used  in 
persuasion and dissuasion, in accusation and defence. If  the written law 
tells against our case, clearly we must appeal to the universal law and to 
equity as being more just. If  however the written law supports our case, 
we must urge ... that not to use the laws is as bad as to have no laws at 
all  .... So far as the laws are concerned, the above discussion is probably 
65  There were other groups within the city and Sealey (1987, 5-30) describes the relationships 
between the three main categories of  citizen, slave and foreign resident. 
66  Yunis (1996, 6) and Sinclair (1988, 106-135) describe the sheer numbers that were needed 
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sufficient. (Rhet 1375b25)67 
From  our  point  of view,  what  is  interesting  is  what  is  missing from  this 
discussion.  In considering the role  of law in persuasion, Aristotle does  not 
consider how to  find  law, how to  interpret it or how to  apply it.  We  know 
more about the Athenian legal system than any other Greek system but the 
Athenians produced no textbooks and no works of  jurisprudence comparable 
to those produced later by the Romans. If  there was logic and a system to their 
law it remained "implicit and unconscious for them.,,68 As Todd puts it: 
Law is one of  the very few areas of  social practice in which the ancient 
Greeks  have  had  no  significant  influence  on  subsequent  societies. 
(1993,3) 
Fourth  century  Athens  did  have  a  complex  legal  structure  but  this  very 
complexity limited the  development of jurisprudence. Athens  created legal 
procedures and institutions but within this law was linked to individuals and 
politics. 
This  applied both to  the  creation and  application of its  laws.  If a  citizen 
sought to change a law or introduce a new law they would have to approach 
the Assembly who could make or change laws by a simple vote.  They were 
then published by being inscribed on stone pillars. These were dotted around 
the  city  and despite an attempt to  compile the laws  in 403/2,  it remained 
difficult to work out whether a law inscribed on a pillar was still valid. Every 
proposed change in the law did have to go through a committee who would 
scrutinise it and consider how it would affect the current law.  They would 
67 This technique is used in a surviving speech by Lysias. "It is the laws which urge the victims 
in cases such as this to exact this penalty.  I urge you to show agreement with them. If 
not, you will provide so much security for seducers as to encourage thieves too to claim 
that they are seducers ...  Everyone will know that the law on seducers can be ignored, 
that is  your vote they need to fear for this is  the supreme authority in the city.  (Carey 
1997,32) 
68 For a good overall introduction to Athenian law see Garner (1987). MacDowell's The Law 
in Classical Athens (1978) remains the standard text on this area.  Todd (1993) is very 
thorough and possibly a better introduction for the lawyer. For speeches from actual trials 
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instruct the assembly to repeal simultaneously any laws that it conflicted with. 
This, though, did not prevent conflicting laws standing.  The committee was 
not made up of  experts and relied on the individual who had proposed the law 
to  fmd  all  the  other  laws  that  were  affected.  If a  law  proposed  by  an 
individual was  later found  to  conflict with an existing law that individual 
could be brought to court. As it was difficult to know the state of  the law, this 
could be a useful political ploy against a rival.  69 An individual citizen wishing 
to change law would have been involved not only in a need to persuade others 
of  its use but in a complex calculation about the likelihood of  a challenge. 
Most of the "legal" decisions  of the  assembly,  though,  were  not laws but 
decrees.  This  distinction was  a  fundamental  one  and was  strengthened by 
reforms  in  403/2  BeE.  Decrees  did  not  need  to  go  through  the  same 
procedures as laws. They were not intended to be fundamental or unchanging 
and were designed to  be temporary.  They were passed by simple majority 
vote.  They could not contradict laws.
70  Again, it was up to the proposer to 
ensure that decrees did not contradict with the laws and he could be tried if  he 
failed to do so.  The system thus made the individual responsible for not only 
persuading others that a change in the law was needed but for ensuring that 
"his" law did not conflict with others. Both laws and decrees were linked to 
individuals,  most  laws  would  have  been  presented  in  order  to  further 
individual or group interests and Athenians could contract out of  almost all of 
the laws.  As citizens they would have been neither able to contract in or out 
of  the institutions. This was a status conferred at birth and which would have 
been at the core of the individual's own sense of self.  The community was 
generated by physical proximity and close relationships and reinforced by the 
need for these citizens to talk to each other.  71 
69 Todd (1993, 55-58) describes in some detail how difficult it was for the average Athenian to 
find laws. 
70  This does not mean that Athenians saw substantive law as part of a unified system. Laws 
could not conflict with each other and decrees with laws but this was a pragmatic matter. 
Sealey (1994,25-58) is clear that laws were seen as individual and discrete. 
71  Strauss (1986) points to the importance of  personal relations in Athens. Political groupings 
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Individual citizens were also responsible for the application of law in courts. 
A surviving speech by Demosthenes includes a line which refers to the oaths 
that jurors had to take and shows that they could not refuse to  come to a 
decision: "Nay, more, in cases which are not covered by the laws, you have 
sworn that you will decide as  in your judgement is  most just." (1936, 477) 
Laws were subordinate to the views of  the citizens. Todd suggests that statute 
law was evidential rather than binding: 
The function of a modem judge, whether in civil- or in common-law 
jurisdictions, is to apply legal rules to a concrete case~ an Athenian trial 
is  instead a dispute an agon (Gernet) or krisis (Paoli), which it is the 
court's function to resolve:  statute law in Athens does not supply the 
rules according to which the dikastai must proceed, but rather the limits 
within which they must resolve the dispute. (1993, 59) 
Juries then were generally expected to make their decisions based on their 
individual views of  what was or was not just in the circumstances. They were 
neither trained legal experts nor were they expected to justify their decisions. 
They were chosen by lot from a pool of men who had sworn an oath at the 
start of the year.  Jurors were paid every time that they attended the courts. 
There  were  practical  reasons  for  this,  service  was  not compulsory on this 
group, members of which would simply turn up as they chose to and a large 
number were needed every day as Athenian juries were very large. The size of 
a jury would vary according to the case, 500 for public and 2-400 in private 
cases depending on the amount of  money involved. 
The  procedures  in court were  relatively simple.  The  parties to  the  dispute 
would speak in tum before the jury and could present laws or witnesses to 
back up their case. The jury would make their decision by a simple majority 
vote,  taken by  ballot,  at the  end.  This  is  also  how they would  decide  on 
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punishment. They could not put forward suggestions or impose a punishment 
other than that which had been asked for by the parties.72 There would have 
been little time to do so - trials were very short in Athens. The longest public 
cases would take a day. Where private cases were being tried, the court would 
deal  with  an  average  of four  a  day.73  A  magistrate  would  sit  and  be 
responsible for procedure but would have had no judicial role. 
There was no scope in this system for Athenian courts to develop case law or 
systems of reasoning to fill the gap created by the uncertainty of statute law. 
Given the size of  the jury it was not possible to be sure why a jury had come 
to the decision. Earlier cases might be used by orators as examples of public 
standards but these would be merely illustrative and the court would certainly 
not feel  bound by them.  In contrast to the talmudic structure the Athenian 
legal system had no  legal memory,  every decision was treated in isolation, 
laws were part of the context of that decision but had no  greater influence 
than other factors. 
This meant that law both in its creation and application remained linked to 
individuals and circumstances.  There was no  sense of a hierarchy of laws. 
Instead there were procedures by which a citizen could face fellow citizens 
and appeal to a sense of  justice in the courts or political expediency in the 
Assembly. 
This  system  was  not  without  critics.  Aristotle  did  not  approve  of the 
flexibility of  Athenian law. He prefers the decision of  the lawmaker to that of 
the judge/jury and advocates that laws should be written to leave as little as 
possible to judgement: 
Now,  it is  of great moment that well-drawn laws  should themselves 
define all the points they possibly can and leave as few as may be to the 
72  This is what would happen in straightforward cases. But there were other more complex 
procedures and, although the decision of  the jury was supposed to be final and there was 
no formal appeal structure, cases could be reopened. (Todd 1993, 144-146) 
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decision of the judges; and this for several reasons.  First, to find one 
man, or a few men, who are sensible persons and capable of  legislating 
and administering justice is  easier than to find a large number. Next, 
laws are made after long consideration, whereas decisions in the courts 
are given at short notice, which makes it hard for those who try the case 
to satisfy the claims of  justice and expediency. The weightiest reason of 
all is that the decision of the lawgiver is not particular but prospective 
and general, whereas members of  the assembly and the jury find it their 
duty to decide on definite cases brought before them.  They will often 
have  allowed  themselves  to  be  so  much  influenced  by  feelings  of 
friendship or hatred or self-interest that they lose any clear pleasure or 
pain. In general, then, the judge should, we say, be allowed to decide as 
few things as possible. (Rhet 1354a31) 
This can be linked in part to Aristotle's snobbery.74 He had very little respect 
for the poorer citizens who formed the majority of the juries. In PolitiCS, he 
argues that for democracies to be successful they should ensure that the rich 
as  well as the poor undertake jury service.  This, he feels,  would ensure a 
better representation of  the public. The balance between rich and poor that he 
envisages  would be a mean,  in his  sense of the word,  but not an average. 
Indeed, Athens probably got juries of average citizens as many more citizens 
were in the lower classes. Aristotle almost seems to be suggesting that there is 
a need for these groups to be represented as interest groups.  75 
Aristotle's unease is not simply linked to his snobbery. He does not see self-
interest as equally problematic in all forms of rhetoric, he ranks deliberative 
74  Bullen (1997) looks at this and similar criticisms that Aristotle makes in Politics. Overall, 
Aristotle believes that all citizens should be involved in some aspects of  government but 
there are specific areas where specialist skills are needed that all citizens will not have. 
Waldron  (1995)  starts from  the  other end  of this  argument,  and  asks  what  Aristotle 
means  when  he  talks  about  many  being  better at making  decisions than one.  He too 
concludes that Aristotle meant this only in a limited sense and that, often, Aristotle would 
prefer decisions to be made by one skilled individual. 
75  In Politics,  he  also  states  a  preference  for  arbitration.  The arbiter is  more trustworthy 
because he is in the middle of  the two parties. Malloch V.A 2002  Historical studies  148 
or political rhetoric above legal because self-interest is clearer and not hidden: 
The reason for this is that in political oratory there is less inducement to 
talk about non-essentials. Political oratory is less given to unscrupulous 
practices than forensic, but treats of wider issues. In a political debate 
the man who  is  forming a judgement is  making a decision about his 
own vital interests. (Rhet 1354b26) 
The audience for a political debate is  involved in the decision and needs to 
take responsibility for it This would equally apply to the other main use of 
deliberative rhetoric, in private counsel. The decision has implications for the 
person making the decision.  The jury though has a distance they are bound 
only by their oath to be impartial. It is perhaps this distance, the fact that the 
jury will not have to incorporate their decision into their own lives that makes 
them  more  vulnerable  to  manipulation.  This  does  not  though  mean  that 
emotion  and  character  should  be  excluded.  Indeed  as  decision-making  is 
involved they are inherent to the process: 76 
But since rhetoric exists to affect the giving of decisions - the hearers 
decide between one political speaker and another, and a legal verdict is 
a decision - the orator must not only try to make the argument of his 
speech demonstrative and worthy of  belief; he must also make his own 
character look right and put his hearers who are to decide, into the right 
frame of mind. Particularly in deliberative oratory, but also in lawsuits, 
it adds much to an orator's influence that his own character should look 
right  and  that  he  should  be  thought  to  entertain  the  right  feelings 
towards his hearers; and also that the hearers themselves should be in 
the right frame of  mind. (Rhet 1377b20) 
He summarises: 
There  are  three things  which  inspire  confidence in the  orator's own 
character - the three,  namely that induce us  to  believe a thing apart 
76  Demos  (1961)  points  out  that  Aristotle  never  fully  separated  the  cognitive  from  the 
emotional in the way that later philosophers did.  Smith (1997) feels that Aristotle limits 
reason by making it part of and  a perfecter of natural instinct, it cannot, therefore, go 
beyond our natural capacity. Malloch VA 2002  Historical studies  149 
from  any  proof of it:  good  sense,  excellence  and  good  will.  (Rhet 
1378a5) 
This is  not simply about prejudice because ethics and character are closely 
linked. 
2.2 The role of  ethics 
For  Aristotle  excellence  is  the  goal  of every  individual.  He  does  though 
describe it differently from the point of view of the one seeking to achieve 
excellence and the one seeking to portray it to an audience. In Rhetoric: 
If excellence is a facu1ty of  beneficence, the highest kinds of it must be 
those which are most useful to others, and for this reason men honour 
most the just and the courageous, since courage is  useful to others in 
war, justice both in war and in peace. (Rhet 1366a4) 
This  contrast  with  Ethics,  where  he  describes  only  one  highest  good  or 
excellence,  which  is  purely  wanted  for  its  own  sake,  eudaimonia  or 
happiness. There are other goods, which are wanted at least partially for their 
own sake as well as for happiness:  77 
... honour, pleasure, reason, and every excellence we choose indeed for 
themselves (for if nothing resulted from  them we  should still  choose 
each of  them), but we choose them also for the sake of  happiness. (NE 
1097b1-3) 
It appears that communicating the way that the behaviour of an individual 
affects  others  is  more  useful  than  trying  to  persuade  them  by  abstract 
reasoning that it is the best way for them to behave. In Rhetoric, Aristotle is 
concerned not with the real nature of good and happiness but how to use the 
77  The relationship between these partial ends and the highest end is a complex one. At first, 
Aristotle suggests that the highest end for man is the active life lived rationally, but later 
affirms that it is the contemplative life. The link between the active and contemplative life 
is never made clear and this makes the relationship of ends a matter of debate amongst 
Aristotelian scholars. See Ackrill (1980) and Nagel (1980), Cooper (1977), Kraut (1989) 
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commonly held opinions about them to influence the decision-making of a 
large audience. 
But despite this there is an also an aspirational aspect to his work on rhetoric. 
Though useful, Aristotle wants to raise the standard of rhetoric by ensuring 
that his  pupils will approach their audience with the right facts  and a full 
knowledge of the subject matter and of the reason that they use.  Equally he 
tries to  ensure that his pupils will be good decision-makers.  This mean not 
only that they need to reason well but perhaps even more fundamentally that 
they need the correct character and emotional responses before they can even 
begin to reason well. This is because of  Aristotle's view of  ethical knowledge 
cannot be understood outwith the context. Martha Nussbaum (1986) argues 
that Aristotle even feels that our ethical knowledge creates the context: 
What  he  is  saying  is  that  our  most  basic  beliefs  and  experiences 
concerning what is worthwhile constrain what we  discover about the 
world and about ourselves....  certain things are so  deep that either to 
question or to defend them requires us to suspend too much, leaves us 
no place to stand. (1986,321) 
This is why the audience needs to be put into the right frame of  mind it is only 
if they  are  in  the  correct  emotional  state  that  they  will  be  capable  of 
understanding  the  situation  and  coming  to  the  right  decision.  This  may 
explain his preference for political decision-making where the decision-maker 
will  automatically be  emotionally  committed to  the  result because  it  will 
impact directly on his life. It also helps to explain Aristotle's concern with his 
own audience. 
2.2.1 Creation of  individual ethics 
In his work on ethics, Aristotle is very specific about to whom he is prepared 
to speak: 
Hence anyone who is to listen intelligently to lectures about what is 
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must have been brought up in good habits. (NE 1095b3-6) 
To  understand  ethics,  the  individual  already  needs  to  be  living  by  the 
standards that Aristotle  is  describing.  The process  of becoming ethical  or 
achieving an excellent character, they are the same for Aristotle, starts long 
before virtues  are understood in childhood with education.  As  a  child the 
individual is encouraged by praise and blame to follow the correct behaviour. 
This aims to teach the child not only how to act but also what are the right 
feelings  and emotions to have in different situations.  As the child acts, he 
starts to form his basic character. If  he follows good acts and learns how to 
enjoy them then he will develop a good character. 
It makes no small difference, then, whether we form habits of one kind 
or of another from our very youth; it makes a very great difference, or 
rather all the difference. (NE 1103b24-25) 
The moral state of  the adult is thus dependent on the child's and is logically 
prior to the intellectual state which is developed later.  78 The moral state forms 
the ability of  the individual to understand behaviour: 
For each  state  of character has  its  own ideas  of the  noble  and the 
pleasant, and perhaps the good man differs from others most by seeing 
the truth in each class of  things, being as it were the norm and measure 
of  them. (NE 1113a31-35) 
In adulthood the process becomes more complex.  As the man gains more 
experience  and  as  his  ability  to  reason  improves  so  will  his  ability  to 
understand the ends that his childhood training and habits have provided him 
with. This, in turn, will affect the way he sees and understands those ends. At 
this  stage,  the  interaction  between  the  two  aspects  becomes  increasingly 
blurred. Aristotle wants to give these men of  good habits better reason, to give 
78 Meyer (1993) has explored the issues that this raises for moral responsibility. She concludes 
that  even  when  an  individual  can  be regarded  as  not responsible  for  their  character 
because  that was founded  at  a  time  when  they  had  limited  power they  can  still  be 
responsible  for  their  actions  because  of Aristotle's  descriptions  of causality  and 
voluntariness.  Her study,  though,  does  show that  Aristotle's description of character 
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them  a better aim so  that they may achieve  excellence.
79  This  consists of 
providing them with the reasoning to help them understand their already good 
habits.  The profound circularity of the concept shows Aristotle's ethics are 
founded in a trust of the individual, the individual who has been brought up 
well  and  in the  world he inhabits.  This  is  why  it is  a  good  man that is 
Aristotle's model, not a rational principle. 
This is relevant for rhetoric, where Aristotle seems to be at his most a-moral, 
particularly  when  it  comes  to  the  deliberate  manipulation  of emotional 
responses as it would give the man who had an excellent character a built-in 
advantage when it came to debate.  The man of excellence would reveal his 
character through the language and structures he used in argument. He would 
also  have  an  advantage  when  it came  to  assessing  arguments.  Excellence 
provides the ability to perceive the important aspects of a situation. It would 
provide the man who had this talent with great subtlety in his perception of 
the character of others. Thus, the excellence of his character and his skill in 
decision-making and perception would provide the ability to excel in rhetoric 
(in theory).  Moral excellence would be reflected in persuasive talents.  This 
in-built bias in favour of  the virtuous acts as a riposte to those who argue that 
rhetoric is essentially neutral. Athens was a close-knit community, so people 
would be able to observe the behaviour and words of  others, particularly those 
who sought political influence over a long period of time. Aristotle's linking 
of ethics to rhetoric is ultimately not designed to simply insist on the role of 
virtue  but is  a  useful  reminder of the  oft-ignored  impact of emotion and 
character on reasoning. 
Persuasion is  achieved by the  speaker's personal  character when the 
speech is so spoken as to make us think him credible. We believe good 
men  more  fully  and  more  readily  than  others:  this  is  true  generally 
79 NE 1142a9. Aristotle also has a political objective. By showing how important the context is 
to the acquisition and the living of  a good life he hopes to show the importance of  both 
state education and legislation. (NE X:9) Collins (1997) has studied Politics and argues 
that it also has primarily an educative and political role. It seeks to encourage the student 
to adopt a positive attitude towards aristocratic government whilst showing them the best 
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whatever the question is,  and absolutely true where exact certainty is 
impossible and opinions are divided.  This kind of persuasion, like the 
others, should be achieved by what the speaker says, not by what people 
think of his character before he begins to speak. It is not true, as some 
writers assume in their treatises on rhetoric, that the personal goodness 
revealed by the speaker contributes nothing to his power of  persuasion; 
on the contrary his character may almost be called the most effective 
means of  persuasion he possesses. (Rhet 1356a5-13) 
This is of course dependant on social circumstances - what has been praised 
or blamed - Aristotle does assume that there are moral absolutes but his work 
can also be understood as containing a complex view of the way in which 
society creates not only the ethical context but the ethics of the individual. 
This is because he argues that there is a close link between speech and social 
ethics. 
2.2.2 Social ethics 
The relationship between speech and social ethics is most obvious in display 
or epideictic rhetoric where the orator praises or blames individuals or actions 
and Aristotle suggests this performs a similar role to praise or blame aimed at 
a child: 
To praise a man is in one respect akin to urging a course of action  .... 
Since we know what action or character is required, then, in order to 
express these facts  as  suggestions for action, we have to change and 
reverse our form of  words. Thus the statement 'A man should be proud 
not  of what  he  owes  to  himself,  if put  like  this,  amounts  to  a 
suggestion; to make it into a praise we must put it thus,  'Since he is 
proud not of  what he owes to anyone, think what you would urge people 
to do; and when you want to urge' the doing of  anything, think what you 
would praise a man for having done. (Rhet 1367b36) 
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rhetoric  that Perelman argues  helps  to  form  the values  of a society.  Ryan 
(1984), in a study of  Rhetoric, comes to a similar conclusion and argues that 
the language used to affect changes  in convictions could affect the desires 
both of  the person speaking and of  the listener, and therefore, their characters. 
As Ryan puts it: 
That Aristotle was concerned primarily with deliberative rhetoric, that 
he  showed great care  in  distinguishing acceptable  from  unacceptable 
kinds of rhetorical argumentation, and that he regarded it as imperative 
that the speaker have in mind a coherent, and genuine, system of  values 
- all  these  indicate,  I believe  that  he  saw rhetoric  as  a method,  not 
primarily for persuasion leading to action, but for conviction leading to 
a new,  changed,  or reinforced attitude,  which in tum would result in 
action.  And  it  was  this  latter  view  of rhetoric,  and  of rhetorical 
argumentation, that could very well have led Aristotle to expend on it 
the efforts he did. He saw it, I believe, as a means of shaping the ethos 
of a society.  Speakers, using the art of rhetoric, would over a period of 
time have a great impact on the ethos or character of society. In no way 
was  it Aristotle's view that the  ethos  was  completely determined by 
speakers,  but  rather  that  it  was  developed  by  an  interplay  between 
speakers and hearers, hearers on the one hand would be influenced by 
the speakers, and on the other hand themselves be such that they "are 
sufficiently disposed towards  what is  true,  and most of the time they 
attain the truth."(1984, 190-191) 
This is why Aristotle devoted time to rhetoric not only as a significant social 
structure but also  and even more so as a way of affecting ethics.  Therefore 
rhetoric is more than simply persuasion and is involved in the very shaping of 
society. This makes it very powerful and Aristotle is aware of  the dangers: 
And if it is objected that one who uses such power of speech unjustly 
might do great harm, that is a charge which may be made in common 
against  all  good  things  except  excellence,  and  above  all  against  the 
things that are most useful, as  strength, health, wealth, generalship. A 
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inflict the greatest of  injuries by using them wrongly. (Rhet 1355a20) 
This is partly because of  the field within which rhetoric is used. The example 
that Aristotle gives of a man who possesses excellence is  of a man who  is 
well  known for his  rhetoric:  Pericles.  This is  because there is  a close link 
between  moral  excellence  or  practical  wisdom  and  skill  in  politics  and 
legislation, though they are not identical: 
Political wisdom and practical wisdom are the same state of  mind, but 
to be them is not the same. Of  the wisdom concerned with the city, the 
practical wisdom which plays a controlling part is legislative wisdom, 
while that which is related to this as  particulars to their universal is 
known by the general name of 'political wisdom'; this has to do with 
action and deliberation, for a decree is a thing to be carried out in the 
form of  an individual act. (NE 1141 b24-28) 
Pericles could use his rhetorical skill well but those who followed him did 
not: 
So long as Pericles was leader of  the people, things went tolerably well 
with the state; but when he was dead there was a great change for the 
worse. Then for the first time did the people choose a leader who was of 
no  reputation among men of good standing,  whereas  up  to  this time 
such men had always been found as leaders of  the democracy  ..... After 
the death of  Pericles, Nicis, who subsequently fell in Sicily, appeared as 
leader of the aristocracy, and Cleon son of Cleaenetus of the people. 
The latter seems, more than anyone else, to have been the cause of  the 
corruption of the democracy by his wild undertakings; and he was the 
first to  use unseemly shouting and coarse abuse on the Bema, and to 
harangue the people with his cloak girt up short about him, whereas all 
his predecessors had spoken decently and in order.  .... After Cleophon 
the popular leadership was occupied successively by the men who chose 
to talk the biggest and pander the most to the tastes in the majority, with 
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Leaders  by  their  speech  are  capable  of raising  or lowering the  ethics  of 
society.  Although he believes that the power of rhetoric is tempered by the 
general preference for the good and the true. 
Rhetoric is useful because things that are true and things that are just 
have a natural tendency to prevail over their opposites, so that if the 
decisions of  judges are not what they ought to be, the defeat must be 
due  to  the  speakers  themselves,  and  they  must  be  blamed 
accordingly.(Rhet 1355a20) 
He is though concerned about the quality of  the Athenian audience who may 
not have been educated into the correct habits and, notably the critique of 
Pericles he records is of  the way he impacted on the audience: 
Pericles was the first to institute pay for service in the law-courts, as a 
bid for popular favour to counterbalance the wealth of  Cimon. ...  Some 
critics accuse him of thereby causing deterioration in the character of 
the juries, since it was always the common people who put themselves 
forward for selection as jurors, rather than the men of better position. 
(Const.27) 
This perhaps suggests that even men who have practical wisdom should use 
these  highly  flexible  arguments  of rhetoric  with  care.
80  Even  those  who 
possess  excellent  decision-making which cannot be used to  harm,  can be 
harmful when it comes to persuasion, or perhaps Aristotle is simply being 
inconsistent and recognising that Pericles could make wrong decisions. There 
is a certain amount of  snobbery in this critique. Aristotle does seem to favour 
those leaders who had distinction of birth as well as talent and is critical of 
those  who  actively  sought  the  approval  of the  majority.  Clearly  although 
society creates the  ethical  context this  does  not mean that individuals  are 
always bound by its standards, it can be judged by what it choose to praise 
and blame. 
80 "In the practical art of  rhetoric, one senses that the aim is not to know what phronesis is, but 
rather to exercise this virtue in circumstances that challenge its optimal use."  (Farrell 
1995, 195) Garver (1994,45) argues that in Rhetoric Aristotle is trying to encourage the 
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3. Logic and persuasion 
The  last  section  dealt  with  the  relationship  between  rhetoric,  ethics  and 
character. So far none of  this has dealt with the actual words and structures of 
reasoning used. Aristotle's work deals with this in two ways. First he makes 
the theoretical statement that there is a close connection between logic and 
persuasion. Secondly, he shows his students how to generate speeches which 
will be persuasive. This reveals that there is a close link between the reasons 
shown and the character that is made visible. 
3.1 Rhetoric as the counterpart of  dialectic. 
At  the  beginning  of Rhetoric  Aristotle  argues  that  there  is  a  close  link 
between  his  theories  of reasoning  and  his  theory  of persuasion.  This  is 
significant because  it is  in the  areas  of logic  and reasoning that Aristotle 
believed that he had made the most contribution. 
Aristotle generally built on the work of  others and was quite happy to admit to 
thiS.81  When it came to logic, though, he believed that he had created a whole 
new field of  study: 
Of  the present inquiry, on the other hand, it was not the case that part of 
the work had been thoroughly done before, while part had not. Nothing 
existed at all. (SE.  183b3Sl
2 
The  field  of study  that he  had  created,  he  did not  call  it  logic,  was  the 
systematic study of  reasoning. He divided it into two spheres - demonstration 
and  dialectic.  Demonstration  produces  proofs  and  deals  with  scientific 
reasoning.  Dialectic deals  with areas where there are no  proofs, where the 
issues are probable. Demonstration is ideally suited to theoretical knowledge 
81  "Moreover on the subject of  rhetoric there exists much that has been said long ago  ....  " (SE. 
185al0) 
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but dialectic is better used in the other two fonns where our knowledge is less 
certain  and  more  contextual.  In  Rhetoric Aristotle  states  "Rhetoric  is  the 
counterpart of  dialectic" (NE 1354al).  83 
He describes why this is so in some detail. He argues that rhetoric belongs to 
the same part of  the mind (Rhet 1355a15).84 It deals with similar subjects to 
dialectic, both dialectic and rhetoric deal with generalities, with such things 
as  come, more or less, within the general ken of all men and belong to no 
definite science. "Accordingly all men make use, more or less, of  both~ for to 
a certain extent all men attempt to discuss statements and to maintain them, 
to defend themselves and to attack others." (NE 1354a4 )85 
Dialectic and rhetoric then are tools, skills which can be used in a variety of 
context, they are not separate objects of study in the sense that medicine is-
they are  fonns of reasoning and in this  area they are very similar because 
rhetoric follows the structures of  reasoning used in dialectic: 
With regard to the persuasion achieved by proof or apparent proof: just 
as  is  dialectic  there  is  induction  on  the  one  hand  and  deduction  or 
apparent deduction on the other, so it is in rhetoric. The example is an 
induction, the enthymeme is a deduction, and the apparent enthymeme 
is an apparent deduction: for I call rhetorical deduction an enthymeme 
and rhetorical induction an example. (Rhet 1356bl) 
There are though significant differences between the two fonns of reasoning 
and this is  linked to  the relationships within which the reasoning is  taking 
place.  Robin  Smith (1995) believes that Aristotle's  description of dialectic 
83  Brunshwig (1996) deals with the implications of Aristotle's use of the word "counterpart" 
or antistrophe. He argues that there is a development in Aristotle's word and that he may 
originally  have  meant  a  historical  counterpart  but  that  this  altered  and  became  a 
theoretical one.  He also  suggests that antistrophe implies an  analogical or comparative 
relationship. 
84 Aristotle does not specifY which part but it is probably the calculative part. The parts of  the 
mind are described in more detail in the section on epideictic rhetoric. 
85  In Ethics (NE 1  094b 11) Aristotle seems to imply that the subject dictates how it  can be 
known. "Our discussion will be adequate if  it has as much clearness as the subject matter 
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reflects that its roots lie in a rule-based contest where there were very strict 
limitations on what could be debated and how. This had since broadened and 
Smith believes that by the time of Aristotle dialectic could be  described as 
argument directed at another person which proceeds by asking questions. 
Aristotle seemed to want to limit dialectic to something closer to its original 
source.  Dialectic,  then,  is  argument  within  a  restricted  debate,  indeed 
something almost like Plato's view of what rhetoric should be, for Aristotle 
though rhetoric is only like dialectic. The difference lies in the context within 
which rhetoric is used. Equally this idea of  asking questions and debate would 
be unsuitable for rhetoric where  a large audience was  faced.  This is  at the 
core of  the difference. Strict logic appears to be only suitable within a certain 
relationship where one individual can face another and where education and 
rules limit what is accepted as reasonable. 
In  the  rhetorical  context  there  is  a  very  different  relationship.  Rhetorical 
debate is defined as those things which people debate about: "we deliberate 
upon without arts or systems to guide us, in the hearing of  persons who cannot 
take in at a glance a complicated argument." (Rhet 1355a23) Aristotle feels 
that  there  is  something  about  the  audience  in particular  that  makes  full 
dialectic reasoning impossible: 
It is possible to form deductions and draw conclusions from the results 
of previous  deductions;  or,  on the  other hand,  from  premises which 
have not been thus proved, and at the same time are not reputable and 
so call for proof Reasonings of  the former kind will necessarily be hard 
to follow owing to their length, for we assume an audience of  untrained 
thinkers; those of  the latter kind will fail to be persuasive, because they 
are  based  on premises  that are  not generally  admitted  of reputable. 
(Rhet 1357a8) 
Rhetoric involves a larger, more political grouping and the orator must use 
whatever means are available. The orator cannot rely on rules or education to 
limit the attitudes of  the audience, assumptions can be made about prejudices 
but not about their capacity to  deal  with complex arguments.  The  form  of 
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person one is  wishing to convince.  This point is repeated more explicitly at 
the end of  Topics: 
You should display your training in inductive reasoning against a young 
man,  in  deductive  against  an  expert  You  should  try,  moreover,  to 
secure from those skilled in deduction their premises, from an inductive 
reasoner  their  parallel  cases;  for  this  is  the  thing in which they  are 
respectively  trained.  In  general,  too,  from  your  exercises  in 
argumentation you should try to carry away either a deduction on some 
subject or a solution or a proposition or an objection, or whether some 
one put his point which made it the one or the other. For that is what 
gives  one  ability,  and  the  object  of training  is  to  acquire  ability, 
especially in regard to propositions and objections. For it is the skilled 
propounder and objectioner who  is, speaking generally, a dialectician. 
Do not argue with every one, nor practise upon the man in the street; for 
there are some people with whom any argument is bound to degenerate. 
(Top.  164all) 
This is a very pragmatic view of dialectic and one that emphasises the danger 
of  being open to arguments. In dialectic though there is an option to choose to 
debate  or  not,  in  situations  in  which  rhetoric  is  used,  there  is  often  no 
choice.
86 
3.2 The structures of  rhetoric. 
Aristotle  does  not  simply  describe  the  process  of rhetoric  but  teaches  by 
showing examples and structures. The Rhetoric is a manual that can be used 
for  generating  arguments.  This  again  parallels  the  structure  of dialectic 
reasomng. 
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In books 2-8 of Topics, Aristotle gives his students the material necessary to 
put together good arguments. These are the topoi or locations from which the 
book gets its name. Aristotle provides lists of  rules that show the student what 
type  of premise  or proposition  would  give  the  desired  conclusion.  Smith 
pictures the student using these in the following way: 
Overall,  the  dialectical  method  of  the  topics  reqUIres  the  joint 
application of the "locations" and the inventories of opinion.  To find 
my  argument,  I  first  look  up  a  location  appropriate  to  my  desired 
conclusion and use it to discover premises that would be useful, then I 
consult the relevant inventory of opinions to  see if those premises are 
found there. If  they are, I have my argument: all that remains is to cast it 
into the form of  questions and present them to my opponent. (1995,61) 
The  amount of time that Aristotle gives  to  detailing the  form  of premises 
encourages the view that Topics is predominantly a training manual. As well 
as  showing what premises to use, he  also describes what form of argument 
would best support them: 
Induction is more convincing and clear: it is more readily learnt by the 
use  of the senses, and is applicable generally to the mass of men; but 
deduction  is  more  forcible  and more  effective  against contradictious 
people. (Top.  105a16.) 
In Rhetoric,  Aristotle also takes the student of rhetoric through the process 
that an orator should undergo to produce a complete speech. 
For example, Aristotle defines the field of deliberative rhetoric by listing the 
things which men deliberate about most often. He then shows what an orator 
needs to know to have the right amount of  information: 
These,  then,  are  the  most  important  kinds  of information  that  the 
deliberative  speaker must possess.  Let us  now go  back and state the 
premises  from  which he  will  have  to  argue  in  favour  of adopting or 
rejecting measures regarding these and other matters. (Rhet 1360a36) 
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needs to start fonnulating his speech. 
Having established the premises, the orator needs to know how to put them 
together into persuasive arguments, how to use fonns of  argument practically. 
Like  dialectic,  rhetoric  uses  both  deduction  and  induction.  These  two 
structures  of reasoning  shared  by  rhetoric  and  dialectic,87  deal  with  how 
premises support the conclusion of  an argument but do so in different ways: 
Now a deduction  is  an  argument  in which,  certain things  being laid 
down,  something  other  than  these  necessarily  comes  about  through 
them. (Top.  lO0a25) 
...  induction  is  a  passage  from  particulars  to  universals,  e.g.  the 
argument  that  supposing  the  skilled  pilot is  the  most  effective,  and 
likewise the  skilled charioteer, then in general the skilled man is  the 
best at his particular task. (Top.  105all) 
Deduction is  concerned with what inferences can be drawn from  premises. 
Induction builds  up  an  argument  from  related  premises.  Aristotle  did  not 
spend a great deal of time on induction and deduction is certainly the more 
important fonn. As it is concerned with inference and the rules that limit what 
deductions can be made it is, in contemporary tenninology, the study of  valid 
arguments.  Aristotle  describes  the  enthymeme,  rhetorical  deduction,  as 
similar to dialectical deduction but simpler: 
The  enthymeme  must  consist  of few  propositions,  fewer  than  those 
which make up a primary deduction. (Rhet 1357a16) 
This  seems  to  imply  that  the  enthymeme  is  a  lesser  fonn  of a  dialectic 
deduction. This view can be supported by Aristotle's definition of  the maxim, 
which is an even more compact fonn.  The maxim consists almost totally of 
conclusions.  The maxim is important not as  a logical fonn of reasoning but 
because it is useful to the speaker: 
One  great  advantage  of maxims  to  a  speaker  is  due  to  the  want  of 
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intelligence in his hearers, who love to hear him succeed in expressing 
as  a  universal  truth  the  opinions  which they  hold  themselves  about 
particular cases. (Rhet 1395b 1) 
In the section on the practical use  of the enthymeme and on the rhetorical 
proofs  in  general,  Aristotle  first  lists  material  from  which  proofs  can  be 
constructed: 
Another commonplace is  got by considering some modification of the 
key-word, and arguing that what can or cannot be said of  the one, can or 
cannot be said of  the other. ... Another is based on correlative ideas .... 
Another is the afortiori. (Rhet 1397a20) 
He follows these with examples of how this material can be structured into 
arguments. In this section of  Rhetoric, the enthymeme becomes the name for 
a  list  of persuasive  techniques  that  are  presented  ready  for  use.  These 
techniques  are  regarded  as  the  most  persuasive.  This  is  why  they  are 
enthymemes but they have very different forms and it cannot be that they are 
logically  the  same.  Aristotle  even  lists  false  enthymemes,  methods  of 
reasoning that appear to be enthymematic but are not.  The "rules" of reason 
do  underlie this, the enthymeme is still the most persuasive form because of 
its relationship to the dialectic deduction, but this section shows how flexible 
this relationship can be.  Aristotle even goes as far as to use induction as an 
enthymeme: 
Another line is based on induction. (Rhet 1398a31) 
Ryan  (1984)  argues  that  topoi  are  patterns  and  that  in  Rhetoric  and,  by 
implication, in Topics,  Aristotle is  setting out a list of patterns that can be 
imitated. In his discussion of deduction and induction, Aristotle tries to bring 
some system to these patterns to work out why some are more persuasive than 
others are but his  aim remains practical and this is  why the topics and the 
logic do not always agree. 
This  means  that  logical  validity  cannot  be  the  difference  between  the 
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enthymeme  is  not  a  form  of argument  at  all  but refers  to  ideas  and that 
Aristotle is arguing that it is the ideas that are conveyed that are the argument 
and not the form.  The form, then, would simply be used to express the ideas 
in the most persuasive manner. The enthymeme then is simply the word used 
for ideas from which it is possible to deduce or create persuasive arguments. 
It should  be  remembered that  the  material  that Aristotle  is  working  with 
already exists. Aristotle gives both forms of reasoning a theoretical base but, 
in both Topics and Rhetoric, there are inconsistencies between the theory and 
the practice. As  with the enthymeme, the list of deductions in Topics is not 
logically consistent. DUring (1968) sees these lists as examples of actual use 
and in this area the question of  logical validity is not a central issue. 
Again, it seems that it is the context that is behind the difference. Dialectic is 
limited in both the premises that can be used, in what debates it can be used 
and with whom. This may be because it was originally used in the context of 
a rule-bound debate.  Rhetoric is  bound by its need to teach students to  be 
successful in forms  of public speaking that already existed. It seems that it 
may be the context of use  and possibly the standard of the debate that lies 
behind the difference between rhetoric and dialectic. 
Another difference between dialectic and rhetoric can be seen in the way in 
which the rhetorical equivalent of induction is a much more important form 
than its more reputable and logical equivalent. Example, is presented in two 
forms,  narrated and invented.  These also are distinguished not according to 
the  logic  of their  form  but the  materials  that they  use  for  example.  The 
narrated  examples  consist  of facts  that  are  true.  The  invented  examples 
consist of facts that have been made up.  Further there are two sorts of these 
invented  examples,  the  illustrative  parable  and  the  fable.  The  difference 
between the two is predominantly practical and affects when they should be 
used: 
Fables are  suitable for addresses to  popular assemblies and they have 
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hard to find parallels among actual past events. You will in fact frame 
them just as you frame illustrative parallels: all you require is the power 
of  thinking out your analogy, a power developed by intellectual training. 
But while it is easier to supply parallels by inventing fables, it is more 
valuable for the political speaker to supply them by quoting what has 
actually happened, since in most respects the future will be like what 
the past has been like. (Rhet 1394al) 
In rhetoric the end, persuading a large audience, appears to dictate the means 
and this favours practical examples which work like induction and which are 
close to experience even more so than the enthymeme which starts from ideas 
and seeks to show that they apply. The dominance of  the particular which has 
already been seen earlier appears again.  Eugene Garver has argued strongly 
that the  key  to  showing  character is  not  logic  but examples and that this 
explains the tendency to prefer these to logical structures: 
The great appeal of narrative and examples is that they are obviously 
and immediately ethical, where enthymemes are not. Enthymemes can 
be the manifestation of a pure rationality that has nothing ethical about 
it. The goal of  rhetorical arguments is to make discourse ethical, and so 
a  purely  logical  argument  can  create  suspicion,  mistrust,  and 
unsuccessful persuasion. Hence the appeal of  narrative. One's choice of 
examples cannot help making discourse ethical by revealing character. 
Narratives are never ethically neutraL  Examples cannot help but make 
their reasoning ethical and so examples are nearer to the goal of  making 
discourse ethical than enthymemes. (Garver 1999, 120) 
Garver makes  it clear that Aristotle's goal is not to replace argument with 
narrative  but  to  make  reasoning  ethical,  logic  on  its  own  can  "create 
suspicions that one is being merely clever, not practically wise". This seems 
to be at odds with Aristotle's practical focus but makes more sense when his 
view of  the role of  rhetoric in society and its link to ethics is understood. This 
does not mean that Aristotle rejects logic but simply that he accepts that logic 
is  perhaps  less  robust  and  possibly  needs  a  more  rarified  and  protected 
atmosphere to survive. Examples are a shorthand linked to community mores. Malloch VA 2002 
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The aim of this chapter has been to generate a more complex understanding 
of the role of persuasion in judicial decision-making. This section highlights 
certain  aspects  of this  and introduces  some  of the  arguments  that will  be 
developed in the next chapter which deals with common law reasoning. It is 
in two  parts,  the  first  claims that in  seeking to  understand these  different 
forms in their own terms, i.e. the way in which structures and systems led to a 
system in which an individual could and would seek to be persuasive, that 
what has been revealed is the way in which both the individual and the system 
become  dependant  on  each  other.  The  system  could  not  survive  without 
individuals but also  gives  the  individual  a sense of identity and access to 
authority. The second part suggests that the distance between the system and 
the  person who  wishes to  participate in the system is  one that needs to  be 
carefully measured. 
1. Identity and authority 
In both systems a process was described whereby the individual's own sense 
of identity and the character that was revealed to a wider society was created 
through an interplay between their particularity and the communal structures 
which they sought in enter in order to be seen by others and by themselves. 
Relationships, indeed, were the key to both structures whether the traditional 
talmudic  form  which passed on not only knowledge  but responsibility and 
authority through  strictly regulated relationships  or the  political  system  of 
Athens  which linked all  citizens together by  making them all  individually 
responsible for pursuing their own interests but limited how they could do so 
by making them seek to persuade others in order to achieve this. 
It is  by  entering  into  and  accepting these  relationships  that  a  community 
within which an individual can seek to  be persuasive is  created. Before an 
individual can seek to persuade he needs to assert his identity as a member of 
the community with the right to be heard.  This parallels the talmudic saying Malloch VA 2002  Historical studies  167 
that  in  order to  understand the  law one  needs  to  do  before  one  hears the 
reasons,  in order to  be persuasive one  needs to be seen before one can be 
heard.  In both  studies  individuals  needed to  be  visible  before  they  could 
persuade  others  that their arguments  deserved either support or obedience. 
Their acceptance of certain standards allows them to be recognised and be 
seen as people who have authority to make decisions and legal interpretations, 
or the right to be heard.  This making visible is closely linked to the way in 
which  identity  and  even  the  character  of the  individual  is  formed  and 
describes the ways in which an individual can become acceptable, a part of 
the community. 
This  visibility  comes  at a  price  for  the  individual,  by  showing that he  is 
acceptable he needs to acquire a set of  socially acceptable character traits and 
identity, to submit to the standards of  judgment within the system. 
Individuals  do  gain from  this  system,  they  gain status  from their sense  of 
identity, they gain a place in the world and become visible to themselves and 
they gain power.  88 
Authority, or auctoritas, has its origins in Roman political experience. It 
comes  from  the  verb  augere,  meaning "to augment"  or "to add to." 
Politically it meant that those who had authority had it by virtue of the 
fact  that  they  augmented  or  breathed  fresh  life  into  the  original 
accomplishment of those  who  founded  the  city of Rome.  Above  all 
other  considerable  achievements  of  Rome  was  the  unrepeatable 
enormity of  the original acts that lay the foundations for the city's body 
politic. These deeds gave authority to the living as long as these citizens 
safeguarded  and  renewed  the  spirit  of that  original  foundation.  The 
shining beauty of  this beginning was passed down through tradition, and 
it  was  sacred  or  religious  in  the  sense  that  it  was  with  the  city's 
founding  that  that  gods  were  given  a  home.  It was  the  sacred  and 
88 Curtis further argues that our own individual experiences do not allow for self illumination 
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stabilizing cornerstone of  the body politic. (Curtis 1999, 105) 
The goal of  judgment is authority and specifically, the right to be seen as  a 
judge.
89  The  question of how much  choice  an  individual  whose  sense  of 
identity is related to this submission can have is not a simple one and is one 
that will be answered differently in different cultures  and times.  Indeed,  it 
could  be  answered  differently  for  the  same  individual  participating  in 
different  systems  within  a  wider  culture.  In  describing  the  competing 
methodologies of  dialectic and rhetoric Aristotle could be describing different 
roles or characters that an individual would use to express their identity at 
different times. The Talmud seeks to influence the identity of each individual 
in  such  detail  because  there  are  competing  understandings  open  to  the 
individual  in  the  other  communities  within  which  he  lives  and  precisely 
because its authority is limited. This would suggest that the more authoritative 
the system the less concerned it would have to be with influencing the nature 
of the  individual.  State  sponsored systems  could survive  with fewer  of its 
citizens identifying with the  law and with a judiciary who  would see their 
identity as judge as  less all-encompassing than a religious duty.  In the next 
chapter  on  the  common  law  it  will  be  seen  that  the  individual  who 
participates as a judge is very aware of  their role in the system and one of  the 
reasons they seek to be persuasive and to use arguments which support the 
foundations of the common law is to protect it as well as to formulate their 
own  identity  and  to  explore  how that identity  or  sense  of role  should  be 
formed.  This awareness is both a support to and a danger to the system. It is 
the  need to  prevent individuals moving too  far  away from the  system  and 
therefore  judging  it  with  other  standards  rather  than  participating  in  the 
system that explains why a sense ofthe correct distance is all-important 
2. Distance and participation 
In chapter 1 it was seen that Steiner has described two poles as the dominant 
89 In terms of  chapter 1 this could be seen as being dignified by being general. Malloch VA 2002  Historical studies  169 
approach to  texts,  critics  or readers.  In seeking to be persuasive neither a 
talmudic scholar nor an Athenian orator sits comfortably in either of these 
categories as they do not seek to distance themselves from the subject as a 
critic would, to do so would be to undermine its authority and use a form of 
judgment which comes from without rather than within. Instead, they seek to 
show that they participate in it, whether it be society or the text by persuasion. 
V S Naipaul has argued that the novel, a form which contains narrative and 
character, is only appropriate for certain societies where people have enough 
freedom to generate narratives and can only be written by an author who can 
see  the  detail  of the  society  but  has  not  seen  enough  of the  world  to 
understand the  larger  political  and  other  factors  which  inform  those  and 
which by providing an understanding of the broader context undermine his 
ability to see the details.90 This distance would undermine hislher emotional 
understanding and this is the key not only to good story telling but successful 
persuaSIOn. 
Some  distance  though  is  needed  III order  to judge.  The  danger  of over 
identification is paralysis: 
The problem with which Arendt wrestles is that we need compassion in 
order to have solidarity with the "oppressed and exploited," and yet this 
compassion is  politically pernicious  if it becomes the foundation  of 
politics - and takes the form  of pity.  Arendt says  that compassion is 
politically irrelevant because it destroys the distance between persons. 
In  the  intensity  of  identification  with  another's  suffering,  the 
compassionate person loses the capacity for argumentative speech, for 
talk about shared interests, for precisely those activities that arouse our 
urge to appear and that humanize the world. The compassionate cannot 
stand the suffering of others, and hence if they are moved to act, to go 
public, they eschew persuasion and negotiation in favour of darkness. 
(Curtis 1999, 90) 
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A judge who is too distant introduces alternative fOTIns  of  judgment and may 
fail to be persuasive
91  but one who is too close cannot judge. The next chapter 
considers the ways  in which judges in the common law have tried to both 
respond  to  society  and  to  ensure  that  law  remains  a  separate  criteria  of 
judgment in order to support their role as judges. 
91  This  criticism  could be made  against  the legal  theorists in  chapter 2 - indeed  it  is  their 
distance  and  their emotional  commitment to philosophy  and  to individual goals which 
make it hard for them to see these aspects of  decision-making. Chapter 4 
Judicial decision-making in the common law 
This chapter considers the role of persuasion in judicial decision-making in 
common law systems.  The common law is  an example of a system  where 
individuals make judgments where they have limited authority and therefore 
have  to  provide  persuasive  reasons.  This  chapter specifically  looks  at  six 
decisions of the highest court in the two jurisdictions considered, the House 
of  Lords. 
Although law lords have the highest authority of any judge in the system this 
is limited by a number of  factors, their position as un-elected decision-makers 
in a democracy, the collegiate nature of  the judiciary which requires judges to 
consider the views of others, the danger of being overruled or distinguished 
and positively the desire to create a precedent. Persuasive strategies are used 
by the judges in response to these limitations and both seek to reinforce and 
protect  the  individual  decision  and  to  legitimate  the  judicial  role.  The 
audience they are trying to persuade therefore is a multiple one consisting of 
their peers, future judges, the parties in the case and wider society. Following 
the analysis in the last chapter this chapter will look at the ways they ground 
authority and it does so through the law of negligence and, in particular, six 
cases which deal with the issues of  pure economic loss. 
Negligence is both central to and a border line issue for delict. It is easy to 
argue that an individual should be held liable when they commit an act with 
the intention that it cause harm. In this the relationship is clearly established 
by the  actions.  Indeed such an act  will  usually be criminal, although civil 
redress  in the form  of compensation may be sought.  Negligence raises the 
question  of  how  far  we  should  be  responsible  for  the  unintended 
consequences of our actions. This raises issues of who we are responsible for 
and what relationships the law is prepared to recognise. This area of law thus 
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the decisions considered refer to an underlying attitude towards the judicial 
role within society. 
The chapter starts by showing how the doctrine of precedent both provides a 
foundation  for judicial authority and a  restriction by defining what judges 
need to take into account, the material they need to use to generate persuasive 
argument. Distinguishing techniques show the flexibility of  this doctrine and, 
in  showing what judges can choose not to  take into account,  demonstrates 
more precisely what sort of  arguments are likely to be persuasive. 
At the core of the chapter is the exploration of  the law of negligence. This is 
in two  sections.  The  first  section  looks  at the development of the  law of 
negligence  in  Scotland  and  in  England.  This  shows  how  a  sense  of the 
relationship between law and society develops through the case law and leads 
to the creation of  different persuasive strategies or methodologies. 
The second section looks at two methodologies in some detail, principled and 
case-based reasoning. This study reveals that underlying these two strategies 
are  conflicting  attitudes  towards  the  judicial  role  and  that  rather  than 
undermining  this  conflict  helps  to  create  commitment.  Throughout  this 
exploration of negligence, a large field, six cases are used as the main object 
of study.  The first Donoghue v Stevenson
1  is the modem foundation of the 
law in this area. The other five
2 all relate to pure economic loss an area which 
is at the boundaries of negligence and this is why methodological debate has 
been to the fore in these cases. In concentrating on these cases they are being 
used as examples of the implications of this debate and this thesis at no time 
sets out an analysis of  the current state of  the law of  negligence. 
1 1932 SC (HL) 32, 1932 SLT 317. 
2 Anns v Merton London Borough Council [1978J  AC  728,  [1977J  2 All  ER 429;  Caparo 
Industries pIc v Dickman [1990J  2 AC  605,  [1990J  1 All ER 568; Hedley Byrne & Co 
Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964J AC 465, [1963J 2 All ER 575; Junior Books Ltd v 
Veitchi  Co  Ltd 1982  SC  (HL)  24,  1982  SLT  492;  and Murphy v Brentwood District 
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Precedent and distinguishing techniques 
1. Precedent 
The doctrine of precedent consists of inbuilt limitations in the system that 
dictate what judges take into account, the examples that they must use.  The 
rules are strict.  Judges are only bound by decisions of higher courts in their 
court  structure  and  only  by  cases  that  are  directly  in  point  but  in these 
circumstances they are  completely bound.
3  Cases which are not completely 
binding are also influential, decisions made at the same level or even in other 
jurisdictions can also be highly persuasive and often need to be taken into 
account.  Precedent gives judicial decisions authority by providing that they 
can use  previous  case  law to  show that they  are  coming to  decisions  not 
because of personal bias but because they are bound by external constraints. It 
also encourages the judges to generate decisions which in turn can become 
authoritative and binding on judges in the future.  In doing so it ensures that 
judges are not only readers and appliers of decisions but authors and in using 
previous  decisions  they  set  out  the  way  in  which  they  wish  their  own 
reasoning to be dealt with. The doctrine itself impacts on this as it dictates not 
simply that previous case law must be taken into account but what in that case 
law should be considered. 
According to the system of precedent, judges are not bound by all aspects of 
previous decisions. What is generally considered to be binding in any decision 
is  the  ratio  decidendi.  This  is  the  "statement of law applied to  the  legal 
problems  raised by the  facts  as  found  upon which the decision is  based." 
(Walker  and  Ward  1998,  61)  It  is  distinguished  from  obiter  dicta,  other 
judicial  pronouncements  on principles  of law  which,  although  potentially 
3 The Court of  Appeal in England considers itself bound by its own decisions as well as by the 
decisions of  the House of  Lords. Until 1966, the highest court was also bound by its own 
prior  decisions.  In  1966  Lord  Gardiner,  then the Lord Chancellor,  issued  a  practice 
statement which declared that judges in the House of Lords were no longer bound by 
prior decisions of  the House. This power is used rarely as one of  the aims of  the system 
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interesting and useful for later cases, are not ratio because they are not linked 
to the material facts and do not found the decision. The aspect of  the decision 
which precedent defines as most persuasive is the part that relates law to the 
specific details of the problem placed before the judges. This encourages the 
judges to stay close to the details of  the case. 
There are though limitations to this as a decision which sticks too close to the 
individual facts is not persuasive and will not found a precedent. This can be 
seen in the case of Qualcast (Wolverhampton)  Ltd v Haynes
4  the House of 
Lords found that a judge in the lower courts had misunderstood the concept. 
The judge had held that he was bound by the decisions of a higher court as to 
what  was  reasonable  in  specific  circumstances.  As  the  higher  court  had 
passed judgement on a case that was almost indistinguishable on the facts, he 
felt that he was bound by it and decided accordingly. The House of  Lords held 
that he had failed to distinguish between judgements of law and judgements 
on the facts: 
The question whether on the facts  in that particular case there was or 
was not a failure to take reasonable care was a question for the jury  .... 
The  jury's  decision  did  not  become  part  of our  law  citable  as  a 
precedent  .... Now that negligence cases are mostly tried without juries, 
the distinction between the functions  of judge and jury is  blurred.  A 
judge naturally gives reasons for the conclusion formerly arrived at by a 
jury without reasons. It may sometimes be difficult to draw the line, but 
if  the reasons given by a judge for arriving at the conclusion previously 
reached by a jury are to be treated as  "law" and citable the precedent 
system will die from a surfeit of  authorities. 
5 
Although the distinction being made is that between facts and law the Lords 
are not referring to an external standard but to the different roles of  judge and 
jury.  The judge will give  reasons for decisions which a jury would not but 
4 [1959] AC (HL) 743, [1959] 2 All ER 38 
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because he is doing so in his role as a "jury" then these reasons, in effect, can 
have  no  precedential  value,  the judge  is  not  acting  qua judge and  is  not 
persuasive. Indeed, these reasons, though the judge clearly feels the need to 
give some, are regarded as unimportant. 
The definition of the judicial role in the sense of defining what is or is not 
persuasive does not belong to the individual judge making a decision.  The 
ratio decidendi of a case, and the role and place of  that case in the system, is 
decided not by the judges in that case but by later judges who decide to use 
that decision: 
It is for the court which is later called on to consider the precedent to 
decide  whether the  precedent  is  "in point"  or "distinguishable"  and 
whether  binding  or  persuasive,  and  what the  ratio  decidendi  of the 
precedent is. (Marshall 1995, 117) 
A judge therefore  is  seeking to  persuade  not the  immediate  audience  but 
hislher current and future  colleagues that hislher decision is  persuasive and 
does  so  by using the  authority of previous  generations.  Slhe  is  persuasive 
when  others  agree  that  what  has  been  produced  is  a  workable  ratio  - a 
decision which has the character of law and that s/he is doing so  in hislher 
role  as  judge.  This  clearly has  echoes of discussion of understanding  and 
judgment in chapter one and this will be considered in more detail in the 
following chapter. It should be noted that there is one further limitation on the 
judge making  a  decision,  slhe  is  expected  not  to  use  the  cases  that  slhe 
chooses but those that are presented before him/her during argument. Indeed, 
if a  case  is  used that the judge disagrees  with slhe must either reluctantly 
admit that  slhe  is  bound or distinguish that case.  This  limits  the  personal 
involvement of  the judge and is one of  the limitations that stops him/her from 
pursuing a personal view of the law. Judicial decision-making takes place in 
the context of other decisions and of the presentation of reasons chosen by 
others. This does not mean that there is no space for a personal involvement, 
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2. Distinguishing techniques 
Distinguishing  techniques  allow judges  to  avoid  some  of the  rigours  of 
precedent while  at  the  same  time  reinforcing its  role  as  a dominant legal 
practice  by  focusing  the  attention of the judges on  certain  aspects  of the 
decision. There are no rules that limit what techniques can be used but judges 
need to persuade others that their decision to distinguish is correct, otherwise 
their decision will be vulnerable to  appeal  and,  in using techniques  which 
they feel will be persuasive and undermine the authority of  the case they wish 
to  avoid  following,  they  reveal  what  it  is  in  previous  decisions  that  is 
authoritative and stay close to the central tenets of  precedent. 
In distinguishing a case they can avoid attacking the reasoning in the previous 
case and thus setting up their authority against that of another judge directll 
by  instead setting  limits  both  on  the  case  that  is  before them  and on  the 
previous cases they wish to avoid. They can concentrate on either the facts or 
the law of  the previous case. On the use of  facts to distinguish cases, consider 
Lord Keith's analysis of  Hedley Byrne in Junior Books: 
That case was concerned with a negligent statement made in response 
to  an inquiry about the financial  standing of a particular company, in 
reliance  on  the  accuracy  of which  the  plaintiffs  had  acted  to  their 
detriment.  So  the  case  is  not  in  point  here  except  in  so  far  as  it 
established that reasonable anticipation of physical injury to person or 
property is not a sine qua non for the existence of  a duty of  care. 
7 
It should be noted that what is important is not the specific facts but the ways 
they  are  legally  understand  and  the  way  they  have  been  categorised  and 
classified.  In  Caparo,  Lord Bridge  shows  how this  same technique can be 
used  to  distinguish  several  cases  at  once  by  generalising  the  factual 
6  This  is  particularly  true where they  are  seeking  to distinguish  a  case  where they would 
otherwise be bound. 
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circumstances and then excluding the instant case from the category that has 
just been defined: 
The salient features of  all these cases is that the defendant giving advice 
or information was  fully  aware of the nature of the transaction which 
the plaintiff had in contemplation, knew that the advice or information 
would be communicated to  him directly or indirectly and knew that it 
was  very  likely  that  the  plaintiff  would  rely  on  that  advice  or 
information in deciding whether or not to engage in the transaction in 
contemplation  .... The situation is entirely different where a statement is 
put into more or less general circulation and may forseeably be relied on 
by strangers to the maker of the statement for anyone of a variety of 
different purposes which the maker of the statement has  no  reason to 
anticipate. 
8 
The most common technique though does not concentrate on facts but instead 
attacks  the  other element necessary  for  precedent,  a  ratio based  on those 
facts.  This  technique  uses  the  reasoning  of the  judges  to  undermine  the 
authority of the case by looking at one decision in detail or, in cases where 
more than one decision has been issued, comparing decisions within one case. 
Where only one of the decisions is considered, it can be distinguished on the 
grounds  that  it  has  been  disapproved  later,  that  it  misunderstood  earlier 
authority or that it dealt with a narrow field of  law and it does not apply. 
9 
When  more  than  one  decision  is  gIVen  any  differences  can  be  used  to 
undermine  the  authority  of a  case.  A  classic  example  of this  is  Lord 
Macmillan's  analysis  of the  joint  appeal  of Mullen  v  Barr  &  Co  and 
8 [1990] AC 605 at p 620-621 
9  All  of these techniques were used to demolish Lord Wilberforce's decision in Anns in the 
latter  case  of Caparo.  This  is  a  slightly  unusual  case in  that  this  is  one of the rare 
occasions when the judiciary directly take on the reasoning of  a previous judge and it is 
notable that even here they used these distinguishing techniques. See the way Lord Keith 
of  Kinkel deals with his use of American cases, [1991] 1 AC 399 at pp 469-470; and the 
way his decision is clearly defined into the field of  pure economic loss and out of  the field 
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McGowan v Barr & COlO in Donoghue: 
The Lord Justice-Clerk held that negligence had not been proved, and 
therefore  did  not  pronounce  upon  the  question  of relevancy.  Lord 
Ormidale held that there was no relevant case against the defenders but 
would  have  been  prepared,  if necessary,  to  hold  that  in  any  case 
negligence had not been established by the evidence. Lord Hunter held 
that the case was  relevant and that negligence had been proved.  Lord 
Anderson held that the pursuer had no case in law against the defenders, 
but that, if  this view was erroneous, negligence had not been proved.  11 
By showing the differences between the judges, Lord Macmillan undermines 
the decision as a whole. If he had wished to follow the case he would simply 
have chosen the decision he agreed most with and only mentioned that one. 
Lord Buckmaster, who supported Lord Anderson's view, does exactly this in 
the same case: 
In Mullen  v Barr &  Co.,  a  case  indistinguishable  from  the  present 
excepting upon the ground that a mouse is not a snail, and necessarily 
adopted  by  the  Second  Division  in their judgement, Lord  Anderson 
says. ...  In agreeing,  as  I  do  with the judgement of Lord Anderson,  I 
desire to add that I find it hard to dissent form the emphatic nature of 
the language with which his judgement is clothed. 12 
A similar technique is used to show that the decisions in a case do not support 
the proposition for which they have been cited: 
Leaving  this  on  one  side,  however,  it  is  not  easy  to  cull  from  the 
speeches  in  the  Hedley  Byrne  case  any  clear  attempt  to  define  or 
classify  the  circumstances  which  give  rise  to  the  relationship  of 
proximity on which the action depends ...  13 
In this statement, which comes from  Lord Oliver's decision in Caparo,  the 
objection being made refers to an apparent lack of clarity. This is at the core 
of  most of  these techniques, the decision is either too clear and too narrow, or 
10  1929 SC 461, 1929 SLT 71. These are known as the "mouse cases". 
11  1932 SC (HL) 31 at p 62 
12 supra at p 42 
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too vague and unclear and therefore can not be used. In this these techniques 
reinforce the doctrine of precedent by ensuring that it is those who fulfil the 
requirements of  this practice that will see their reasoning being reused. Indeed 
the practice of  distinguishing, the way judges relate to previous legal material 
is where the content of  the doctrine of  precedent can really be seen. The next 
section deals with the way judges use legal material and justify their decision 
through two  dominant methodologies,  case-based and principled reasoning 
and their allied persuasive strategies. First the background to the development 
of these  methodologies  is  set  out  in  an  historical  study  of the  law  of 
negligence. Malloch VA 2002 
Negligence.  14 
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Negligence is a vast area and this chapter concentrates on only six cases. In 
all  of them,  though  methodology  was  an  explicit  matter of debate  in the 
judicial decisions and this is why they are of  interest. This section sets out the 
background to these cases and places them in their broader legal context. The 
six cases considered come from not one but two jurisdictions, Scotland and 
England.
I5  These  systems  originally  developed  separately  and  the  Act  of 
Union of 1707 had guaranteed the independence of the Scottish legal system 
which has  remained a  separate jurisdiction.  In  1711,  though  it was  firmly 
established  that  the  House  of Lords  could  overrule  the  Court  of Session, 
previously Scotland's supreme court in civil matters.
I6 This brought English 
and Scots law into direct contact and in Donoghue v Stevenson which is the 
first  of the six the law was  said to be the same in both jurisdictions.  Since 
then the laws have developed together
I
?  and the other five cases dealing with 
pure  economic  loss  come  from  both  systems.  Their  separate  evolution  is 
though interesting as it shows the ways in which two different legal systems 
developed different strategies for dealing with the same perceived gap in the 
law.  Pre-Donoghue  the  concern  was  whether  or  how to  recognise  certain 
relationships as legal and post-Donoghue the focus shifted to how to control 
the principle contained therein. 
14  This  section  considers  persuasion  from  the  viewpoint  of the  judge.  See  Perelman's 
description of  French law in chapter 2 for a parallel analysis of  how attitudes towards the 
judiciary impacted  on the way in which the role  of the judge and  the  decision  were 
regarded. 
15 Technically England and Wales. 
16 In the case of  Greenshields v Magistrates oj  Edinburgh. (1710 - 11) Rob.  12 
17  There have  been  calls,  particularly  by  academics,  for  Scots  law to again be allowed to 
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1. Negligence pre-Donoghue
18 
1.1 Delict 
1.1.1 The role of  reason 
Viscount Stair's Institutions
19  is the foundation of  the law of delict and is the 
first authoritative statement of  the ways in which an action and its results can 
be legally recognised.20  Stair's description of delict,  one of the obediential 
obligations  sees  it  as  based  on the  need to  repair  for  an injury  lost  and 
ultimately authorised by divine authority:21 
Obediential obligations are either by the will of God immediately or by 
the mediation of some fact of  ours; such are obligations of  delinquence, 
whereby we become bound to reparation and satisfaction to the party 
injured, and are liable by punishment to God, which may be exacted by 
those who have his warrant for the effect. (Stair 1988, 100) 
At  the  time,  Stair made  this  statement,  Scots  law accepted  a  number of 
sources, including civillaw.22  Stair, though, saw not posited law but reason as 
18  Although this chapter does not deal with the development of  precedent. The development of 
this  doctrine  which  was not  fixed  until  the  nineteenth  century  shows  another way  in 
which the judiciary can be seen creating an understanding of  the nature oflaw and its role 
in society through the development oflegal doctrine. (Maher and Smith, 1988). 
19  The  Institutions  of the  Law  of Scotland.  (1981)  Originally  published  in  1681,  Stair's 
Institutions was revised in  1693  by Viscount Stair.  This second edition was reissued in 
1981, edited by D.M.Walker. It is this edition that is quoted in this essay. 
20 In Scots law, a small number of  writers have been given 'institutional' status by the courts. 
This means that in the absence of  other authority their statements carry the weight oflaw. 
21  In setting out the law of delict,  Stair's primary source was the Roman Lex Aquiliae, but he 
chose  to  ignore  it  when  it  clashed  with  the  dictates  of reason:  "Obligations  by  the 
Romans  are  distinguished  in  four  kinds:  in  obligations  ex  contractu,  vel  quasi  ex 
contractu, ex maleficio, vel quasi ex maleficio. Which distinction insinuates no reason of 
the cause or rise of these distinct obligations,  as is  requisite in a good distinct division; 
and therefore; they may be more appositely divided, according to the principle or original 
from whence they flow,  as in obligations obediential, and by engagement, or natural and 
conventional." (1981, 100) 
22  Stair himself was a student of both civil law and philosophy.  Stair had taken a general arts 
degree at Glasgow, he also taught and is believed to have been a teacher of philosophy 
with a particular interest in logic. He then followed a long Scottish tradition and studied 
civil  law  abroad  in  the  Netherlands  in  Leiden  during  an  enforced  period  of exile. 
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the ultimate foundation of  law: 
Law is  the  dictate of reason,  determining every rational being to  that 
which is congruous and convenient for the nature and condition thereof 
(1981, 73-73) 
Stair's acceptance of the role  of reason in law then is  strongly linked to a 
sense that there is a natural law which can be accessed by reason and which 
can provide an alternative authoritative source to civil law (posited by secular 
authorities) or custom (practice and the roots of  precedent). 
In this  specific  area,  obligations of delinquence  are  created by  individuals 
who by their actions become bound to one another. This is a distinct method 
of entering relationships  apart from  citizenship,  statute,  or contract and is 
primarily what sets this part of  the common law apart. In this area of  law it is 
the judges who assess that there is a need for legal intervention. Stair argues 
that  the  obligations  are  the  logical  result  of the  injunction  to  love  your 
neighbour as  yourself but the  role  of the civil  authorities  in  this  area is  a 
limited one which suggests that for Stair law had a specific and limited role 
which did not extend to imposing moral obligations.  Specifically, only God 
can punish the  wrongdoer.  Civil  authorities  do  though  have  the  power to 
regulate  the  individual's  responsibility  to  repair  for  evil  done.  This  is  a 
general  obligation and  is  not limited to  specific  nominate  delicts.
23  As  an 
obligation, a restriction in behaviour, it is limited to the negative injunction to 
repair  any  evil  done  to  a  neighbour.  This  obligation rests  on two  distinct 
concepts who  is  a neighbour and what is  evil, underlying any  definition of 
both will be a set of assumptions about how and where law should intervene 
(1988,  209-259)  considers  the  central  place  of philosophy  in  Scottish  thinking  and 
contrasts Stair who founded law on reason with Blackstone who saw past practice as the 
primary source oflaw. 
23  There were some specific medieval remedies, including assythment and spuilzie, which had 
survived and which  Stair mentions.  These remedies had links to criminal law and have 
since  either  been  abolished  or are  considered  obsolete.  (Thomson  1999,  1-7;  Norrie 
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to  impose moral  obligations which may have  wider compass.  Therefore in 
this area of law those making decisions about its application are required to 
not only a view about how law and society relate but how law should reflect 
the morality underlie Stair's description of  what persuasive. 
In the  eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,  institutional writers  were  more 
academic  and  less  theological  and the  civilian Lex Aquiliae became more 
influentiae
4  (perhaps  reflecting  the  difference  between  Reformation  and 
Enlightenment Scotland). There is thus a shift in the sense of  what sources are 
acceptable and though reason remains the method authority is sought not in 
religion which was being questioned but in easily verifiable authorities. The 
root of law though remains a wrong and this is not only a deliberate act but 
includes a negligent one as Erskine put it: 
Wrong may arise not only from positive acts of trespass or injury, but 
from blameable omission or neglect of  duty. (1989, 664i
5 
As  wrong  was  the  source,  the  judiciary  who  now  take  over  from  the 
institutional writers in developing this area of law now sought to develop the 
law by using culpa, a roman law principle, as a way of trying to set out the 
sorts of relationships the law was prepared to recognise on the actions of  the 
individuals alone.  26 
1.1.2 Culpa 
The development of negligence in the courts in the nineteenth century can be 
linked  to  specific  societal  changes,  the  industrial  revolution  and  growing 
urbanisation.  This  brought  people  into  closer  proximity  and  in  more 
dangerous circumstances. The attitudes and experience of the judiciary were 
24 Bell,  (1899, 250) follows the Lex Aquiliae's four-fold categorisation of obligations rather 
than Stair's schema. 
25 From his Institute first published in 1773. Bell makes a similar point in his work. (1899, 257) 
26  The  importance  of precedent  was  established  by  the  nineteenth  century  and  is  the 
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also  important.  In  one  of the  earliest  cases,  Innes  v  Magistrates  of 
Edinburgh,27 it was held that a person who fell into a pit in the lanes of the 
city was entitled to damages even though considerable precautions had been 
taken to prevent such an accident. At the time, Edinburgh, home of the law 
courts,  was  full  of man-made holes  as  a result of building work.  This may 
have made the judges more prone to decide for the victim. 
A major influence on the development of  the law at this time was John Inglis. 
Inglis  dominated  the  Court  of Session  in the  later  half of the  nineteenth 
century,  first  as  Lord  Justice-Clerk  and  latterly  as  Lord President.
28  Elliot 
(1954)  argues  that  he  was  central  in  authoritatively  establishing  culpa  or 
wroni
9  as the key to liability. In Campbell v Kennedy/o when he was Lord 
Justice-Clerk, Inglis stated: 
...  I go  further,  and hold that no  action for  reparation of damage  so 
caused can be relevant, unless negligence or culpa of some description 
is averred.
31 
Inglis was supported by the rest of the second division in this but there was 
some debate about its implications. The other judges were prepared to accept 
that culpa could be inferred from  the facts.  Inglis maintained that it was so 
central to the definition of  delict that it needed to be specifically mentioned in 
the  averments.  This  required those who  sought legal redress not to  specify 
facts  which the judges could then decide amounted to a situation they could 
recognise but to state from the start the specific legal principle under which 
the pursuer sought reparation. 
The difference of opinion in Campbell about the centrality of culpa supports 
27 (1798) Mor 13967. This case was founded largely on Lex Aquiliae rather than negligence. 
28 John Inglis was Lord Justice-Clerk 1858-1867 and Lord President from 1867 till his death in 
1891. He was much admired by his contemporaries. A laudatory biography was written 
shortly after his death by James Crabb Watt (1893). 
29  At its broadest culpa simply means wrong. It is also used to refer to unintentional wrongs 
alone  and  in  this  sense  is  often  contrasted  with  dolus,  intentional  wrong.  It is  the 
narrower  sense  that  came  to the  fore  during  the  nineteenth  century  and  led  to the 
exploration of  negligence by the courts. 
30 (1864) 3M 121 
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MacCormick's  (1974)  assertion  that  there  is  a  need  to  be  careful  when 
assessing the importance of culpa as a principle in the nineteenth century. He 
sees no signs of a fixed principle in the early cases. Instead, Culpa was used 
whenever there was a difficult case that dealt with unintended acts because of 
a preference for Roman legal terms and its meaning varied. The principle of 
culpa, the need for wrong to be established before there could be liability for 
injury, evolved alongside the use of  the word.
32 As MacCormick puts it: 
Not only do the courts in the process of  setting the rule to be applied in 
these situations bring into relief the element of  fault, expressed in terms 
of culpa, but these situations appear to have provided the medium for 
the creation of the principle. It was in areas where the basis of liability 
was  doubtful that the pressure for  the emergence and utilisation of a 
principle was strongest. (1974,28-29) 
This suggests that where the judiciary were unsure about whether they could 
provide  a remedy that they sought support and authority for judgments.  In 
effect,  they were  seeking to  find  legally persuasive reasons to justify their 
application  of law  in  the  absence  of any  pre-existing  legally  recognised 
relationship.  This  may  explain  Inglis'  desire  for  the  party  who  sought to 
establish  a  relationship  to  first  make  it  clear what  legal  reason the  court 
should apply. There was a sense that law should respond and that culpa used 
to  justify  and  rationalise judicial  attempts  to  make  that  response.  It  was 
therefore a useful category which allowed the judiciary to  both develop the 
law while making that development seem part of a rational structure rather 
than a  mater of policy.  This reinforced the authority of their decisions  by 
providing for  a legal standard by which their decisions could be judged. It 
also allowed them to develop a sense of  how this new society should be dealt 
with and provided the basis for a persuasive strategy that could be used to 
explore the relationship between individuals and the law. 
32  The first  reported case to deal with negligence was Caddell v Black.  1804 MOL  13905, 
(1812) 5 Paton 567 (HL).  This case cited both Stair and the Lex Aquiliae as sources of 
the law.  There  is  an  earlier unreported  case  of Gardner v Ferguson  (1795)  cited  in 
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By the end of the nineteenth century negligence or unintentional wrong was 
well established as the core of delict. The source for delictual obligation was 
culpa an act, negligent or intentional, by which an individual became liable 
for wrongful damage which resulted.  Culpa then is an act capable of setting 
up a relationship of responsibility between people. The problem facing Scots 
law was how to limit this very broad principle and thus what relationships the 
law was  prepared to  recognise.  Two  main routes  were used,  remoteness of 
damage and duty of care. The remoteness of damage route was used in Allan 
v Barcla/
3 and is described by Lord Kinloch:
34 
The grand rule on the subject of damages, is that none can be claimed 
except such as naturally and directly arise out of the wrong  done~ and 
such, therefore as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the view 
of  the wrongdoer.  35 
In  contrast,  Lord Kinnear in Black v Fife  Coal Ltd
36  felt  the  duty  of care 
principle was more appropriate as it makes the issue one of law as opposed to 
one offact: 
...  it  involves  a  matter  of law,  because  it  means  that  no  ground  of 
liability  in  respect  of negligence  has  been  established  against  the 
respondents.  But  negligence  is  not  a  ground  of liability,  unless  the 
person whose conduct is impeached is under a duty of  taking care~ and 
whether there is such a duty in particular circumstances and how far it 
goes are questions of  law. 37 
The difference between these two  approaches is  significant, although there 
may be  little  difference  in practice.  The first,  a consequentialist approach, 
encourages  a  concentration  on  the  individual  facts  of  each  case  by 
highlighting the physical results of  the act. The second, is grounded not in the 
consequences but in a relationship governed by law and thus  encourages a 
33  (1864) 2M 873 
34 Lord Kinloch sat as Lord Ordinary in this case. This quote comes from a note to the judges 
sitting in the appeal 
35  (1864) 2M 873 at p 874 
36 1912 SC (:m..) 33 
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concentration on how law creates and identifies relationships. This is a more 
general approach encouraging abstraction though it is still rooted in an ethical 
understanding of  responsibility for others. The approach chosen would dictate 
what examples and analogies  could be used to justify individual decisions, 
whether pragmatic examples of the likely physical results of actions or more 
general  examples  of responsibility  and  duty.  These  examples,  following 
Aristotle, would reflect and create the judicial view of the character of law 
and therefore their view ofthe role oflaw in society. 
Donoghue v Stevenson definitively answered this question by coming down in 
favour of duty of care and, in doing so, ended the formative period of delict. 
The impact of this case will be considered after the section on tort.  This is 
because Donoghue did not only seek to answer questions for delict but also 
for tort. It could do so because Scots law had become heavily influenced by 
English  law  in  this  area  and  particularly  by  Winterbottom  v  Wright. 38 
Winterbottom was decided on the English doctrine of privity of contract and 
the judges explicitly refused to create a general liability. Indeed, the House of 
Lords  opposed the  idea of general  liability for  injury  caused by wrongful 
actions.  They  felt  that  liability  should  only  be  created  by  consent  - by 
contract.  This reflects English law which had a very different development 
based  on  a  sense  of law  as  part of the  royal  prerogative  and  which  was 
reluctant to see any relationship recognised in law without the prior consent 
of  the parties. 
38  1842 10 M&W 109. This decision was followed in the "mouse cases" Mullen v Barr & Co. 
and McGowan v Barr & Co (1929 SC 461,  1929 SLT 71). The facts in these cases were 
virtually identical to those in Donoghue but the judges all gave different reasons for their 
decisions showing that this was felt to be a difficult area. It is possible for all judges in a 
case to produce a written decision but this is  rare and usually  occurs in  controversial 
cases,  and  indeed,  in  cases  which  are  regarded  as  of some  importance  and  likely  to 
become sources of precedent. This allows later benches more flexibility in deciding how 
to use the case and which reasons will be acceptable. Malloch VA 2002  Judicial decision-making in the common law  188 
1.2 Tort 
1.2.1 Access to law 
In England, the roots of  tort lie in the middle ages when an action for trespass 
was introduced into the King's COurtS.
39 Trespass simply meant wrong and the 
action was designed to deal with breaches of  the King's peace. Over time this 
'criminal'  action  extended  to  cover  areas  of civil  wrong.
40  An action  of 
trespass,  for example, would be used to recover damages from  a workman 
who had negligently damaged an object in his care. (Milsom 1981,290) This 
reflected what must have been a sense that the courts should intervene but 
these non-criminal cases were distorted by the need to bring them into the 
original formula,  which stated there had been a crime against the monarch 
and that force had been used. In 13 70 a new procedure was introduced. This 
made it possible to go to trial on the case, the facts simply stated, rather than 
having  to  claim  a  breach of the  peace.  The  dominant  focus  of law  was 
therefore access and how individuals could gain access to a space where the 
law seen as lying in the hands of  the sovereign would be available to them. 
There were now two actions, trespass and case. The creation of case did not 
lead to trespass losing all its civil aspects. Instead, it split the civil aspects into 
two, with people being free to choose whether to proceed by trespass or case 
to  attract the  court's attention either by alerting  it to  relevant  facts  or by 
bringing  it under the  King's jurisdiction by  claiming his  peace  had been 
breached. The two actions followed separate procedures until 1504 when the 
procedures  were  made  the  same  but  even  after  this  the  writs  remained 
distinct. 
It is not possible to understand English law without appreciating the central 
39 The sources for the history in this  section are;  Hepple (1984), Winfield (1926;1934) and 
Milsom (1981) 
40  Markesinis  (1977) argues that tort and  delict owe their similarities to the fact that, at an 
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importance,  until  this  century,  of writs.  A case  could be brought before  a 
court that on its facts was good in law but that failed because the wrong writ 
had been used.  Separate writs could have different procedures and law even 
when pursued through the same court. In tort the existence of  two writs, even 
though  procedurally  identical  after  1504,  caused  considerable  difficulty. 
Especially as  over time trespass lost most of its criminal connotations.  This 
meant that there was considerable overlap between the writs but, if  the wrong 
writ was  used - e.g.  trespass where case was  more appropriate - the action 
would fail. 
By the seventeenth century the situation had become very confused and it was 
not clear why one  situation should be tried as  case and one as trespass.  In 
Scott v Shepherrfl the judiciary tried to establish a logical difference to help 
to  resolve some of the confusion.  It held that trespass covered direct injury 
and case covered indirect injury.  This meant that wrongs were organised by 
injury rather than fault and led to tort being dominated by questions of fact 
rather than law.  This reflects the way  in which case had been created and 
contrasts with the Scottish development where Inglis sought to bring the facts 
under a recognisable legal principle and led English judges to create a series 
of nominate torts which detailed specific circumstances in which the higher 
courts had held that there was a relationship where there could be liability. 
These  areas  were  limited  and were generally restricted to  people who  had 
specific jobs, innkeepers for example, the nature of which meant that people 
relied on them to care for them or their property.  (Winfield 1926,  185-186) 
The judiciary were only prepared to recognise pre-existing relationships. 
Negligence was part of this structure but it had a limited place. It was not a 
nominate  tort  but  a  way  of establishing  wrong  within  the  structure  of 
nominate torts. Its role did become more important after it became clear that 
the difference between direct and indirect injury was not always an easy one 
to establish and there was another attempt to remedy the situation in Williams 
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v Hollands.
42  In that decision it was held that actions that, under the Scott v 
Shepherd rule,  should proceed by way of a  writ of trespass could proceed 
under case with no penalty. This did not abolish the difference but meant that 
it  had  no  importance  and  this  allowed  legal  focus  from  the  distinction 
between trespass and case to the torts themselves.43  Milsom (1981) argues 
that negligence evolved as the central question was no longer about the nature 
of the injury, focus turned to the wrong and in response to this lawyers used 
moral  language,  like  negligence  or deceit,  as  a  way of legitimating their 
arguments.  After  a  number of cases  used  negligence  as  a  foundation  for 
liability, it became a standard way for establishing wrong but only in cases 
where the law held that one of the parties had a special duty to the other. 
Relationships came first and acts second and relationships were still a matter 
of  choice or clearly pre-existed by virtue of  the social roles of  the individuals. 
1.2.2 Privity of  contract 
The doctrine of privity of contract prevented any development beyond this 
point.  The main justification for this doctrine was the unlimited liability or 
floodgate  argument  which  was  expressed  in  its  most  pristine  form  in 
Winterbottom v Wright: 
The only safe rule is to confine the right to those who enter into the 
contract:  if we  go  one step beyond that,  there  is  no  reason why we 
should not go fifty.44 
The issue in Winterbottom was whether coach hirers could be held liable to a 
driver who was injured in an accident caused by latent defects in one of  their 
coaches.  The  application of the  floodgates  argument can be seen in Lord 
Arbinger's decision where he justifies the dismissal of  the case by arguing: 
There is no privity of  contract between these parties; and if  the plaintiff 
can sue, every passenger,  or even any person passing along the road, 
42 2. LJCP (NS) 10 Bing 112 
43  See Pritchard's (1964) article for a fuller discussion of  the reason for and an explanation of 
the importance of  this rule. 
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who  was injured by the upsetting of the coach, might bring a similar 
action. Unless we confine the operation of such contracts as this to the 
parties  who  entered  into  them,  the  most  absurd  and  outrageous 
consequences to which I can see no limit, would ensue.45 
There is a strong feeling in this argument that law needs to be controlled. The 
legal  sphere  is  one  that  is  both  powerful  and  dangerous  and  that  could 
overwhelm other relationships so that it needs to be carefully fenced in.46 In 
this view of law the role  of the judge is  to  limit the potentially dangerous 
consequences.  Another justification put forward  for privity of contract was 
that  the  harm  should  be  left where  it falls.  The  classic  exposition of this 
comes from Bramwell, B. in Holmes and Wife v Mather:
47 
For  the  convenience  of mankind  in  carrying  on  the  affairs  of life, 
people,  as  they  go  along the  roads  must  expect or put up  with such 
mischief as reasonable care on the part of  others cannot avoid. 
Again this reflects a sense that people should be left alone to regulate their 
own affairs. There is a strong individualistic feel to such arguments that gives 
law  a  very  pragmatic  character.  As  society  changed,  though,  there  was  a 
growing sense that in certain circumstances it was inequitable for the victim 
to be left to carry the harm. Forty years after Winterbottom, Lord Esher, then 
Brett,  M.R,  reveals  how  much  when  he  made  a  concerted  attempt  to 
undermine the doctrine of  privity of  contract in Heaven v Pender. 48 
The facts  in Heaven were not contested.  A painter had been injured when 
staging  put  up  by  the  owner  of a  dry  dock  gave  way.  The  painter  was 
employed not by the owner of the dry dock but by the owner of the boat he 
was painting. The issue was whether the owner of  the dry dock could be liable 
if the  staging had been put up  negligently.  Lord Esher felt  that privity of 
contract should not stand in the way of the injured party receiving damages. 
45  supra at p 125 
46  This is a reverse of  the argument in the Talmud that a fence needs to be placed around the 
Torah  in  order to protect it  but there is the same  sense that law needs and  requires 
limitations in order to be effective. 
47 (1875) LR 10 Ex 261 at p 267 
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He argued that there could be duty outside contract: 
It  should  be  observed that the  existence  of a  contract between two 
persons does not prevent the existence of the suggested duty between 
them also being raised by law independently of  the contract.
49 
He  even went so  far as to  suggest a general principle that could cover the 
area: 
The proposition will stand thus: whenever one person supplies goods, or 
machinery, or the like, for the purpose of their being used by another 
person  under  such  circumstances  that  every  one  of ordinary  sense 
would, if  he thought, recognise at once that unless he used ordinary care 
and skill with regard to the condition of  the thing supplied or the mode 
of supplying  it,  there  will  be  no  danger  of injury  to  the  person  or 
property of  him for whose use the thing is supplied, and who is to use it 
as duty arises to use ordinary care and care as to the condition or matter 
of supplying such a thing. And for a neglect of such an ordinary care or 
skill whereby injury happens a legal liability arises to be enforced by an 
action for negligence.  50 
Esher was attempting to introduce a new way to define relationships based on 
actions  and  close  contact  rather  than  by  consent.  This  reveals  a  greater 
awareness  of the  complexities  of social  relationships than was  seen in the 
earlier English cases. Lord Esher's proposals went too far for the other judges 
sitting on the case.
51  Although they supported his conclusion, they stated that 
they did not support his principle and it was this view that was followed in 
later cases.  52 
Esher had failed to persuade his fellow judges to adopt a principle that would 
allow the law to recognise certain relationships.  This did though happen in 
49 (1883) 11  QBD 503 at p 507 
50 supra at p 507 
51  Their timidity was criticised by Lord Johnston in the Scottish case of  Kemp & Dougall v 
Damgavil Coal Co.  Ltd 1909 SC 1314, 1909 2 SLT 181 
52 There was another small breach in the case of  Le Lievre v Gould [1883] 1 QB 491: "If  one 
man is near to another or is near to the property of another, a duty lies upon him not to 
do that which may cause a physical injury to the other, or may injure his property" p 497 
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Donoghue. 
2. Donoghue v Stevenson 
Donoghue v Stevenson is one of  the most persuasive of  all legal decisions and 
has been adopted by numerous jurisdiction. The facts of  the case were simple. 
On the 26
th of  August 1928, Mrs May Donoghue entered a teashop in Paisley 
with a friend.  Her friend  bought Mrs Donoghue an ice  cream and a fizzy 
drink. 53  It was later claimed that having drunk some of the fizzy drink, Mrs 
Donoghue discovered a decomposing snail in the bottle. It was alleged that, as 
a result,  she  suffered both shock and illness.  54  The  bottle was  opaque  and 
there was no way that the retailer could have examined it before the sale. Mrs 
Donoghue  decided  to  claim  against the  manufacturer and employed  W.G. 
Leechman & Co. to take the case. 55 
Today,  this  would  be  a  straightforward  situation  covered  by  consumer 
legislation  but  at  the  time  it was  not  clear that the  law  could  provide  a 
remedy.  Mrs  Donoghue  had  no  contract  with  either  the  retailer  or  the 
manufacturer and it was a moot point whether in such a circumstance there 
could be a claim under delict. 
The House of  Lords did decide in favour of  Mrs Donoghue and, rather than go 
to proof, Stevenson settled out of  court. The decision was not unanimous. The 
House was divided three to two, but despite the narrowness of the result the 
53  There is some confusion as to what the drink was. The case reports that it was ginger beer, 
but "ginger" in the West Coast of Scotland is a term used to cover any bottled fizzy drink 
and it could have been misinterpreted. (Thomson 1999, 58) 
54 The facts were never proved 
55  There was a sense of  the wider legal profession although this solicitor had been unsuccessful 
in two virtually identical cases here was extremely successful but there was strong feeling 
a change was due.  Even Stevenson's senior counsel felt  the law was against them - "I 
personally thought that the H.L. would decide as they did in fact decide, but that we had 
a very strong case on the facts.  If the case had gone to proof I think it would have been 
fought and possibly won on the issue whether there was a snail in the bottle and I may 
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case has become incredibly influential and possible one of  most persuasive. 
The influence of  Donoghue comes not from the bare facts of  the decision but 
the methodology of  the decision-making and the reasons given. It has become 
precedent and regarded as both useful and authoritative in Scotland. Indeed in 
both jurisdictions it has become the foundation of  the law in this area. One of 
the reasons is not just its simple ratio but that judges have been able to adapt 
and use it in a number of different ways.  The core decisions in the care are 
those of  Lord Macmillan, a Scottish judge and Lord Aitken, an English judge. 
Their decisions  reflect these  different backgrounds  and their views  of the 
relationship  between  law  and  society.  They  also  reflect  the  relationship 
between the two judges and the two jurisdictions.56 
2.1 Judicial relationships. 
Lord  Macmillan  had  initially  intended  to  decide  the  case  usmg  mainly 
Scottish cases  and authority and only deal with English law because it had 
been cited before him. As he puts it, in an earlier draft of  his decision: 
The question accordingly for your Lordships' determination is whether 
by the law of Scotland the appellant has on her averments any right of 
action against the respondent.  I say advisedly, by the law of Scotland, 
for  close  as  may be the approximation in modem times between the 
Scots  law  of delict  and  the  English  law of torts,  and  instructive  as 
English precedents may be of way of illustration in Scottish cases, the 
question before the House  is  one  of Scots  law.  Historically there are 
distinctions,  both  in  origin  and  in  principle,  in  this  branch  of law 
between the two systems. These distinctions may not be material for the 
present purpose,  but they should be borne in mind.  Thus  the  law of 
Scotland  has  never  recognised  the  English  distinction  between 
56  It also  brings  to  mind  the  point  made  in  section  on  precedent  that  the  first  step  to 
establishing a precedent is to show that the other judges who  sat with you found your 
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misfeasance and non-feasance, which has had considerable influence on 
the development of  the English law of  negligence; nor again has the law 
of Scotland been hampered by procedural difficulties due to the rigidity 
of the  English  system  of forms  of action,  which,  though  decently 
interred by the Judicature Act, in Maitland's words "still rule us  from 
their  graves."  I  hope,  however,  to  show  in  the  sequel  that, 
notwithstanding these historical divergencies, the law of Scotland and 
the law of England, in their relation to practical problem of everyday 
life which this appeal presents, are not really at variance in principle. 
Both parties indeed at your Lordships' bar appeared to assume that this 
was  so,  but while  the  appellant  maintained  that  her  claim  was  not 
contrary  to  English  doctrine  or  English  decisions  when  rightly 
interpreted the respondent contended that according to English law the 
appellant's  claim  was  inadmissible.  It will  therefore be necessary to 
consider hereafter whether the  respondent's submission on the law of 
England is well-founded. But this is a Scottish case and I think it both 
appropriate  and logical that to  consider in the first  case whether the 
appellant had stated a relevant case according to Scots law, for if she 
has  not it is  unnecessary to examine the English authorities.  (Rodger 
1992,249) 
Yet despite this robust defence of Scots law, Lord Macmillan's final decision 
minimised any difference and decided on English law: 
At your Lordship's bar counsel for both parties to the present appeal, 
accepting, as I do also, the view that there is no distinction between the 
law  of  Scotland  and  the  law  of England  in  the  legal  principles 
applicable  to  the  case,  confined  their  arguments  to  the  English 
authorities.  The  appellant endeavoured to establish that,  according to 
the law of England, the pleadings disclose a good cause of action; the 
respondent  endeavoured  to  show that,  on  the  English  decisions,  the 
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myself at once to an examination of  the relevant precedents.  57 
Lord  Macmillan  never  explained  why  he  changed  his  mind  about  what 
material  was  primarily  persuasive  in  this  case  The  earlier version  of the 
decision was  only found  recently  amongst  his  papers.  Rodger (1992),  who 
published the earlier decision, suggests a number of reasons for this change. 
These include the fact that none of  the Scots authorities that Lord Macmillan 
used  in  his  earlier  decision  had  been put  before  the  court  by  the  parties 
involved
58 but Rodger also feels that Lord Atkin may have had something to 
do with Lord Macmillan's change of  mind. 
It  is  certainly  likely  that  Lord  Atkin  would  have  been  discussing  Lord 
Macmillan's decision in detail with him. He appears to have been preparing 
for such a case for some time and was very clear about what he wanted it to 
achieve. Lord Atkin was a reformer. He was unhappy with certain aspects of 
English law and sought to change them for the better. In two lectures to the 
Society of Public Teachers of Law, made prior to the Donoghue decision, he 
argued that English law needed to become more scientific, by this he meant 
more principled: 
There is a general tendency to demand that law should consist of  broad 
principles,  that  narrow  distinctions  should  be  eliminated.  There  are 
certainly  still  a  number  of such  distinctions  which  it  is  difficult  to 
justify or to apply. (Atkin 1925, 13) 59 
Lord Atkin was seeking to eliminate such narrow distinctions and to develop 
principles to replace them. He specifically criticised tort and singled it out as 
an area of law in need of reform. (1925, 13) Lord Atkin chose the Donoghue 
case to introduce a principled approach to this part of  law: 
It is  remarkable  how  difficult  it  is  to  find  in the English authorities 
statements of general application defining the relations between parties 
57 1932 SC (HL) 31  at p 63 
58  This reflects a sense of the judge as a dispute solver and not primarily as the source of  the 
law. 
59  In the same article,  Atkin suggests that in areas of law where principles were settled they 
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that give rise to the duty.  The Courts are concerned with the particular 
relations which come before them in actual litigation, and it is sufficient 
to say whether the duty exists in those circumstance. The result is that 
the Courts have been engaged upon an elaborate classification of duties 
as  they  exist  in  respect  of property,  whether  real  or  personal,  with 
further  divisions  as  to  ownership,  occupation,  or  control,  and 
distinctions based on the particular relations of  the one side or the other, 
whether  manufacturer,  salesman,  or  landlord,  customer,  tenant, 
stranger,  and  so  on.  In this  way  it  can  be  ascertained  at  any  time 
whether  the  law  recognises  a  duty,  but  only  where  the  case  can  be 
referred  to  some  particular  species  which  has  been  examined  and 
classified.  And yet the  duty  which is  common to  all the cases where 
liability  is  established  must  logically  be  based  upon  some  element 
common to the cases where it is found to exist.
60 
Clearly, Lord Atkin wanted to have  an impact beyond the present case and 
one that would reflect his view of law as  it should be - based on logic and 
principle. If  there were some doubt as to whether the decision applied equally 
in England as in Scotland, this would have undermined that impact. This may 
have encouraged him to persuade Lord Macmillan to use only English law in 
his decision. 
Whether Lord Macmillan was persuaded by Lord Atkin's reforming zeal, or 
was affected by other factors, can not be known for certain. It is certain that 
his use of  English authorities did not affect the reasoning he employed in the 
decision: 
Essentially what Lord Macmillan did when he prepared the May version 
was  to  take the generalised reasoning that he had originally used for 
Scots law and apply it to the law of both systems.  In other words he 
used  the  same  basic  material but said that  he  was  speaking of both 
systems rather than simply of  Scots law. (Rodger 1992,242) 
Although Lords Macmillan and Atkin were both using what they described as 
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a principled approach,  they had very  different attitudes towards  it and this 
revealed in reasons used to justify and legitimate their use of  that approach. 
2.2 Principled reasoning. 
Lord Macmillan saw this as  a traditional way of approaching such questions 
and found it unproblematic. Lord Atkin was seeking to have a radical effect 
on the way the law evolved. This difference can be seen in the way each judge 
introduced his  use  of principle-based reasoning.  Lord Atkin,  quoted earlier, 
starts by appealing to logic and reason.  This appeals to a sense of law as an 
atemporal  hierarchy which can always  supply the  answer.  He  then seeks  a 
foundation in commonly accepted morality: 
The rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes in law, you must 
not  injure  your  neighbour;  and  the  lawyer's  question,  Who  is  my 
neighbour? receives a restricted reply. You must take reasonable care to 
avoid  acts  or  omissions  which you  can reasonably  foresee  would be 
likely to  injure your neighbour.  Who,  then,  in law,  is  my neighbour? 
The  answer  seems  to  be  - persons  who  are  so  closely  and  directly 
affected  by  my  act  that  I  ought  reasonably  to  have  them  in 
contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the 
acts or omissions which are called into question. 61 
It is notable that this is the same principle that Stair used when seeking to find 
a foundation for delict. It grounds this area of  law in social morality and in the 
structures  of society.  Aristotle  argues  that  the  maxim  or  proverb  has  a 
particular  power  and  it  is  likely  this  is  because  of its  instant  emotional 
comprehensibility rather than any  inherent logic.  Lord Macmillan does  not 
61  supra at p 44.  This section is remarkably like one from one of  the lectures to the Society of 
Public  Teachers of Law:  "It is  quite true that law and morality do  not cover identical 
fields.  No doubt morality extends beyond the more limited range in which you can lay 
down the definite  prohibitions of law;  but apart from  that,  the British law has  always 
necessarily ingrained in  it moral  teaching in  this  sense:  that it  lays  down  standards of 
honesty and plain dealing between man and man ..... He is not to injure his neighbour by 
acts of  negligence; and that certainly covers a very large field of  the law. I doubt whether 
the  whole law of tort  could  not be  comprised in  the golden  maxim  to do  unto your 
neighbour as you would that he should do unto you." (1932, 30) Malloch VA 2002  Judicial decision-making in the common law  199 
feel the same need to justify his use of principle though, he does point to its 
flexibility and the way it can be used to link law and societies' view of  what 
is appropriate: 
In  the  daily  contacts  of social  and business  life,  human beings  are 
thrown into, or place themselves in, an infinite variety of  relations with 
their  fellows;  and  the  law  can  refer  only  to  the  standards  of the 
reasonable man in order to determine whether any particular relation 
gives rise to a  duty to take care as  between those who stand in that 
relation to each other.  The grounds of action may be as  various and 
manifold as human errancy; and the conception of legal responsibility 
may develop in adaptation to altering social conditions and standards. 
The criterion of  judgement must adjust and adapt itself to the changing 
circumstances of life.  The categories of negligence are never closed. 
The cardinal principle of  liability is that the party complained of  should 
owe to  the party complaining a  duty to take care,  and that the party 
complaining should be able to prove that he has suffered damage in 
consequence of a breach of  that duty. Where there is room for diversity 
of view, it is in determining what circumstances will establish such a 
relationship between the parties as to give rise, on the one side, to a duty 
to take care, and, on the other side, to a right to have care taken.  62 
In using a reasonable man as the standard Macmillan is asserting that a person 
should be the model rather than founding law in any more abstract principle. 
It also reflects the close link Macmillan feels should exist between the law as 
applied by the judiciary and the way in which society is evolving. The role of 
the judge is to assess whether society ready to be legally regulated or not and 
then to absorb that within legal system by applying legal categories to the 
relationships. 
By coming down in favour of the duty of care, both judges are  setting the 
scene  for  legal  rather  than  pragmatic  argument.  That  is  argument  about 
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principle and relationships rather than cause and effect. In doing so Donoghue 
solved the question of how to  limit the culpa principle by coming down in 
favour of duty of care and relationships similar to the way England had.  In 
tort, duty of  care became the founding principle in negligence cases. This then 
became  the  principle  around  which  new  legitimate  arguments  could  be 
explored. This has led to an explosion of  cases, five of  which, all dealing with 
pure economic loss are considered here. 
3. Pure economic loss 
Despite the shift to  a relationship-based principle, negligence has tended to 
ground itself in physical links between people and to restrict loss to physical 
consequences: 
The  duty  of care  only  extends to  physical  injuries  to  the  pursuer  or 
damage to the pursuer's property caused by the defective product. The 
damage must be done to property other than the defective product itself. 
For  example,  if a  defective  vacuum  cleaner explodes  and  burns  the 
pursuer or burns the  pursuer's carpet, there is  Donoghue v Stevenson 
liability.  But  if the  defective  vacuum  simply  does  not  work  or  it 
explodes and does not injure the pursuer or does not damage any other 
property  of the  pursuer  there  is  no  Donoghue  v Stevenson  liability. 
Why?  In  these  circumstance,  the  pursuer  has  suffered  only  pure 
economic  loss,  ie  the  cost  of repairing  the  vacuum  cleaner  or  the 
difference in value between a defective or non-defective cleaner.  The 
courts  have  consistently  refused  to  allow  the  pursuer  to  recover 
compensation in delict for such losses. Instead, the pursuer must resort 
to the law of  contract to obtain compensation  .... (Thomson 1999,95) 
There has been a reluctance to go beyond the physical results of  actions which 
could be easily absorbed into legal terms and the judiciary have required an 
extra justification to do so. As Thomson points out: 
Although  reasonable  foreseeability  of  pure  economIC  loss  is  not 
sufficient for the imposition of a duty of  care, the courts have, in certain 
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However, there must be factors in addition to reasonable foreseeability 
of pure  economic  loss,  which  demonstrates  that there  is  a  sufficient 
degree of  proximity between the parties for a duty of  care to be inferred. 
(1999, 79)63 
This is why pure economic loss is an interesting area. It is not enough that the 
reasonable  forseeable  results  of my  actions  might  lead  to  such  loss.  In 
considering proximity judges have continually to consider what relationships 
deserve legal recognition. 
One of the first significant cases was Hedley Byrne v Heller. 64 The question 
in Hedley Byrne was whether negligent misrepresentation could give rise to 
liability. In this case an agency had placed orders with a company for a third 
party. The agency was liable for the orders and asked their bankers to check 
the company.  The bank wrongly and negligently gave  good references and 
when the company failed the agency was liable to the principal. The agency 
sued their bankers for the loss which was described as purely economic. 
One of  the main authorities against the agency was the English case of Derry 
v Peak 65  which  asserted that negligent  statements  could not give  rise  to 
liability but Derry v Peak had been limited by Nocton v Ashburton.
66 As Lord 
Reid in Hedley Byrne said: 
It must now be taken that Derry v Peak did not establish any universal 
rule  that  in  the  absence  of  contract  an  innocent  but  negligent 
misrepresentation cannot give rise to an action  ....  it was shown in this 
House in Nocton v Lord Ashburton that this is too much widely stated. 
We cannot, therefore, now accept as accurate the numerous statements 
to  that  effect  in  cases  between  1859  and  1914,  and  we  must  now 
63  Thomson (1999,69-109) sees duty of  care as a 'threshold device'. A way of  allowing judges 
to limit liability by using policy considerations. This view,  and others, of duty of care is 
discussed byK Norrie (1996b 157-169) 
64 [1964] AC 465, [1964] 2 All ER 575, HL. 
65  (1889) 14 App Cass 337. 
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determine the extent of  the exceptions to that rule.
67 
The  situation in Hedley Byrne was  declared to be  such an exception.  The 
House  held that there  was  a special relationship between the  parties.  This 
relationship  was  sufficient  to  find  that  they  were  in  proximity  and  that, 
therefore, the agents were reasonable in relying on the bankers statement and 
that the bankers had a duty of  care not to make those statements negligently. 
In  doing  so  the judges made  use  of Donoghue,  Lord Devlin chose  not to 
follow the facts of  the decision but to use its methodology: 
...  for a general conception cannot be applied to pieces of paper in the 
same  way  as  to  manufacturers  ....  The  real  value  of Donoghue  v 
Stevenson to the argument in this case is that it shows how the law can 
be developed to solve particular problems.
68 
Lord Pearce's reasoning is similar but he prefers Lord Macmillan's contextual 
reasoning and is clearer about the need for judges to consider how law relates 
to society in deciding which relationships to recognise: 
How wide the sphere of the duty of care in negligence is to be drawn 
depends  ultimately  upon  the  courts'  assessment  of the  demands  of 
society  for  protection  from  the  carelessness  of others.  Economic 
protection has lagged behind protection in physical matters where there 
is injury to person and property. It may be that the size and width of  the 
range  of possible  claims has  acted as  a deterrent to  the  extension of 
economic protection.
69 
According to this view the role of  the judge is to assess whether society would 
regard it as unfair if the law did not recognise certain relationships. It is not 
clear how the judge would assess the social view. Anns made this point more 
explicit. 
In Anns, the local authority defending the case had approved the design for 
67 [1964] AC 465 at p 484 
68 supra at p 525 
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the foundations  of a  building.  These later proved defective.  The House of 
Lords decided that the local authority was liable to the owners of the house 
even though there had been no  other damage to  any  other object or to  a 
person.  The most frequently cited and criticised passage from the decision 
focuses on the reasoning used. It was delivered by Lord Wilberforce: 
Through the trilogy of cases  in this  House  - Donoghue  v Stevenson 
[1932] A.  C.  562, Hedley Byrne &  Co.  Ltd.  v.  Heller & Partners Ltd. 
[1964] AC 465, and Dorset Yacht Co.  Ltd.  v.  Home Office [1970] AC 
1004, the position has now been reached that in order to establish that a 
duty of  care arises in particular situation, it is not necessary to bring the 
facts of  that situation within those of  previous situations in which a duty 
of  care  has  been  held  to  exist.  Rather  the  questions  has  to  be 
approached in two stages. First one has to ask whether, as between the 
alleged wrongdoer and the person who has suffered damage there is a 
sufficient relationship of proximity or neighbourhood such that, in the 
reasonable contemplation of  the former, carelessness on his part may be 
likely to cause damage to the latter - in which case a prima facie duty of 
care arises. Secondly, if  the first question is answered affirmatively, it is 
necessary to consider whether there are any considerations which ought 
to negative, or to reduce or limit the scope of the duty or the class of 
person to whom it is owed or the damages to which a breach of  duty of 
it may arise.
70 
This was to prove a remarkably unpersuasive statement.  In particular Lord 
Wilberforce was attacked for confusing the limiting principle which should 
have  been  proximity  by  restricting  this  to  reasonable  foreseeability  and 
expanding the political role of  the judiciary. Little that he actually said though 
could be criticised if  compared for example to Lord Macmillan in Donoghue, 
where Macmillan links duty of care to reasonable foreseeability and refers to 
the need for law to be socially aware.  This though was in cases of physical 
injury where proximity and reasonable foreseeability  would logically have 
been very close. In cases of  economic loss there was less obvious justification 
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for  law to intervene and perhaps, therefore, an underlying need to be more 
cautious about proximity.7l  In Hedley Byrne the judge was to be responsible 
for assessing whether society was ready for this relationship to be classified as 
legal but Anns went further,  the relationship was already recognised by the 
physical  act  and  then  the  judge  would  consider  whether  it  was  fair  to 
recognise it.  This may seem a pedantic difference but it means that the legal 
classification becomes automatic and judges are left concentrating on policy 
and this they can no longer hide behind a discussion of legal classifications.
72 
The  discomfort this generated can be seen in Murphy which overruled this 
decision but before this there is one more case to consider Junior Books. 
In Junior Books, the pursuer was a company which owned a new factory. The 
company was  seeking reparation for  a floor  that had been laid badly.  The 
floor had been laid by a nominated sub-contractor. Thus, although the pursuer 
knew who  was  laying  the  floor,  there  was  no  direct  contract between the 
company and the  defendants.  There were  no  averments  that the  floor  was 
dangerous.  The loss was, therefore, economic. The cost to the company was 
the cost of  repair or replacement. The court held that the sub-contractors were 
liable  to  the  pursuer.  On  the  facts,  this  appears  uncontroversial.  It was 
reasonably foreseeable that if  the sub-contractor's laid the floor badly that the 
pursuers  would  be  disadvantaged.  In the  absence  of any  damage  to  other 
property or immediate danger the special relationship test comes into play and 
the relationship can be easily established by the link of contracts.73  Indeed it 
is clearly stated that proximity was accepted and not in issue. This meant that 
the judges were  left to  consider whether the  damages  were  such  as  to  be 
covered.  This would seem to be fairly uncontroversial, this, though, was not 
how  the  decision  was  regarded.  Instead,  critics  focused  on the  perceived 
71  Peter Cane (2000) argues that negligence is  not rooted in the intention of the actor (as in 
criminal mens rea) but rather judges have focused on the victim and this has led to the 
discussion of  whether it would be inequitable to compensate and then how to justify. 
72 Howarth (1995) sees a similar problem in The  Wagon Mound No 1.  (Overseas Tankships v 
Morts Dock and Engineering Co.  Ltd.  [1961]  AC  388,  [1961]  1 All ER 404.) In that 
case,  Howarth argues the remoteness and directness test was lost raising the spectre of 
infinite liability and that this was the source for the reaction against principled reasoning. 
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dangers of extending liability to goods which though badly manufactured do 
not present a danger to property or person. The dangers were that if no such 
boundary existed that there would be no  way to logically stop legal liability 
spreading into more and more areas. The obvious fear behind this being that 
law itself would therefore be brought into disrepute. 
Part of the problem came from Lord Wilberforce's two stage tests in Anns, 
which was explicitly referred to as  persuasive in Junior Books and although 
Junior Books can be seen in a different light this led to  it being viewed as 
infected with the  same  perceived fault.  Reasonable  foreseeability  is  easily 
passed in this case.  As  proximity and reasonably foreseeability had become 
combined, proximity was  not considered.74  Instead, the limiting factor was 
what the judiciary often define as policy - the view of  the community.75 Two 
of  the judges saw no reason for restricting the duty of care. Lord Brandon did 
and in his decision lays the ground for the reaction against Anns and Junior 
Books. Lord Brandon follows Lord Wilberforce's two stage test closely but he 
does  so  in order to undermine it by showing that its methodology takes the 
law  into  dangerous  areas.  Notably,  he  was  very  clear  about  the  policy 
considerations that informed his choice to dissent: 
To that second question I would answer that there are two  important 
considerations which ought to limit the scope of  the duty of care which 
it is common ground was owed by the defenders to the pursuers on the 
assumed facts of  the present case. 
The first consideration is that, in Donoghue v Stevenson itself and in all 
the  numerous  cases  in which the  principle of that decision has  been 
applied to different but analogous factual situations, it has always been 
either stated expressly, or taken for granted, that an essential ingredient 
in the cause of  action relied on was the existence of  danger, or the threat 
74 This seems to be a reversal of  the initial process and establishes duty through proximity. The 
limitation is reasonable foreseeability of  the damage. 
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of  danger, of  physical damage to persons or their property, excluding for 
this purpose the very piece of property from the defective condition of 
which such danger,  or threat of danger,  arises.  To  dispense  with that 
essential ingredient in a cause of action of the kind concerned in the 
present case would, in my view, involve a radical departure from long-
established authority. 
The  second consideration is  that there  is  no  sound policy reason for 
substituting the  wider  scope  of the  duty  of care  put forward  for  the 
pursuers for the more restricted scope of such duty put forward by the 
76  pursuers  .... 
The  first  consideration is  not strictly a policy reason but rather a desire to 
restrict law and is based on a clear view of the role of the judge. There is a 
strong  underlying  desire  to  limit what could be  perceived  as  judicial law 
making.  In  concentrating on  authority  rather than  principle  law  will  only 
evolve in steps rather than grand leaps and the policy consideration, although 
dealt with, is largely rejected. In concentrating on authority and analogy Lord 
Brandon is seeking to remind judges that their power is limited, that they need 
to justify their reasons and that the way judges should justify their reasons is 
by appeal  to  precedent.  This  restricts what an individual judge can do  but 
embeds new decisions in a tradition. This has the advantage of  hiding the way 
in which judges inevitably consider the relationship between law and society 
in such areas in questions of classification and categorisation. Although the 
result  is  similar this  differs  from  early English attitudes to law as  it is  no 
longer a question of access to  a space  where judge's dispense  a delegated 
authority but an awareness that the judiciary might not be the best place to 
openly  define  the  legal  meaning of relationships in the  face  of a political 
alternative.  This  contrasts  sharply with Lord Atkin's desire to organise the 
law around scientific principles which sees the law as  an area which creates 
meaning which should be clear and easy to see. 
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In the decade following Junior Books. Lord Brandon was to be at the head of 
the  judicial  shift  which  led  to  case-based  reasoning  becoming  dominant. 
There are probably a number of social reasons for this shift. Internally, there 
was  a lack of a clear justification of these  relationships  and  the judiciary 
sought to justify any change in the law by embedding it in tradition rather 
than being seen to  be  involved in  social  engineering of any  kind.  From a 
broader view the  market-centred  1980s favoured  a caveat emptor approach 
rather than a protectionist one. The fear of  American-style litigation may also 
have been a factor but the generational change in the judiciary may also have 
been significant.  77 New judges may well have instinctively sought a different 
path from their predecessors in order to stamp their own personalities on the 
law.  Two cases show this new approach, Caparo v Dickman
78 and Murphy v 
Brentwood District Council.  79 
In Caparo the criticism of  previous decisions was on two fronts. The first, put 
forward by Lords Bridge, Oliver and Jauncey, dealt with the identification of 
foreseeability  with proximity.  All  three judges agreed that these  should be 
kept separate: 
The relationship of proximity  '"  is  not one which is created solely by 
the foreseeability of harm resulting from carelessness in the statement, 
but  is  one  in  which  some  further  ingredient  importing proximity  is 
present.  80 
Interestingly, the test in Caparo has been understood in two ways reflecting 
the  difference  between  the  two  methodologies.  Some  commentators 
describing Caparo as introducing a three-stage test which expanded the first 
part of Lord Wilberforce's two-stage test so that foreseeability and proximity 
become separate tests that both needed to be passed before liability could be 
77  There may  also  have been a reflection of changed attitudes towards reason and scientific 
principles since Donoghue. 
78 [1990] 2 AC 605, [1990] 1 All ER 568 
79 [1991] 1 AC 398, [1990] 2 All ER 908 
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established.81  This reestablishes a principled form of  reasoning. But the other 
criticism in the decision was of  the principled approach itself and this is how 
most people have viewed Caparo. Lords Bridge, Roskill and Oliver all argued 
that there had been a move within recent cases back to such an approach and 
that this was a necessary corrective: 
My noble and learned friends have traced the evolution of  the decisions 
from Anns v Merton London Borough [1977] 2 All ER 492, [1978] AC 
728  until and including the most recent decisions of your Lordships' 
House in Smith v Eric S Bush (afirm), Harris v Wyre Forest DC [1989] 
2 All ER 514, [1989] 2 WLR 790. I agree with your Lordship that it has 
now to be accepted that there is  no simple formula or touchstone to 
which recourse can be had in order to provide in every case a ready 
answer to the questions whether, given certain facts, the law will or will 
not impose liability for negligence or, in cases where such liability can 
be shown to exist, determine the extent of  such liability. Phrases such as 
'foreseeability',  'proximity',  'neighbourhood',  'just  and  reasonable', 
'fairness',  'voluntary acceptance of risk'  or 'voluntary assumption of 
responsibility'  will be found  used from  time to time in the different 
cases.  But, as  your Lordships have said,  such phrases are not precise 
definitions. At best they are but labels or phrases descriptive of  the very 
different factual situations which can exist in particular cases and which 
must be carefully examined in each cases before it can be pragmatically 
determined whether a duty of care exists and, if so, what is the scope 
and  extent of that duty.  If this  conclusion  involves  a  return  to  the 
traditional categorisation of  cases as pointing to the existence and scope 
of any  duty  of care,  as  my  noble  and  learned  friend  Lord Bridge, 
suggests,  I think this is infinitely preferable to recourse to somewhat 
wide generalisations which leave their practical application matters of 
difficulty and uncertainty.82 
81  This has been particularly true of  the Scottish courts (See Brodie 1997 for a full analysis of 
this position). 
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The  return to a desire to control law is  clearly present in this passage and 
brings to mind the talmudic idea of  the need for a fence around law to protect 
it.  It could be arguable that the judges are aware that this works both ways, 
society needs to be protected from a law escaping its bounds and intruding in 
all relationships but equally if law and particularly judge made law is seen to 
be too radical it risks undermining the institution itself. 
After Caparo it was clear that Anns was under a sustained attack and eight 
years  after  Junior  Books  and  several  cases  in  which  Anns  was  debated, 
distinguished and  criticised,83  Anns was  overruled in Murphy v Brentwood 
District Council. 84 If  Anns was the highpoint of expansion, then Murphy was 
the highpoint of the reaction.  The  main criticism of Anns had been of its 
reasoning. It was felt that it had laid down too broad a principle and that it led 
to dangerous results. Murphy espoused a different approach: 
As  regards the ingredients necessary to establish such a duty in novel 
situations. I consider that an incremental approach on the lines indicated 
by Brennan J in the Sutherland Shire Council case is to be preferred to 
the two-stage test. 85 
Brennan's view of reasoning had been referred to positively in a number of 
cases in which Anns had been criticised and distinguished.86 Its use in Murphy 
gave it even more support. Brennan did not set out his approach in detail. It is 
as  much a critique of the use of policy in decision-making as  a distinctive 
method: 
It is preferable in my view, that the law should develop novel categories 
83  See Governors of  the Peabody Donation Fund v Sir Lindsay Parkinson & Co Ltd [1984] 3 
All ER 529,  1985 AC 210. Leigh & Sillavan Ltd v Aliahnon Shipping Co Ltd [1986] 2 
All  ER  145,  [1986]  AC  785.  Curran  v  Northern  Ireland  Co-ownership  Housing 
Association (Stewart,  third party) [1987] 2 All ER 13,  [1987] AC 718. Yuen Kun-yeu v 
A-G of  Hong Kong [1987] 2 All ER 705, [1988] AC 175. Hill v Chief  Constable of  West 
Yorkshire.  [1988] 2 All ER238, [1989] AC 53. 
84 [1991] 1 AC 398, [1990] 2 All ER 908 
85  [1991] 1 AC 398 at p 461 
86  See Caparo Industries pic v Dichnan [1990] AC 605 at p 618 per Lord Bridge, Curran v 
Northern Ireland Co-ownership Housing Association (Stewart,  third party) [1987]  AC 
718 at p 726 per Lord Bridge, Yuen Kun-yeu v A-G of  Hong Kong [1988] AC 175  at p 
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of  negligence incrementally and by analogy with established categories, 
rather  than  by  a  massive  extension  of a  prima  facie  duty  of care 
restrained  only  by  indefmable  "considerations  which  ought  to  be 
negative,  or to  reduce  or limit the  scope  of the  duty  or the  class  of 
person to whom it is owed".  87 
Brennan is allying his views strongly to a core legal value, the need to provide 
certainty.  It is this that allows people to use law in their daily affairs.  He  is 
arguing that principled reasoning does not provide for such certainty. In some 
ways  he  almost seeks a return to the pre-Donoghue law.  Legal reasoning is 
based on examples with pre-established factual categories and certainly does 
not seek to understand the broader social relationships behind the categories 
but to  restrict the  speed  with  which  law can  respond.  It portrays  a  more 
cautious role for the judiciary. 
4. Conclusion 
In  looking  at  negligence,  the  unintended  consequences  of actions,  the 
judiciary have, over centuries, tried to adapt to changing attitudes towards law 
and changes within society generally. This task is not though unproblematic. 
Judges not only have to consider changing attitudes but how they can justify 
their recognition of those  attitudes.  In particular,  in deciding how far  pure 
economic loss  should be recognised legally, the judiciary have been led to 
consider their own role and the way they should relationships in society. Two 
dominant methodologies have emerged, principled and case-based reasoning. 
These reflect historical differences in the two jurisdictions which interact in 
this area but also different views about where the limitations, the boundaries 
of law should be drawn.  These reflect attitudes towards the judicial role and 
the  next  section  shows  how  looking  at  these  two  methodologies  and  the 
persuasive strategies involved within them helps to reveal the emotional and 
personal commitment of  the judiciary to the law. 
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Principled and case-based reasoning 
The  last  section  showed  how the  law evolved  and  how  in  the  five  pure 
economic loss cases being considered these two methodologies were used to 
justify judicial reasoning. Although the phrase principled reasoning suggests 
that previous case law is ignored the doctrine of precedent ensures that the 
judiciary  must  take  into  account  previous  decisions  and  the  distinction 
between the two is more subtle and relates to how previous decisions should 
be used.  The choice made between these methodologies deals with how the 
judiciary relate to  the  material  which they must take into  account and the 
examples  they  use  and,  therefore,  following  Aristotle,  the  character  they 
portray. 
1. Judicial definitions. 
In Donoghue, Lord Atkin describes how principled reasoning is  based on a 
belief that there must be some logic to the law: 
And yet the duty  which is  common to  all the cases where liability is 
established must logically be based upon some element common to the 
cases where it is found to exist. 88 
The advantage of finding this logical element is that it can then be applied to 
future cases, as Lord Fraser puts it in Junior Books: 
If and  when  such other cases  arise  they will  have  to  be  decided by 
appealing sound principles to their particular facts. 89 
Principled reasoners seek to find a principle in previous case law that can be 
reused. In Hedley Byrne Lord Morris of  Borth-Y-Gest follows this procedure, 
first looking at previous authorities, then setting out a general principle and 
finally stating: 
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I do not propose to examine the facts of  particular situations or the facts 
of recently decided cases in the light of this analysis but I proceed to 
apply it to the facts of  the case now under review.  90 
According to these statements, principled reasoning is dependant on finding a 
ratio that has been applied in a number of  situations and therefore can found a 
general authoritative principle. Once this principle has been established future 
judges can  use  this  rather than examining previous  decisions.  This  can be 
seen in the case of Donoghue which is seen as founding a general principle 
and earlier cases are rarely considered. Lord Devlin describes this as  almost 
an organic and natural process: 
What Lord Atkin did was to  use  his general conception to  open up  a 
category of cases giving rise to a special duty.  It was already clear that 
the  law  recognised  the  existence  of such  a  duty  in  the  category  of 
articles  that  were  dangerous  in  themselves.  What  Donoghue  v. 
Stevenson  did  may  be  described  either  as  the  widening  of an  old 
category  or  as  the  creation  of a  new  and  similar  one.  The  general 
conception can be used to produce other categories in the same way. An 
existing category grows as instances of its application multiply until the 
time comes when its cell divides.
91 
It should be noted that these categorisations are general rather than universal 
and  do  not  stray  far  from  the  requirements  of precedent.  They  provide  a 
structure within which arguments can be placed and examined to see if they 
fit.  In this view of legal development the role of the judge is to set out these 
logical categories and to decide when a new one has or should be created. The 
judge is responsible for developing a rational and logical structure.
92 
Case-based  reasomng  IS  often  portrayed  as  being  in  direct  conflict  to 
principled  reasoning  and  in  many  judicial  pronouncements  which  have 
90 [1964] AC 465 at p 503. 
91  [1964] AC 465 at pp 524-525. 
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supported this  style  of reasoning,  approval  has  been given to the words of 
Brennan in The Council of  the Shire of  Sutherland v Heyman & another: 
It  is  preferable,  in  my  view,  that  the  law  should  develop  novel 
categories of negligence incrementally and by analogy with established 
categories, rather than a massive extension of  a prima facie duty of  care 
restrained only be indefinable «considerations which ought to negative, 
or to  reduce  or  limit the  scope  of the  duty  or the  class of person to 
whom it is owed.  ,,93 
Brennan  is  describing  a  form  of reasoning that,  like  principled reasoning, 
starts with previous cases and at first  sight seems very similar.  This can be 
explained by the dominance of the doctrine of precedent which ensures that 
categories and classifications remain at the core of what is persuasive.
94 The 
difference lies in the way that these categories and classifications are created. 
This can be seen in a section from Lord Bridge's judgement in Caparo, where 
he describes how he will put the analogical method into practice: 
Consistently with the traditional approach it is to these authorities and 
to subsequent decisions directly relevant to this relatively narrow comer 
of  the  field  that  we  should  look  to  determine  the  essential 
characteristics  of  a  situation  giving  rise,  independently  of  any 
contractual or fiduciary relationship, to a duty of  care owed by one party 
to another to ensure that the accuracy of any statement which the one 
party makes  and on which the other party may forseeably  rely to his 
economic detriment.  95 
From  this  it  would  appear  that the  main  difference between the  forms  of 
reasoning is that judges perform the task of finding a generalisation in every 
case in case-based reasoning and do  not need to  do  so  in principled.  Case-
based reasoners use the cases cited before them to find examples that are used 
93  (1985) 157 CLR424 at p 481 
94 If  a case is too narrow then it will be distinguished on its facts if  too broad it will not found a 
precedent being seen as obiter and distinguished accordingly. 
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to find "characteristics" that are essential and apply these direct to the case. 
They do not seek to state this generalisation in such a way that it can found a 
new category. This structure is founded not on the sense of law of a structure 
but of law as authority. Previous cases show not some logical principle being 
developed but the application of authority. This is a form of commentary and 
reflects a sense of  law as traditional rather than logical. 
The  implications  of choosing  between  these  two  forms  can  be  seen  in 
Donoghue where there was  a  direct conflict between judges on this point, 
Lord Buckmaster preferred a case-based approach, although he admitted the 
limited presence of  principle: 
The law applicable is the common law, and, although its principles are 
capable of application to meet new conditions not contemplated when 
the  law was  laid  down,  these  principles  cannot be  changed nor  can 
additions  be  made  to  them  because  any  particular  meritorious  case 
seems outside their ambit. Now, the common law must be sought in law 
books by writers of  authority, and in judgements of  the judges entrusted 
with its administration. The law books give no  assistance, because the 
work of living authors, however deservedly eminent, cannot be used as 
authority, although the opinions they express may demand attention and 
the ancient books do not assist. I tum, therefore, to the decided cases to 
see if  they can be construed so as to support the appellant's case.
96 
This is a more rigid version of case-based reasoning than would generally be 
accepted  today  but it  does  show the  link  between this  and  tradition  and 
authority.  In making this statement it is  also clear that he has a very strong 
view of  his own role which is to apply authority. 
The following extracts all come from Lord Buckmaster's speech in Donoghue 
and show how he deals with earlier cases: 
One of the earliest is the case of Langbridge v.  Levy. It is a case often 
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quoted  and variously  explained.  ...  [Facts  of case  summarised.]  .... 
How far it is from the present case can be seen from the judgement of 
Parke, B.,  who,  in delivering the judgement of the Court, used these 
words (at p 531  of 2.  M &  W.): " We should pause before we made a 
precedent by our decision which would be an authority for an action 
against  the  vendors,  even  of such  instruments  and  articles  as  are 
dangerous  in  themselves,  at the  suit of any person whomsoever into 
those hands they might happen to pass, and should be injured thereby." 
The case of Winterbottom v Wright is, on the other hand, an authority 
that is closely applicable. Owing to negligence in the construction of a 
carriage  it broke  down,  and  a  stranger  to  the  manufacture  and  sale 
sought to recover damages for  injuries which he alleged were due to 
negligence in the work, and it was held that he had no cause of action 
wither in tort or arising out of contract. This case seems to me to show 
that the manufacturer of any article is not liable to a third party injured 
by negligent construction, for there can be nothing in the construction of 
a coach to lace it in a special category. It  may be noted, also, that in this 
case Alderson, B., said (at p 115) : - "The only safe rule is to confine the 
right to recover to those who enter into the contract ; if we go one step 
beyond that, there is no reason why we should not go fifty.,,97 
In these extracts, Lord Buckmaster is following a standard pattern. The facts 
are described and distinguished and the reasoning backed up with a statement 
of the judge from the prior case which shows the possible consequences of 
the decision. It is not surprising that a judge who sees his role as following 
authority  should take  such a  syllogistic  approach which from  the study of 
MacCormick reveals an ethical commitment to the rule of  law. 
Lord Macmillan's decision is more complex. He starts by setting out the facts 
of  the case before him and its procedural history. There then follows two very 
different sections. The first which he refers to as "preliminary observations", 
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could also be split into two subsidiary parts. The first deals with the "mouse 
cases"  and  uses  passages  from  the  individual judgments  of the judges to 
undermine its authority, to make it appear a decision that is problematic. He 
also  uses  the  reliance  on  English  authority  in  those  cases  to  justify  his 
concentration  on  English  rather  than  Scottish  authorities.  This  section  is 
clearly dealing with arguments that he feels could undermine the authority of 
his  decisions  and  he  is  preparing a rebuttal.  The  second part consists of a 
general  consideration  of the  relationship  between  privity  of contract  and 
negligence,  few  cases  are  quoted  and  it  almost  feels  like  a  textbook  or 
academic discussion in that it is "reasonable" - looking for general reasons for 
distinctions.  This  suggests  that  he  believes  such  arguments  are  not  only 
persuasive in a legal context but that it is important for a judge and a decision 
to appear to be reasonable in this sense. The second section of  the decision is 
where  the  case  law is  contained.  Lord Macmillan starts by setting out his 
approach: 
...  I tum to the series of English cases which is  said to compose the 
consistent  body  of authority  on  which  we  are  asked  to  nonsuit  the 
appellant.  It will  be  found  that in most of them the  facts  were  very 
different from the facts of the present case, and did not give rise to the 
special relationship, and consequent duty, which, in my opinion is the 
starting point here.,,98 
Lord  Macmillan  then  considers  a  senes  of cases,  these  are  approached 
chronologically  and  in  most  he  follows  Lord  Buckmaster's  pattern  of a 
description of  facts and then principles. This shows the dominance not only of 
precedent but of  a rule of  law ethic that lies within the concept of  precedent.  99 
It is not surprising that in a system where precedent ensures that authority is 
grounded in previous cases that judges who also see reason as  an important 
factor  still  use  this  syllogistic  structure.  Even  here  though  there  are 
differences, he concentrates more than Buckmaster on what the judges said in 
98 supra at p 65 
99  As judges tend to use the form rather than the strict deductive logic of the syllogism this 
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those  decisions  rather than the  facts  for  example  in  considering Heaven  v 
Pender concentrates  on the dicta of Brett MR.  Having established none of 
these apply, he returns to general principles which he sets out in some detail 
before applying them to the circumstances of  the case. 
It is in this latter section that one would expect to find the main distinctions 
between  Lord  Macmillan's  and  Lord  Buckmaster's,  yet  in  applying  the 
principle he  does  use  a practical example, not of a previous case but of a 
hypothetical situation of  a baker to show the reasonableness of  his decision: 
Suppose that a baker, through carelessness, allows a large quantity of 
arsenic to be mixed with a batch of  his bread, with the result that those 
who subsequently eat it are poisoned, could he be heard to say that he 
owed no duty to the consumers of  his bread to take care that it was free 
from poison, and that, as he did not know that any poison had got into 
it, his only liability was for breach of  warranty under his contract of  sale 
to those who actually bought the poisoned bread from him?lOo 
Indeed Lord Macmillan appeals to the reasonableness of the consequences of 
his decision and the irrationality of  the alternative as a central justification. 
I am happy to think that in their relation to the practical problem of 
every day life which this appeal presents, the legal systems of the two 
countries are in no way at variance, and that the principles of  both alike 
are  sufficiently consonant with justice and common sense to admit of 
the claim which the appellant seeks to establish.lOi 
This parallels Lord Buckmasters approval of the "floodgate doctrine", both 
judges are then looking at the facts of  previous cases and seeking to apply and 
justify their decision making primarily in terms of consequences which are or 
are  not  reasonable.  There  are  significant  differences  in  some  of their 
100 1932 SC (HL) 31  at p 71. 
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approach
102 but this does suggest that the source of  what they find persuasive 
comes at least in part from how well it justifies the reasonable result. 
If I  were  asked  what  is  the  most  potent  influence  upon  a  court  in 
formulating a statement of legal principle, I would answer that in the 
generality  of instances  it is  the  desired  result  in  the  particular  case 
before the court. (Goff 1984, 183) 
This  could be seen to be a cynical statement where judges rationalise their 
opinions  but  as  seen  earlier
103  such  rationalisations  are  a  way  in  which 
individuals  can understand  values  and  socially  are  a  way  of encouraging 
others  to  act  appropriately.  It  shall  be  argued  that  the  values  this 
rationalisation supports  are  linked to the sense  of the judicial role held by 
each individual judge, whether they feel bound by authority or are seeking to 
apply justice - concepts which link well to these two forms of  reasoning. The 
sections that follow look at these themes in more detail, the first looks at the 
consequences  that  concern  the  judiciary  and  which  cluster  around  the 
floodgates  argument.  This  relates  strongly  to  a  sense  of the  relationship 
between  law and  society  and  the  character  of law but  in  the  way  these 
arguments  relate  to  judicial role  also  help  to  foster  a  sense  of individual 
identity. 
2. Law and society 
A central issue in the cases explored here is the difference between economic 
and  physical  loss,  the  relationship  between  this  and  what  judges  find 
persuasive can be seen if  the decision of Lord Keith in Murphy is contrasted 
with that of Lord Devlin in Hedley Byrne. Lord Keith strongly supported the 
view that these should be treated differently: 
It being recognised that the nature of the loss held to be recoverable in 
Anns was pure economic loss, the next point for examination is whether 
the avoidance of loss of  that nature fell within the scope of any duty of 
102 Notably in Lord Macmillan's adoption of  a more academic style. 
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care owed to the plaintiffs by the local authority. On the basis of  the law 
as it stood at the time of the decision the answer to that question must 
be in the negative. 104 
because to allow such a right: 
would  open  an  exceedingly  wide  field  of  claims,  involving  the 
introduction of something in the nature of a transmissible warranty of 
quality. 105 
What is interesting in this passages, is what Lord Keith finds persuasive about 
the  consequences that he  identifies.  He  is  persuaded by  the  danger of "an 
exceedingly  wide  field  of claims."  It  is  this  consequence  that  is  most 
persuasive and suggests that he feels there is a need to protect society from 
the law. 
Compare  this  rhetoric  with  Lord  Devlin  in  Hedley  Byrne,  who  feels  the 
distinction is unjustifiable: 
The interposition of the physical injury is said to make a difference of 
principle.  I can find  neither logic  nor common sense in this.  .  ..  I am 
bound to say, my Lords, that I think this to be nonsense. It is not the sort 
of nonsense that can arise even in the best system of  law out of  the need 
to draw nice distinctions between borderline cases. It arises, if it is the 
law, simply out of  a refusal to make sense  .. The line is not drawn on any 
intelligible principle.  106 
The arguments that persuade Lord Devlin centre around the use of logic and 
principle.  He  finds  the  distinction  simply  "a refusal  to  make  sense."  The 
power of logic is enough for him to consider overruling earlier authority. But 
it is not simply logic alone that persuades Lord Devlin: 
As  well  as  being  defective  in  the  sense  that  it  would  leave  a  man 
without  a  remedy  where  he  ought  to  have  one,  it  would  also  be 
104 [1991] 1 AC 398 at p468 
105 supra at p 469 
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profoundly illogical.  107 
Logic linked to a sense of the unjustness of the decision that would result is 
what persuades Lord Devlin. The desire for law to be logical is thus linked to 
a sense in which this is the way to apply it to society. Lord Keith, on the other 
hand,  feels the persuasive force of authority more than Lord Devlin and is 
also  persuaded by arguments  that stress  the  potential  danger of unlimited 
liability.  There  is  thus  a  real  difference,  expressed  through  their  use  of 
language, between what these two judges find persuasive. This difference is 
one that is  not just related to the facts of the case but reveals more general 
attitudes about legal reasoning. 
The  differences  between  what judges  found  persuaSIve  tended  to  cluster 
around  the  issue  of unlimited  liability  or  the  floodgates  argument.  This 
argument  dominates  delict.  It is  present  in  all  the  cases  in  one  form  or 
another. It has not always been seen as positive.  McManus feels that it has 
had a particularly negative effect on the way the courts have handled the issue 
of 'nervous shock': 
As far as so-called "secondary" victims of  nervous shock are concerned, 
the  Atkinian  foreseeability  test  has  been  refined  in  effect,  almost 
beyond recognition, by judges superimposing arbitrary limits to the rule 
in order to whittle down the potential number of claimants. (McManus 
1996, 159) 
The classic statement on unlimited liability, quoted in the last chapter, comes 
from Winterbottom v Wright: 
The only safe rule is to confine the right to those who enter into the 
contract:  if we  go  one  step beyond that,  there  is  no  reason why  we 
should not go fifty. 108 
This fear, that reason would compel judges into making decisions that would 
expand the law to irrational levels if  they take that one first step, is the core of 
107 supra at p 516 
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the argument. 109 It is  so  persuasive that it distorted the development of tort 
and  delict  for  decades  following  this  decision.  It was  the  main  argument 
against  introducing  principle  into  delict  and,  even  after  Donoghue  did 
introduce  principle,  it  retained  its  persuasive  force.  Consider  these  two 
passages,  which  are  separated  in  time  by  nearly  sixty  years.  First  Lord 
Buckmaster from 1932: 
If such a duty exists, it seems to me  it must cover the construction of 
every article, and I cannot see any reason why it should not apply to the 
construction of a house. If one step, why not fifty? Yet if a house be, as 
it sometimes is, negligently built, and in consequence of  that negligence 
the  ceiling falls  and  injuries  the  occupier or  anyone  else,  no  action 
against  the  builder  exists,  according  to  the  English  law,  although  I 
believe such a right did exist according to the laws of  Babylon.  110 
Now Lord Jauncey from 1990: 
If it were to stand as good law there is no logical reason why it should 
not extend to defective chattels, thereby opening the door to a mass of 
product liability claims which the law has not previously entertained. III 
There are stylistic differences between these two passages. Lord Buckmaster 
is  much more assertive.  This can be attributed to  the passage of time.  The 
underlying argument is, though, exactly the same. 
The consistency with which the unlimited liability argument appears suggests 
that it is of  great significance to delict. As Lord Fraser in Junior Books puts it: 
....  the concern which has been repeatedly expressed by judges in the 
United  Kingdom  and  elsewhere,  that  the  effect  of relaxing  strict 
limitations upon the  area of liability for  delict (tort) would be,  in the 
words of Cardozo J., to introduce "liability in an indeterminate amount 
for  an  indeterminate  time  to  an  indeterminate  class."  This  is  the 
floodgates  argument,  if I  may  use  the  expression  as  a  convenient 
109 The fear of  infinite regress and its importance in law is described in more detail in chapter 5 
below. 
110 1932 SC (lll.,) 31  at p 43 
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description,  and not in any  dismissive or question-begging sense.  The 
argument appears to me unattractive, especially if it leads, as I think it 
would  be  in  this  case,  to  drawing  an  arbitrary  an  illogical  line just 
because a line has to be drawn somewhere. But it has to be considered, 
because it has had a significant influence ...  112 
Lord  Fraser  is  not  persuaded  by  the  floodgates  argument  but  he  has  to 
consider it. 113  This shows how powerful this argument can be and how the 
sense of law as something dangerous which led to the privity of contract rule 
still  dominates this  are  of law.  It does  not,  though,  stand alone.  There are 
other arguments that reoccur throughout the cases.  Some of these tend to be 
used by those  who  support the  unlimited liability  argument  and others  by 
those who reject it. These create two distinct persuasive strategies. 
In particular, those who are persuaded by the unlimited liability argument are 
very open about the use of policy in law and its limitations. Lord Keith in 
Murphy again: 
So  far as  policy considerations are  concerned, it is  no  doubt the  case 
that extending the scope of the tort of negligence may tend to inhibit 
carelessness  and improve  standards  of manufacture  and  construction. 
On the  other hand overkill  may present its  own dangers.  ...  There is 
much to  be  said for  the  view that in what is  essentially a consumer 
protection field,  ...  the precise extent and limits of the liabilities which 
in  the  public  interest  should  be  imposed  on  builders  and  local 
authorities are best left to the legislature. I 14 
The presentation of  the judicial role in this passage is repeated by a number of 
judges who  are also persuaded by the unlimited liability argument. It is  not 
surprising  that those  who  hold this  view  also  tend to  support  case-based 
reasoning.  The incremental development that case-based reasoning claims is 
112 1982 SC (HL) 244 at p 264 
113 It is the nature of dominant arguments that even those who oppose them need to work 
within their structures. See the Neusner quote with which this thesis began p 1 above. 
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attractive to the cautious nature of  the decision-making of  these judges. They 
are keenly aware of the importance of authority and in seeking to move one 
step  at  a  time  they  are  re-establishing  the  relationship  between  law  and 
society in every decision. 
If those  who  are  persuaded by  unlimited  liability  are  persuaded by  other 
related arguments,  this  is  also true of those who  are not persuaded by this 
argument. 
In looking at Lord Devlin's decision in Hedley Byrne, two  arguments were 
identified as  persuasive.  One  was  the "justice" argument.  This rests  on the 
need to provide remedies where there is felt to have been an injustice. Unlike 
the group of  judges identified earlier, who feel the need for a strong argument 
before they will consider expanding the law, Lord Devlin wants a good reason 
for not providing a remedy. The other argument that Lord Devlin appeals to is 
the need for logic in the law. This positive attitude towards logic is in direct 
contrast  with  those  who  support  the  unlimited  liability  argument  and  are 
afraid of logic leading to illogical extremes. Principled reasoners make more 
assumptions about law and society. They assume that reason is good and that 
logic  and justice  can  establish  the  relationship  between  law  and  society 
without the need to constantly refer to authority. 
Thus, there is a clear distinction between the way judges approach arguments 
about consequences and policy and this links to the different methodologies 
adopted.  The unlimited liability argument is linked to a distrust of principle. 
Those  who  support  principled-reasoning  are  sceptical  of line  drawing  and 
classification which is closer to case-based reasoning. Thus, there seems to be 
a link between the methodology explicitly chosen and what the judge finds 
persuasive.  The  principled  group  is  persuaded  by  logic  and  reason,  by 
arguments about justice.  They admire the structure of principles.  The case-
based  group  is  afraid  of the  generality  of principles  and  seek  refuge  in 
classifications which they feel  they can control.  The choice made between 
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but also to the language which they use and it is here that the most emotive 
language  is  used.
115  This  suggests  that  it  is  to  these  arguments  that  the 
judiciary are most committed and these are linked to their views of judicial 
role. 
It is  notable  that  it  is  in  reasons  centred  around  this  most  emotive  of 
arguments and the persuasive strategies that are related to it and that include 
more  abstract  issues  of methodology  that  the  real  differences  are  seen 
between  individuals.  As  shall  be  seen  these  emotive  arguments  remain 
individual and this may be because they reflect a very deep sense of the role 
of law in society that will be closely linked to the judge's view of their own 
judicial role and thus be closely linked to their own identity. 
3. Judicial role 
Arguments  related  to  judicial  role  can  not  only  be  extracted  from  the 
decisions but are made explicitly. The link between these arguments and the 
relationship between law and society can be seen in Murphy where an attitude 
towards  role  was  the main persuasive  argument.  Lord Mackay puts  it this 
way: 
For this  House  in  its judicial  capacity to  create  a large  new area of 
responsibility  on  local  authorities  in  respect  of defective  buildings 
would in my opinion not be a proper exercise of  judicial power.
116 
Lord Bridge: 
It is  pre-eminently for  the  legislature to  decide  whether these  policy 
reasons should be accepted as sufficient ....  117 
Lord Oliver: 
115 Language such as "just" 1982 SC (HL) 244 at p 271  per Lord Roskill; "absurd" [1964] AC 
465 at p 516 per Lord Devlin; "capricious" [1991]  AC  398 at p 457 per Lord Mackay 
and  the  use  of such  phrases  as  Lord  Salmon's  "  the  innocents  who  suffer  from  it 
[negligence]"  [1978]  AC  738  at  p 767.  Negligence itself is of course an  emotive term 
with connotations of  blame and wrongdoing. 
116 [1991] 1 AC 398 at p 457. 
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...  I do not, for my part, think that it is right for the courts not simply to 
expand existing principles but to create large new principles in order to 
fulfil a social need in an area of consumer protection which has already 
been perceived by the legislature, but for which, presumably advisedly, 
it has not thought it necessary to provide.
II8 
Lord J  auncey: 
Parliament is far better equipped than the courts to take policy decisions 
in the field of  consumer protection.  1  19 
Though all make variations on the theme, these judges clearly have similar 
views about the judicial role and how that relates to the legislative role. There 
is no clear "opposing" view to this description of the judicial role. 120  Judges 
who do not find the unlimited liability argument persuasive do not talk about 
judicial  role.  It could  be  argued  that  in  their  preference  for  arguments 
involving logic and justice that a sense of  judicial role could be extracted and 
Lord Devlin is perhaps the prime example of  this: 
This is why the distinction is now said to depend on whether financial 
loss is caused through physical injury or whether it is caused directly. 
The interposition of the physical injury is  said to make a difference of 
principle. I can find neither logic nor common sense than this  ....  [Devlin 
gives  a  practical  example which he feels  shows  this  absurdity]  I  am 
bound to say, my Lords, that I think this to be nonsense. It is not the sort 
of  nonsense that can arise even in the best system of  law out of  the need 
to draw nice distinctions between borderline cases. It arises, if it is the 
law, simply out of  a refusal to make sense. The line is not drawn on any 
intelligible principle.
I21 
Lord Devlin clearly sees it as a core role of the judge the need to be logical 
and use common sense: "no system of law can be workable if it has not got 
118 supra at p 492. 
119 supra at p 498. 
120 The attitude towards Parliament would be accepted generally by almost all judges. 
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logic at the root of  it". 122 Law is a hierarchy and a structure. It is also just and 
it is this aspect of logic that principled reasoners often focus on.  Amongst a 
number  of case-based  reasoners  in  Murphy  Lord  Mackay  of Clashfem 
manages to find a principled approach to the decision: 
the  result  of  applying  these  qualifications  to  different  factual 
circumstances  is  to  require  distinctions  to  be  made  which  have  no 
justification on any reasonable principle and can only be described as 
capricious.  It cannot be  right for  this House to leave the  law in that 
state.  123 
Judges do  not though apply persuasive strategies and methodologies rigidly. 
They can be mixed and it is here that it is possible to see how the individual 
retains their commitment to a view of  judicial role even when at first sight his 
choice of  methodology appears at odds with this. 
A good  example  of this  is  Lord Brandon's dissent in Junior Books.
124  He 
explicitly uses principled reasoning. So do the other judges in this case and it 
is clearly the dominant form.  Yet, closer analysis of Lord Brandon's decision 
shows  that  he  also  finds  persuasive  arguments  that  would  normally  be 
associated with case-based reasoning - he is worried about unlimited liability 
and seeks to follow authority. 
Lord Brandon starts by  identifying the principle he will  follow.  He begins 
with Donoghue but settles on Lord Wilberforce and bases his decision on the 
two-stage principle in Anns: 
My Lords,  in support of their contentions the pursuers placed reliance 
on the broad statements relating to liability in negligence contained in 
the  speech  of Lord  Wilberforce  in  Anns v Merton  London  borough 
Council (supra)  at pp.  751-2. Lord Wilberforce there said: - "Through 
122 supra at p 516. 
123  [1991] AC 398 at p 497. 
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the trilogy of cases in this House - Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 
562, Hedley Byrne &  Co.  td v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465, 
and  Dorset  Yacht  Co.  Ltd  V  Home  Office  [1970]  AC  1004  - the 
position has now been reached that in order to establish that a duty of 
care arises in a particular situation, it is not necessary to bring the facts 
of that situation within those of previous situations in which a duty of 
care has been held to exist. Rather the question has to be approached in 
two  stages.  First,  one  has  to  ask  whether,  as  between  the  alleged 
wrongdoer and the person who has suffered damage there is a sufficient 
relationship of proximity or neighbourhood such that, in the reasonable 
contemplation of the former, carelessness on his part may be likely to 
cause damage to the latter - in which case a prima facie duty of care 
arises.  Secondly,  if the  first  question  is  answered affirmatively,  it is 
necessary to consider whether there are any considerations which ought 
to negative or to reduce or limit the scope of the duty or the class or 
person to whom it is owed or the damages to which a breach of it may 
give rise ... ,,125 
Lord Brandon answers the first question positively: 
That first question having been answered in the affirmative, however, it 
is necessary, according to the views expressed by Lord Wilberforce ... 
whether there are any considerations which ought, inter alia, to limit the 
scope of  duty which exists. 126 
In answering the second question, though, he answers in the negative and it is 
this that he uses to justify his dissent. He starts thus: 
To that second question I would answer that there are two important 
considerations which ought to limit the scope of  the duty of  care,  127 
These considerations are authority and the danger of  unlimited liability. As he 
puts it: 
The first consideration is that in Donoghue v Stevenson itself and in all 
125  supra at p 281. 
126 supra at p 281. 
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the  numerous  cases  to  which the  principle of that decision has  been 
applied  ... ,  it  has  always  been  either  stated  expressly,  ...  that  an 
essential ingredient in a the cause of action relied on was the existence 
of danger....  To  dispense  with that essential  ingredient in a cause of 
action of the kind concerned in the present case  would,  in  my  view, 
involve a radical departure from long-established authority. 
The  second consideration is  that there  is  no  sound policy reason for 
substituting the wider scope  of the  duty  of care  put forward  for  the 
pursuers for the more restricted scope of such duty put forward by the 
defenders ..... 
It is, I think, just worth while to consider the difficulties which would 
arise if the wider scope of the duty of care put forward by the pursuers 
were accepted. .  ... 
This illustrates with especial force the inherent difficulty of seeking to 
impose what are really contractual obligations by unprecedented and, as 
I think, wholly undesirable extensions of  the existing law of  delict.  128 
In Junior Books, where he gives a dissenting decision, he refers to few cases 
and  applies  Lord  Wilberforce  two-stage  test.
129  By  contrast,  in Leigh  and 
Sillavan  Ltd v Aliakmon Shipping  Co.  Ltd,130  where  he  gives  the  leading 
decision,  he  places facts  at the  core of his  decision and follows  a form  of 
reasoning much closer to Lord Buckmaster's style in Donoghue. From this, it 
could be argued that, in choice of methodology, Lord Brandon is more aware 
of the importance of the views of others and that the arguments that he finds 
consistently persuasive are the ones that reflect his own view of his role. Lord 
Mackay's decision in Murphy echoes this though it does so in a different way. 
128 supra at p 283. 
129 supra at pp 278-283 
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In Murphy he argues for the narrow view of  the judicial role which is the most 
common persuasive argument in that case and yet he does so because the law 
is not found in principle in this area, there is no principled justification.  131 
Thus although he accepts the dominance of  the legislature he sees the role of 
the judge to apply principles and this is at odds with his fellow judges who 
seek to limit the judge to the application of  authority. 
These Law Lords are not being inconsistent. They are responding to a basic 
requirement  of legal  reasoning,  the  need  to  persuade  others.  The  biggest 
influence  on  the  style  of reasoning  used  and  the  choice  of the  dominant 
persuasive argument appears to be the attitudes of the other judges deciding 
on the same case. 
At  appeal  level, judges do  not decide  alone.  At the  level  of the House  of 
Lords, the authority given to their decisions means that they are also deciding 
for future  cases.  They need to persuade others that their decision-making is 
rational and reasonable.  The process of persuasion can be seen in the texts 
and is the result of  a longer process that occurs behind the scenes.132 
Between the hearing and the final  decision, there is  discussion between the 
judges. The details of this are not made public, but traces of it are left in the 
final  decision.  There is often consensus between judges as  to what are the 
important points of the  case.  The  similarity in matters of style,  number of 
cases cited, the place of facts,  and language used can be striking and notably 
in Lord Brandon's case, choice of methodology which is dependant not only 
on what the individual judge believes is appropriate but on what s/he believes 
will be accepted by the judges around him/her.  Lord Diplock has  suggested 
that: 
.  ..  the way in which Courts in fact  adapt themselves to  the changing 
131  See quote above p 226 
132  See  the  discussion  above  of the  possible  influence  on  Lord  Macmillan's  decision  in 
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pattern of society is  influenced less by conscious intention than by the 
training,  practice  and  habits  of though  of the  legal  profession  as  a 
whole. (Paterson 1982,32) 
This relates to the sense of character of law and yet when these judges are 
looked at in more detail their sense of the role of the law is consistent. This 
identity may  sit  better with  one  persuasive  strategy than  another but what 
really persuades  these judges  individually  is  their view of the  relationship 
between law and society. In containing more than one view the legal system 
allows judges to  ally themselves with alternative views of law and society. 
The  way  the  judges  relate  to  such  arguments  is  linked  to  which  form  of 
reasoning they prefer. When we look at the unlimited liability argument, we 
can  see  that  attitudes  towards  it  and  its  persuasive  force  clearly  split the 
decisions into two groups. 
This model can be used to explain how judges come to the same decision but 
for different reasons. Compare these two passages from different decisions in 
Junior Books. Both were for the respondents, first Lord Roski11: 
I  think today  that  the  proper  control  lies  not  in  asking  whether the 
proper remedy should lie in contract or instead in delict or tort, not in a 
somewhat capricious judicial determination whether a particular case 
falls  on  one  side  of the  line  or the  other,  not in somewhat  artificial 
distinctions between physical and economic or financial loss when the 
two  sometimes  go  together  and  sometimes  do  not - it  is  sometimes 
overlooked that virtually all  damage  including physical  damage  is  in 
one sense financial or economic for it is  compensated by an award of 
damages - but in the first instance establishing the relevant principles 
and then in deciding whether the particular case falls within or without 
those principles.
I33 
and Lord Keith: 
Having thus reached a conclusion in favour of the respondents upon the 
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somewhat narrow ground which I have indicated, I do not consider this 
to be an appropriate case for seeking to advance the frontiers of  the law 
of negligence upon the lines favoured by your Lordships.  There are a 
number of reasons why such an extension would, in my view, be wrong 
in principle  .... So to hold would raise very difficult and delicate issues 
of principle  having  a  wide  potential  application  .... To  introduce  a 
general  liability  covering  such  situations  would  be  disruptive  of 
commercial  practice,  ....  The  policy  considerations  which  would  be 
involved in introducing such a state of  affairs appear to me to be such as 
a court of law cannot properly assess, and the question whether or not it 
would be in the interests of  commerce and the public generally is, in my 
view, much better left to the legislature.
134 
Although Lord Keith and Lord Roskill come to the same conclusion, they are 
persuaded by very different arguments. Lord Roskill is influenced by principle 
and logic. He is wary of  making illogical distinctions. Lord Keith is persuaded 
by the unlimited liability argument. He also refers to policy arguments. Thus, 
although Lords Roskill and Keith superficially appear to be on the same side, 
the  arguments  that they find  persuasive  puts  them in different camps  and 
leads them to prefer different methodologies which relate to the relationship 
between law and society. 
This distinction can generate conflict but in doing so generates loyalty. They 
have  a view to  which they  are  committed and one of the reasons  for  this 
commitment may be that this is not a universal view but one that they have to 
argue for.  In making them generate reasons the law encourages commitment 
by making the judges choose sides this commitment is deepened and linked to 
the way they see themselves as well as the law. 
3.1 Judges outside the courtroom 
Throughout this study, the focus has been on the decision as legal artefact. 
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The attitude of  the judges has predominantly been taken from the law reports. 
There are though other ways in which the attitudes of the judges could have 
been  explored.  Alan  Paterson  in  his  influential  work  the  Law  Lords, 
interviewed a number of senior judges. (Paterson 1982) Some senior Judges 
have written about their attitudes to judging.  135 
Detailed study of these sources are outside the scope of  this thesis. However, 
it  is  worthwhile  to  note  that  a brief consideration of them  reveals  similar 
conclusions to those reached by this study of  the decision itself. 
Paterson  has  concentrated  on  the  affects  of judicial  role  perception  and 
highlights  the  importance  of the  audience  as  perceived  by  the judge.  His 
conclusions support the contention made here that judges are most influenced 
by those people they are  immediately concerned with persuading, the other 
judges  in the  court.  Paterson does  also  make  the point that the  individual 
personalities of  the judges will affect how they respond in hard cases and this 
is strongly linked to their sense of  role or identity: 
The  Law  Lords'  responses  to  role  conflict,  although  along  lines 
predicted  from  other  fields  of research,  depend  in  part  on  their 
personalities. Thus when justice and certainty conflict, some Law Lords, 
for example Lords Diplock, Pearce, Salmon and Denning, consider that 
they  have  a  tendency  to  favour  flexibility  and  justice,  others,  for 
example Lords Cross,  Guest,  Pearson and Upjohn have  admitted to  a 
tendency  in  the  opposite  direction,  while  the  bulk  of the  remainder 
endeavour to strike a balance between the two expectations. (1982, 199) 
The law allows space for  different personalities to exist and it is likely that 
these personalities and views of law are useful to legitimating the role.  They 
encourage strong stances and seek to ensure that judges will not respond to 
135  There is a growing literature in this area. Atkin (1925; 1932), Denning (1979), Goff(1984), 
Devlin (1976; 1978) McLuskey (1987) and Reid (1972) are only a few of  the judges who 
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personal bias but to  a strong sense of their role.  In  looking at the material 
produced by judges who have written or lectured on the judicial decision and 
role, it should be remembered that they are still aiming to persuade others that 
their views are correct. They are doing so, though, before a different audience 
and in these situations, their style is generally more personal, they do not need 
to justify their opinions with reference to earlier cases but much of  their views 
remain the same. Lord Atkin is a good example of this.  As has been shown, 
his  earlier speeches  to  the  Society of the  Public Teachers  of Law,  (Atkin 
1925; 1932) echo his decision in Donoghue v Stevenson. Lord Reid also gave 
a lecture to  the  Society of the Public Teachers of Law,  in which he argued 
that in approaching a decision in the common law: 
We should, I think, have regard to  common sense, legal principle and 
public policy in that order. We are here to serve the public, the common 
ordinary reasonable  man.  He  has  no  great faith  in theories  and he  is 
quite  right.  What  he  wants  and  will  appreciate  is  an  explanation  in 
simple terms which he can understand. (1972, 25) 
Lord Reid is  quite fond of the reasonable man.
136  He is  mentioned twice in 
quick  succession  in  Hedley  Byrne.
137  Indeed,  the  decision  that Lord  Reid 
presents in Hedley Byrne fits with his description of how decisions ought to 
be made. He  starts with the common sense argument and then considers the 
law: 
A reasonable man, knowing that he was being trusted or that his skill 
and judgement were being relied on, would, I think, have three courses 
open to him ... 
[Lord Reid describes three reasonable responses] 
If that is right, then it must follow that Candler v Crane,  Christmas & 
136  The  reasonable  man  has  an  interesting  pedigree.  As  can  be  seen  above,  p  199,  Lord 
Macmillan, like Lord Reid finds its use problematic but in a recent decision in the Inner 
House  in  Scotland  it  was  this  subject  rather  than  the  floodgates  argument  which 
generated  the  most  emotional  responses.  Lord  Morrison  clearly  feeling  that  Lord 
Prosser's use of  this model was a way of  introducing subjective moral views which would 
undermine  the  impartial  position  of law.  (see McLelland v  Greater  Glasgow  Health 
Board 2001  SL T 446 especially pp 453 and 458) 
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Co.  was wrongly decided.138 
The decision being decided at this stage, there is no need to tum to the third 
part of  policy. 
The statements that judges make outside court either in interview or in public 
statements are consistent with the arguments that they make in court.  This 
suggests that they regard at least some of  the arguments that they use in court, 
usually the  ones  relating  to  the  place of law in the world  and  choice  of 
methodology,  as  persuasive  outside the field of the  decision.  In  particular 
what is most persuasive are those arguments which reflect their view of  their 
own role, of  their identity as ajudge. 
4.  Conclusion 
This section has demonstrated the ways in which different methodologies and 
persuasive  strategies  reveal  different attitudes  towards the  place of law in 
society.  The link between these arguments and judicial role and a sense of 
individual identity explains why judges are  committed to these values and 
seek to explore them through their decisions. 
In the  Talmud contradictory views  were  allowed the  status  of truth.  This 
allowed those whose views were not accepted as having practical significance 
to feel that they had nevertheless become part of  the tradition. It also allowed 
a greater pool of material for later generations to  use.  In the common law 
contradictory views are also allowed to stand and the judiciary have generated 
contradictory views of  the legal process and the relationship between law and 
society.  These views  are  both capable of describing the common law and 
could even be seen as  complimentary. Law is  both an historical, traditional 
structure  and  a  logical  structure  and the  choice that judges make between 
seeing law as the exercise of  justice or authority in society relates to their own 
sense of self and how they feel about the role of law.  In doing so, law does 
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not tear itself apart, both of  these views of its place in society can be linked to 
underlying  values  of consistency  and the  rule  of law to  which  all judges 
would subscribe but the existence of this conflict means that judges have to 
make a choice and therefore declare a commitment to law. Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
The first chapter concluded with a quote from Kimberley Curtis describing 
Arendt's vision of  judgment. This saw  judgment as paradoxical, an emotional 
experience as a result of  which the person was both convinced they were right 
and compelled to tell others but did so in a form which suggested a lack of 
belief - persuasion.  This  thesis  set  out to  try  and  unravel  the  aspects  of 
judicial decision-making which leads judges to feel convinced that they are 
right in their application of law but requires them to justify that assertion by 
arguments which legitimate and justify that decision. This chapter concludes 
this  study by considering not only the relationship between judgment and 
persuasIon  but  also  that  between  persuasion  and  philosophy  before 
concluding  by  arguing  that  using  judgment  as  a  paradigm  for  all 
understanding is highly problematic. In doing so it seeks not only to return to 
the main themes of  the thesis but to understand more fully the ethical choice 
made in undertaking either philosophy or  judgment. 
The  fust  section  looks  at  persuaSIOn  as  philosophy  through  Neusner's 
identification of  the Talmud as philosophy. This defines philosophy as a pure 
form of  persuasion where everything is questionable including the identity of 
the questioner. 
The second section looks at judgment and shows why the role of authority 
means that despite some similarities to philosophy the two remain essentially 
different as the role of  judgment is not to question but confirm. 
The final  section begins by arguing that this analysis explains more clearly 
why legal theorists have had difficulty expressing the role of the person in 
judgment. It, and this thesis concludes by arguing that, although it may seem a 
logical result of the position set out in this chapter, judgment should not be 
used as a model for understanding. Malloch VA 2002 
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In chapter 2 it was  argued that the three theorists presented had difficulty 
understanding the emotional commitment of a judge to hislher role.  In part 
this  was  because they were  seeking to  produce  philosophically acceptable 
arguments and were using the person of the judge to deal with gaps in their 
theoretical  structures  but  it  also  related  to  a  problem  that  philosophy  in 
general  had  both  with  understanding  the  individual  and  with  its  own 
foundations.  This problem made it difficult for them to understand judgment 
and,  in  particular,  aspects  of judgment  such  as  authority  and  the  role  of 
character and  identity.  This  section starts by  looking at another attempt to 
understand  judgment  not  only  by  philosophy  but  as  philosophy.  Jacob 
Neusner, whose interpretation of the Talmud was  used in chapter 3, sees a 
strong link between the two. It will be argued here that this argument reveals 
less about judgment than it does about philosophy. His argument does though 
allow the form  and structure of philosophy to be set out more clearly and 
therefore the problems that undertaking any philosophical analysis entails. 
1. The goal of  philosophy 
Jacob  Neusner  has  argued  that  there  is  considerable  congruity  between 
Classical Greek philosophy and the Talmud.  (Neusner 1997) His argument is 
based  on  his  identification  of the  Talmud  as  predominantly  a  work  of 
philosophy  and,  in  doing  so,  he  expresses  a view both about the  goal  of 
judgment and the nature of  philosophy. In describing the Talmud he states: 
This is a book about how in concrete detail great principles of Western 
philosophical  thought  were  brought  to  concrete  realisation,  through 
applied reason and practical logic. (Neusner 1997, 1) 
This  sees  the  Talmud as  a  work  about the  application  of principles.  The 
Talmud  does  deal  in  detail  with the  application  of laws  and  is  a  model 
teaching people how to judge and make persuasive judgments but Neusner is 
not concerned with the details of its debates but rather with the attitudes that 
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Specifically, they took the  static,  systematic exchange of proposition 
and counter-proposition, argument and refutation, and turned it into a 
dynamic, sometimes meandering sequence of propositions, lacking the 
neatness  of the  received,  neat exchange  of positions  and reasons  for 
those positions.  For what marks the Bavli's mode of dialectics is  the 
power of an argument to change course, the possibility of  re-framing a 
position altogether in direct response to  a powerful counter-argument 
(1997, 15)1 
Philosophy is not being identified with a form of argument or even with the 
application  of principles  to  fact  per  se.  Instead  it  is  an  attitude  that  is 
Neusner's core concern and an attitude that is about accepting the power of 
argument and debate. This can be seen in what Neusner describes as the three 
key ways in which a philosophical argument can be identified: 
1) Every allegation is tested by a counter-proposition.
2 
2)  The  range  of possible  moves  from  the  original  argument  are 
explored. 
3) It is set forth in such a way that the reader can understand the thought 
processes of  the participants and reconstruct the argument 
These all place the argument rather than the answer to the argument at the 
heart of  philosophy. They also define what sort of  argument is acceptable and, 
by concentrating on  the  logical  aspects  of the argument,  describe  it as  an 
argument which is  not about the power of language but the power of ideas 
expressed through language.  Indeed, if implemented, these three statements 
would limit the language that would be acceptable in a philosophical debate. 
They are founded on an aim to clarify and to make the steps in the argument 
clear.  There is a desire for purity of form here that could be at odds with a 
desire  to  win  the  argument  and  Neusner  accepts  that  despite  the  highly 
combative nature of  the first statement the goal is not to win: 
Specifically, the goal of all argument is to show in discrete detail, the 
1 Bavli is a term used to denote the Babylonian Talmud. 
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ultimate unity, harmony, proportion and perfection of the law - not of 
the Mishnah as a document but of all the law of the same standing as 
that presented by the Mishnah.(l997, 140) 
On this view of philosophy,  an individual  argues  and seeks to  do  so  in a 
rigorous fashion to establish the harmony, proportion and perfection of the 
object to which he is committed. This suggests that philosophy is interested in 
the aesthetics of argument and persuasive arguments are those which not only 
explain but do so in a specific form.  This desire to uncover, to make clear and 
to explain may suggest a deep seated need in human beings to understand and 
to represent that understanding in an aesthetically pleasing manner. 
3 
Whatever the source, this commitment to harmony and perfection is one that 
can be seen in legal theorists and supports the view that they are essentially 
producing  philosophical  arguments.  The  legal  theorists  in  chapter  2  all 
showed a strong preference for presentations of  law which were structural and 
unified. Even Jackson who criticises positivism for its unified structures seeks 
to replace it with his own.  Dworkin's mythical Hercules is perhaps the best 
known theoretical embodiment of this desire and one which clearly sees this 
particularly as the goal of  the judiciary. (Dworkin 1986) Dworkin accepts that 
this is  unobtainable given the constraints on the judiciary but this does not 
mean this is insignificant. The goal is significant not because it is achievable 
but  because  of the  process  that  it  encourages.
4  Certainly  any  practical 
difficulties  would  not  exclude  such  a  philosophical  goal  from  at  least 
informing legal  argument and it could be argued that those who  supported 
principled reasoning certainly seems to have such a goal and to seek to see 
law displaying a character which is logical and rational. This would suggest 
3  This is not an overriding goal and it could be argued humans also show a desire for chaos 
and irrationality. 
4  Madry and  Richeimer have  criticised Dworkin for having "'mistakenly  collapsed the two 
distinct practices, that of  the philosopher describing judicial practice and that of  the judge 
adjudicating a case".  (1998,  228) The view of philosophy presented here supports this 
critique  and  indeed  Hercules  embodies the role  of a  legal  theorist  that MacCormick 
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judges and philosophers have similar roles and goals. 
Aristotle  though  felt  that  even  when  similar  methodologies  are  used  the 
context could be enough to generate two different forms of study and when 
one considers the persuasive strategies of  philosophers it is possible to see in 
more detail the character of philosophy and how it relates to the identity of 
philosophers.  This  actually  shows  that though the  power of a harmonious 
argument may be used by both philosophers and judges it is in their roles and 
context where the differences emerge. 
2. Philosophy as question 
In describing philosophy, Neusner describes a very general approach which 
can apply to any situation where an argument is used and requires an attitude 
rather than a professional practice but this approach can be seen in particular 
strategies  used  when  presenting  a  philosophical  theory.  First  philosophers 
have  to  demonstrate  there  are  problems  with  past theories  and  with  the 
structure of knowledge.  This demonstrates that there is  a space where they 
can enter.  They then seek to generate solutions to  show that they have the 
right to  define that space, these solutions tend to be structural and involve 
categorisation and classification. The strength of the solution is shown by its 
ability to  clarify  and  solve  a whole  range  of problems.  There  is  no  false 
modesty in these goals - the space they define they define completely from the 
foundations up. Indeed there is not only a strong tendency but in their need to 
answer all possible refutations a need to make theories of  everything. 
The way in which they seek to answer all possible objections and the way 
they  start  the  process  by  attacking  previous  theorists  suggests  that 
philosophers  are  not  operating  in  a  place  where  everything  is  sayable  as 
suggested in chapter 1 - rather it is a space where everything is questionable.
5 
Aristotle defined the question as the heart of  dialectic and he was well aware 
5 Gadamer describes the hermeneutic priority of  the question (1994,362). Malloch VA 2002  Conclusion  241 
of its combative nature.  His caution may be seen as  similar to Perelman's, 
entering this space means being open and allowing all of one's arguments to 
be questioned and this should only be done when the other(s) present are in a 
certain relationship of  respect. 
This relationship means that as well as being questioned the philosopher is 
aware that slhe will be heard.  Other philosophers will listen and attempt to 
understand their solutions. They will be taken seriously. It is the promise not 
only of being able to understand all but of being capable of communicating 
that  knowledge  and  therefore  of convincing  others  that  is  the  lure  of 
philosophy. It suggests that a single individual could understand and explain 
everything.  It places  power  in  the  hands  of an  individual.  Indeed,  the 
individual can even dictate the standards by which s/he will be judged. This 
can be seen in Perelman's description of  the two audiences which are central 
to philosophy - the audience of  all reasonable beings and self-evidence. There 
is a close link between these two, they are both created by the individual who 
seeks to persuade. The individual defines the standards by which s/he will be 
judged.  As  a result they will be the first aspect of any theory that will be 
questioned.  In  this  way  Jackson  criticised  MacCormick  for  failing  to 
understand  the  ethical  commitment  in  his  description  of the  syllogism 
although MacCormick had claimed he wished to describe law without such 
ethical commitment. 
Philosophy is founded on the understanding of  individual philosophers. They 
generate the solutions and take part in the process of  debate and questioning. 
It is they who are always seeking to find better solutions and which keeps it 
looking ever forward, tearing up its foundations as it goes. For all the goal of 
philosophy  may  be  to  explain  all  and  to  communicate  that  purely,  its 
methodology of constant questioning and its corresponding goal to find the 
arguments which can withstand all questions has led it to become concerned 
with its foundations.  In the last century this has led to a focus on a possible 
achilles heel - the inevitable limitations of  the individual. In questioning the 
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itself as pure persuasion - pure debate - but also as incapable of achieving its 
own goals. 
3. Philosophy as persuasion 
Today, the first question a philosopher must ask is "who am IT', s/he needs to 
understand  his/her  point  of view  and  the  prejudices  and  limitations  this 
imposes.
6 Jackson grounds truth in an individual and it is demonstrated by the 
individual defining where s/he stands and what sort of  character s/he seeks to 
display by a rigorous application of self-reflection and self-awareness. Truth 
here  is  a process  which is  displayed not in the harmony and perfection of 
argument in truth but in the honesty of  a person. The person who would have 
ultimate integrity would be completely free of  the limitations of  their point of 
view as  they would understand them perfectly but such an individual is  as 
mythical  as Dworkin's Hercules who  could create the  perfect structures to 
explain  the  law.  This  individual  is  important  though  because  s/he  would 
display  the  character of someone  who  has  absorbed  the  central  point  of 
philosophy  who  debates  with  themselves  and  would  express  philosophy 
through their sense of  identity. S/he would be the paradigm philosopher. 
7 
Perelman saw the audience of oneself as similar to philosophy in that it was 
an area where one sought to convince but this argument take this further and 
sees  this  conviction as  the  foundation of philosophy.  Aristotle  argued that 
debate  was  at its  purest when the individual  who  had to  decide would be 
affected  by  the  result  and  Jackson's  academic  of integrity  would,  if the 
6 Gadamer puts it this way: "My real concern was and is philosophic: not what we do or what 
we ought to do, but what happens to us over and above our wanting and doing." (1994 
xxviii) 
7  If  a  mythical  comparison  is  required  this  would  be  a  Solomon  rather than  a Hercules. 
Hercules shows his strength of  intellect in creating the perfect constructive interpretation. 
For this  structure to  be  convincing in  a world where the  individual  is  now suspect it 
would to be completed by one who, like Solomon could absorb the viewpoint of others 
and  found  the  structure  ethically.  Solomon  is  famed  for  his  skill  in  judgment  and 
philosophy  has  turned  to judgment  for  a  solution  to  this  problem.  The  relationship 
between philosophy  and  judgment  will  be  considered  below.  It should  be  noted that 
Dworkin also accepts that the role of  the individual is problematic when he tries to refute 
suggestions that Hercules would be a tyrant (1986,399) Malloch VA 2002  Conclusion  243 
process was taken to its limit, implicate his/her own identity in the process of 
questioning. Perhaps the best way to describe the nature of the pure form of 
persuasion that results can be seen with a parable of a similar problem in 
ethics.  In Arthur Koestler's book 'Arrival and Departure'  (1969), the main 
character, Peter, writes a short story, "The Last Judgement" (179 - 184) 
Meanwhile the trial of the fIrst defendant had begun. He stood facing 
the Court, a lean ascetic man with a stoop. 
'How do  you doT asked the Judge in a terrible voice, which echoed 
throughout the dome. 
'Humbly,  my  Lord,'  said  the  defendant.  But  his  voice  was  thin,  it 
collapsed in the air without resounding and fell with broken wings on 
the marble slab before his feet 
'Bad echo,' roared the Judge. 'However, proceed.' 
'He has sacrificed his fortune to help the poor,'  said Counsel for the 
Defence. His face resembled the defendant's, but there was more fat on 
his body and more righteousness in his voice. 
'On what did you dine tonightT roared the Judge. 
'On a glass of  milk and a crust of  bread, my Lord,' said the defendant 
The prosecutor rose. He too resembled the defendant, but he loked even 
more haggard and his voice was like a lash. 
'A child starved in China while he guzzled his  milk and bread,'  he 
shouted. 
'Condemned!'  roared  the  Judge;  and  the  audience  echoed  III awe-
stricken voices: 
'Condemned, condemned. ' 
The  next  defendant  was  a jovial,  guileless  man  with  a  paunch.  He 
advanced beaming all over his face, and as he advanced, the opposing 
Counsel changed in appearance; they again both resembled the accused, 
only the Defender looked even more guileless and had a bigger paunch. 
'On what did you dine tonightT roared the Judge. 
'Well,  my Lord,'  said the defendant,  'we thought  we  might  start on 
some fresh salmon, this being the season, and a bottle of  hock, to keep Malloch V.A. 2002  Conclusion  244 
it swimming and cool.' 
<Enough,' roared the Judge. <What has the defence to say?' 
'He has a blessed digestion,' the Defender nodded earnestly, crossing 
his hands on his belly. <  And what is the charge, anyway?' 
The Judge turned towards the prosecution; but the Prosecutor's seat was 
empty. 
'Acquitted in the  absence of a  charge,'  he  roared;  and the  audience 
repeated joyously: 
'Acquitted, acquitted.' (Koestler 1969, 180 - 181) 
Koestler's story was written as  a direct response to relativism and sought to 
try and explain why some people could still feel bound when there was no 
longer a rational justification for submitting to ethics. It can though serve as a 
model for the problem philosophers face. If  they accept that their role is to be 
open to  questions and the rigour of others they cannot seek to impose their 
standards on those others. They are walking into an arena where like the "thin 
man" they are pre-judged. Philosophers though seek to present arguments of 
everything  in  this  arena,  they  construct  not  only  themselves  but  their 
audience,  they  are  open to  all  questions  and  in their structures  they even 
suggest what arguments can be used against them, by what standards they 
should be judged.  Philosophy  is  a  commitment less  to  a  result than to  a 
process.  Debate  and  argument,  the ability to  rigorously  question is  placed 
above all else. 
In the last century this has led them to focus on the individual with the result 
that they must also question themselves and, in doing so, risk destroying their 
own discipline or as Emmanuel Levinas has put it in: 
the modem world; noone is identical to himself; nothing gets said for no 
word  has  its  own  meaning;  all  speech  is  a  magical  whisper;  noone 
listens to what you say; everyone suspects behind your words a not-said, 
a conditioning, an ideology.(Levinas 1990, 152) 
It is a paradox that if everything is questioned noone is listening. In this pure 
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hislher own identity can withstand questioning but the contextual limitations 
mean that this will be impossible, slhe will always be doomed to fail.  Slhe 
will not be able to communicate that conviction and all of  the structures she 
wishes  others  to  accept  as  convincing  will  be  based  on  an  unstable 
foundation.  If this  pure  form  of persuasion  is  always  doomed  to  failure 
because it is rooted in the character of  an individual who creates the standards 
by which that character is judged and these standards are always suspect it 
could  be  argued  that  philosophy  is  a  futile  enterprise.  Yet  unlike  other 
attempts  to  provide  theories  of everything  such  as  science  or  religion, 
philosophy does have an underlying ethical principle that is expressed in the 
way it places the individual human and a human in all hislher limitations at its 
core. Philosophy cannot explain everything because it only ever has one point 
of  view but its desire to place this point of  view in a public arena where it can 
be dignified as a possible explanation of everything and questioned as if it 
were of  supreme importance is a supremely ethical one.
8 
There is also the abundant fact that philosophers do the impossible on a daily 
basis  and  like  Steiner's  translator  the  rigorous  logic  which  declares  its 
enterprise impossible does not stop the process occurring in fact Steiner was 
though wrong to say that this impossibility has no  empirical consequences. 
The goal of philosophy to provide the ultimate unquestionable structure that 
lies beneath its constant process of  debate and questioning should not obscure 
the  fact  that  philosophical  tools  and  methodologies,  the  process  of 
clarification, categorisation and  classification have  been useful  not only in 
philosophies exploration of its own foundations but have been used in other 
spheres of  knowledge. Further it is this commitment to pure persuasion, to the 
power of  argument alone and above all else that give philosophy its character 
and that differentiates  it most strongly from judgment which  seeks  not to 
question but to confirm. 
g Camus's reinterpretation of  the myth of  Sisyphus which seeS in the King condemned to a task 
which  is  unachievable  parallels  this  description of philosophy  as  a  task aimed  at the 
impossible.  Camus  concludes  by  stating:  "The  struggle  itself towards  the heights  is 
enough to fill a man's heart. One must imagine Sisyphus happy."  (2000, Ill) Malloch V.A 2002 
Judgment and persuasion 
1. The role of  authority 
Conclusion  246 
In chapter two all three theorists recognised that authority was at the heart of 
judicial  decision-making which is  perhaps  the paradigm of judgment.  The 
role of authority in judgment can be contrasted with the role of authority in 
philosophy.  Philosophy seeks not to found authority externally but to create 
the  pure  argument whose  authority  is  held within itself and which can be 
easily communicated to the audience of all reasonable beings.  By contrast, 
judgment seeks not only to use authority but can only exist when there is a 
certain amount of authority whether it be social, political or legal to enforce 
that judgment or at least to increase its persuasive power beyond that of the 
pure  argument.  This  is  because  judgment  is  vulnerable  to  the  power  of 
argument,  as  although  judges  have  authority  they  do  not  have  absolute 
authority and this is  seen by the way they express their judgments - in the 
giving of  reasons: 
...  providing a reason invites evaluation of said reason and opens room 
for  disagreement  and  dissent.  In contrast,  issuing  a  decree  without 
reason  means  that  the  decree  rests  solely  upon  the  authority  of the 
issuer; if  that authority is recognized, then those addressed by the decree 
have no opportunity (or reason) to question what has been demanded by 
then. (Kraemer 1996, 25). 
To be effective, judgment must at some point stop the questioning. In doing 
so those who judge must seek to find ways to stop the endless circularity of 
questioning that occurs in pure persuasion.  There are a number of possibly 
strategies, legal systems for example are almost always founded on the use of 
state power. The Talmud which did not have this option used a combination 
of education and social pressure to reinforce its standards and assumptions to 
embed them  in the  subconscious  where  they  could be  safe.  Curtis,  using 
Arendt's structures, describes a process where an appeal to commonsense is 
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self-evidence,  or the  audience  of all  reasonable  beings  commonsense  IS 
embedded in a real  community and this  is  what stops the infinite regress. 
There are concrete others who can choose to accept or not and this stops the 
questioning.  Much of philosophy in practice is a process of judgment with 
accepted social and intellectual practices exemplified by those who undertake 
philosophy as a profession. 
In practice  what this  means  is  that judgment is  not  so  much a  form  of 
persuasion but an attempt to  use  its  power,  the  process  of debate,  while 
protecting its foundations from the ability of argument when pure process to 
undermine itself. A judge to be successful cannot question his role qua judge, 
s/he somewhere to stand a point of  view that is acceptable not universally but 
at  least  generally.  In recognising that  dialectic  and rhetoric  could use the 
similar tools while being very different Aristotle was making a related point. 
He also pointed out that the rarified arguments in a process where one allows 
an other to question all of one's assumptions can only take place following a 
certain amount of training and an acceptance of a certain relationship. In a 
public arena such arguments would simply not be heard. 
9 
There are numerous situations where certain matters are designated as not 
open to  question and the first  sign of judicial authority  is  their ability to 
decide what and whom to listen to.  The common law contains a variety of 
practices which limit what the judge has to or can hear. S/he is limited to the 
arguments and authorities put forward by the parties to the case. S/he has to 
take into account previous case law. There is a hierarchy of courts that binds 
him or her. These limitations protect the foundations of  the judge's authority 
by  designating  certain  matters  as  beyond  question.  Just  as  philosophy's 
ultimate  lack of limitations  defines  its  sphere.  Judgment is  defined by its 
limitations. 
9  This  does not mean that they will  have no  impact.  Relativism  could  be seen as  having 
evolved  first  in philosophical  sphere  and  gradually  affecting  public  speech.  It is  only 
though when the language has entered this sphere and is part of  common sense that such 
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2. Authority and limitations 
It may seem paradoxical that in seeking to avoid the dangers of persuasion, 
judgment uses  argument and language as  its primary tools.  In the common 
law there is  the ultimate power of the judge to  use the state to enforce the 
decision and which  always  defines  law as  not  a  matter of choice.1O  This 
ultimate  sanction  is  at  its  clearest  in  criminal  law  where  society  readily 
accepts  the  legitimacy  of such  power  but  is  hidden  in  civil  law  where 
sanctions are  generally financial  and need to be pursued by individuals.  It 
chooses to hide this power in order to appear above the mechanism which 
justifies the use of this power in a democracy - politics. Harlow, in a recent 
lecture reported in the Independent has argued that if  the law were to be seen 
to be political that would undermine it: 
The judicial process  is  valued for  different qualities.  It  is  formal,  its 
conclusions are reached through a method of reasoned proof based on 
arguments  submitted by  the  parties  to  an  independent and  impartial 
judge. Its objective being primarily the protection of  legal interests, it is 
appropriate for  access to be limited to those  who  can show such an 
interest That is, of course, a stereotype. I suggest however, that, if we 
move too far away from the stereotype, we may end by stultifying it If 
we allow the campaigning style of politics to invade the legal process, 
we may end up by undermining the very qualities of certainty, finality 
and  independence  for  which  the  legal  process  is  esteemed,  thereby 
undercutting its legitimacy.(1ndependent  13 June 2001) 
In democracies, law which is imposed by non-elected judges cannot use the 
methods of  justification that are used to  support the state and therefore the 
state use  of power.  The legal system is self-conscious in that it is based in 
public  acceptance,  particularly  in  a  democracy,  but  seeks  to  hide  this 
10 Cover puts it this way: "On one level judge may appear to be, and may in fact be, offering 
their understanding  of the normative world to their intended audience but on another 
level  they are engaging a violent mechanism through which a  substantial part of their 
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dependence to ensure that it retains a sense of  power. Judges therefore need to 
use  strategies to provide legitimacy in a different manner.  One of the ways 
they do  so  is to make clear that they are not political.  They portray law as 
impartial and consistent,  and not subject to the vagaries of public opinion. 
Law is blind not just to protect those who  come before the judiciary but to 
protect  the  judiciary  from  claims  of bias.  It is  notable  that  feminist  and 
critical theorists seek to undermine law by setting bare the foundations of  the 
system in fallible human beings who do not live up to the impartial character 
it. 
1  1  They  use  its  own  standards,  set up  to  hide  its  dependence  on  public 
opinion, against it.
I2 
The legal system uses a variety of  techniques to establish its legitimacy. This 
thesis has focused on one set of limitations, those which are self-imposed by 
the  judiciary  in  presenting  acceptable  arguments.  This  has  led  to  a 
consideration of  precedent and the judicial role. 
2.1 Precedent and tradition 
Precedent is purely a matter of practice and yet it is rigidly followed.  This is 
understandable  in lower courts where it is  imposed by the state sponsored 
hierarchy  of courts.  Yet  even  in  the  House  of Lords  this  is  a  supreme 
obligation.  Previous  cases  may  be  overruled  but the  Lords  are  extremely 
reluctant to do  so.  This seems to place authority in these previous decisions 
and yet it is  the judge making the decision who defines that power and its 
limits  by  defining  the  ratio  and  choosing  whether  or  not  to  distinguish 
previous cases and even whether to distinguish on the grounds of  fact or law. 
This process is expressed though not in the language of  choice, instead judges 
use the language of  compulsion, they are bound, they cannot see how this, the 
11  Maley suggests that a growing interest in language in law often betrays a radical critique 
(1999,50). 
12  Simpson  has  pointed  out that  the  common  law  is  essentially  customary  and  based  on 
acceptance. (1973, 85-86) He was focusing on those who participate but this is true also 
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facts of  the case simply do not apply. They seek the power of  a tradition. 
Traditions have power because they can hide the person who is making the 
decision in the instant case. Gadamer, who sees tradition as a paradigm of  all 
understanding, has referred to the way in which noone can escape from their 
"historically  determined  consciousness".  Philosophy  has  seen  this  as 
problematic - the individual is always open to prejudices and yet judges seek 
this and seek to prejudge. This is not to use prejudicial in its more common 
sense but there is in the way that judges seek to  portray,  and clearly feel, 
themselves bound by previous cases an attempt to suggest that the case has 
been prejudged that they are applying a tradition that flows through them. In 
this their lack of individual response, the fact that they are determined by a 
tradition makes them less and not more suspect.  The complex structure of 
tradition in the  Talmud was strongly dedicated to smoothing out individual 
differences and creating structures of reasoning which would embed in the 
subconscious and predetermine certain responses to the material. Precedent is 
the structure through which the common law absorbs this traditional power. 
The practice of  distinguishing is essential to this structure and provides for the 
mechanism of change that all traditions require.
13  It ensures that even when 
judges seek to avoid the power of a legal decision they do not seek to  go 
beyond the decision.  An advocate  or barrister who  approached the House 
arguing that precedent was simply a fiction and it was up to those individuals 
present to decide the case on the basis of  their own sense of  what would be a 
just outcome would be unsuccessful. Judges seek not only to make decisions 
but to legitimate and to justify them.  They do  not with to persuade others 
simply that their decision is correct but that they had no choice but to come to 
that decision. They do not wish the decision to belong to them but to belong 
to the system as this is where it gains its authority.14 
13 Krygier has described the way in which traditions build in change (Krygier 1986) and this is 
reflected in Gadamer's statement that the past and present are constantly mediated - see 
chapter 1. 
14 Levenbrook argues that the examples used in precedent are socially rather than judicially set 
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Precedent  is  not  without  content  and  this  thesis  as  well  as  looking  at 
precedent looked at the development of  case law and judicial argument in the 
law of negligence in Scotland and England.  This showed how the methods 
that judges used to develop acceptable arguments in this area of  law changed 
and evolved over time. In Scotland the acceptance of reason and philosophy 
as an authoritative source encouraged the use of  its tools of  categorisation and 
principled reasoning. IS  In England where authority was based in sovereignty 
where  this  encouraged  the  development  of systems  where  authoritative 
processes such as  writs  could become all powerful.  The recognition of the 
limitations of this led judges to look at argument and reasoning and develop 
case law as an alternative source of authority. In Scotland case law came to 
replace a belief in a common moralityI6 as a source of  authority and thus from 
different directions the systems independently evolved a case-based system of 
precedent. Both systems also had to deal with what within that case law was 
authoritative.  It would not have been possible for  the system to  simply be 
founded on the authority of individuals. Each decision made by a judge does 
not question but seeks to establish and re-establish their character and their 
role of  identity - judges cannot ask "who am IT. Rather they have to support 
and nurture that character through their decisions. This thesis has argued that 
in  looking  at the  way  in  which judges  explore  these  arguments  in their 
decisions and in what arguments are accepted it is possible to see the way in 
which these foundations of  judgment are established and re-established and at 
the  core  of this  is  the complex which surrounds the way in which judges 
understand their role. 
2000). 
15  Blackshield  (1987)  has  said  of the influence  of the Scottish traditions  on the House of 
Lords: "This continuing influence is  at its greatest precisely at the level of inarticulate 
background assumptions with which we are now concerned; and it is, of course, at this 
level too that Scots Law Lords (always among the most redoubtable in the House) are 
most likely to display the continuing influence of  their original training." (1987, 115) 
16 It is interesting to note that Simpson links the development of  precedent to a break down of 
custom.  (1973,  98)  Traditions  occur  in  times  when  there  are  difficulties  generating 
consensus in matters such as religion which seek the atemporal.  This is another way in 
which judgment can be distinguished from philosophy which despite any difficulties still 
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2.2 Judicial role 
Negligence  and pure  economic loss  are  of particular interest in looking at 
judicial role  because  of the  way they  deal  explicitly with the  relationship 
between law and  society which the judiciary see  themselves as  mediating. 
Negligence is an alternative way of recognising relationships in the absence 
of contract and can clearly only be based on a sense that law has a duty to 
enforce  such relationships  and  to  enforce  some  broader sense  of the  way 
relationships are formed.  At times the judiciary are very clear about this, in 
Donoghue  Lord  Macmillan  links  the  development  of the  law  to  social 
attitudes  and Atkin goes  further  in espousing a principled approach on the 
foundations  of commonly  accepted  morality.17  They  do  so  though  in the 
context of physical relationships, the bottle passed physically from hand to 
hand.  It is  likely that any  form  of "common sense" would  support a legal 
recognition  of such  relationships.I8  It is  when  there  is  no  longer  a  clear 
physical link but a strong logical link that the arguments about limitations 
become most keen. In considering pure economic loss they cannot ground the 
decision in the real world. 19 This means that in this area judges are concerned 
that the foundations  of their authority will be exposed as  ultimately this is 
what the decision will be based on. These concerns will be expressed where it 
is  that they feel  law is  vulnerable. It may seem a simple matter of fact to 
decide whether damages are reasonably forseeable but as has been seen in the 
case of Junior Books this issue raises questions of foundational importance, 
implicitly raising questions such as how far is law prepared to go and how far 
will  its  foundations  take  it without them being open to  question.  It is  in 
answering these questions that judges use their most emotional language and 
17 Bankowski shows how the imaginative leap that this involved was later absorbed into the 
tradition where it lost its power to surprise (1991,212) 
18  This  has  of course  not  always  been  true  particularly  in  England.  There  is  something 
anachronistic about the early English cases to modern ears which are based in a society 
with strongly defined roles.  The new common sense probably evolved in response to the 
industrial revolution. which undermined this structure. 
19 There is a strong tendency to use the authority of  the "real" world in judgment. Whether it 
be in the linking of  the ratio to the facts of  the case or the wariness about the power of 
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show that it is when they feel that their role is in question that judges are most 
committed. The heat of  the debate reflects the level of  emotional commitment 
and undermines again MacCormick's argument that cognitive commitment 
and  emotional  or  volitional  commitment  are  separable.  The  emotional 
commitment here arising out of  the cognitive commitment and indeed cannot 
be  understood  without  it  Similarly  the  implications  of the  cognitive 
commitment are  seen in the emotional response which in turn deepens the 
cognitive understanding of  the process. The intensity of  their debate does not 
lie around the emotional or ethical  arguments  as  understood by the wider 
society but around the ways these should be absorbed so that the legal system 
retains its authority and is not undermined by being seen to be too politicaL 
In providing these reasons the core commitment of  judges remains to law and 
the distinction between the two methodologies discussed can be seen in terms 
of their  response  to  issues  which they  feel  undermine  law's foundations. 
Often  they  are  afraid  of the  same  problems,  politics  and  the  power  of 
argument  When it  comes  to being seen  as  political,  the fIrst  group  who 
espouse the principled approach is most concerned of the dangers of being 
seen to have founded a decision not on clear reasonable logic but on a narrow 
legalistic  interpretation  of facts  which  can appear to  draw the  line  on  a 
subjective whim and even worse on the whim of people with no links to the 
common people. Case-based reasoners are wary of  being seen to be going too 
far and being ahead of  public opinion, of  losing the power of  tradition to hide 
the  impersonaL  They  are  not afraid that logical  arguments  will  show the 
absurdity of  their narrow classifIcations rather they are afraid of  the power of 
logic to tend to infInite regress. The key to both points of  view is where they 
feel law is established and where the foundations remain secure their sense of 
authority and role is linked to their sense of  limitations. This brings to mind a 
defInition of  a judge by Levinas: 
The Judge  is  not just a  legal  expert of laws~ he obeys  the  law he 
administers and he is trained in this obedience~ the study of the law is 
itself  the essential form of  this obedience. (Levinas 1994, 107) Malloch V.A. 2002  Conclusion  254 
The obedience is not simply demonstrated in his/her ability to apply the rules 
and practices but in their emotional commitment to the foundations of their 
authority. Malloch V.A. 2002 
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It  has been argued that no philosopher or theorist will ever be convincing and 
it has been pointed out that in practice philosophy is a form of  judgment that 
often settles for lesser standards in order to resolve the problems of infinite 
regress.  This conclusion considers first why theorists,  and in particular the 
three studied in chapter 2,  have failed to see the importance of emotional 
commitment  in  understanding  judgment  and  then  whether,  given  the 
limitations  on  philosophy,  judgment  should  be  seen  as  a  model  for  all 
understanding. 
1. Understanding judgment 
In considering the success or failure of a legal theorist it is first necessary to 
consider the goals of  their theory.20 MacCormick seeks to support the rule of 
law with the tools of  philosophy. He does so by defining people as essentially 
reasonable and seeing the syllogism as a choice not simply of  logic but ethics. 
Perelman seeks to justify reasonable debate to provide it with a foundation. 
He is seeking to support theoretical debate with judicial authority. Jackson is 
the  purest theorist,  seeking to  show how a  structure  can clarify practical 
problems. Most of the implications of these positions and the way it led the 
three theorists to misinterpret the role of  the individual were raised at the end 
of  chapter 2 and this section does not seek to revisit that argument but instead 
to deal with how their theories relates to the process of  judgment as described 
in this thesis. 
This  analysis  has  actually  revealed the  importance of much of what  was 
highlighted  by  the  theorists  in  their  own  work  and  in  particular  this 
conclusion owes much to Perelman. Even Jackson who was seen as the least 
persuasive of the three can be seen, particularly in his discussion of closure 
rules, to be aware of the importance of limitations in defining a discourse. 
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Indeed,  the works  of Jackson and Perelman may  well  better highlight the 
ways in which the judge defines himlherself according to his audience as this 
thesis has focused more on the use of language. MacCormick's theory could 
also be used to explore the way in which the judiciary use philosophical tools 
to  bolster their  arguments.  The  core  criticism  made  against  them  though 
remains  and  that  is  that  they  failed  to  deal  with  the  rhetorical  and  the 
symbolic elements in the judicial decision.  Instead, they have sought to  see 
beyond these elements into philosophical structures. This does not mean that 
judgment cannot be understood in this way but that in stripping the decisions 
of the  identity  of the  judge they  failed  to  miss  a  key  component  of the 
judgment - the commitment of  the judge. 
It is in their commitment that the judge reveals the foundations of  the system 
and why they too seek to hide certain personal elements and to be general but 
not universal. They absorb their role as a judge into their own personality and 
the system encourages them to  do  so by offering competing versions of the 
role  which  allow  different  personalities  to  absorb  different  versions.  This 
makes their understanding the role a matter of choice and something which 
they  can  identify  strongly  with  themselves.  This  is  a trick  known  to  the 
Talmud, a system which appears structural and impersonal but which allows 
individuals a degree of freedom.21  In seeking to  describe such a system in 
purely  structural  terms  and  not  realising  the  way  in which the  individual 
relates to the system the theorists inevitably fail to see why the judge absorbs 
a sense  of role  and even more  so  why the  system needs to keep  open the 
possibilities of more than one sense of role or one answer in order to absorb 
different  personalities.  Indeed,  their  view  of judicial  role  can  be  seen  to 
express their own commitment and this is why only one view of  the judge is 
presented and this the one that best fills the gaps and supports the foundations 
21  Garver  applies  the talmudic  structure to law  in  arguing  that while  there may  be  many 
legitimate  arguments  in a  case,  there  will  be  only  one  just  one in the  sense  of one 
compellable argument  and  that the gap between the two is  an ethical one (1999,  122-
123).  Kramer  (1991) following  Derrida has  argued that the  paradoxes within  law,  its 
tendency to set up oppositions set up the sense of  a background of  objectivity to law and 
in this sense would be essential to its desire to justify its foundations. Malloch V.A. 2002  Conclusion  257 
of  their own theory. In this light, McConnick's work is particularly notable as 
he, like the judiciary, wishes to support the legal system, and his description 
of  judgment as essentially rational not only supports a rule of law ethic but 
gives strong support to a '"Scottish" style of  reasoning. Jackson's commitment 
to integrity is seen in his description of  the academic which supports his role 
and explains his distance from a process which is essentially more bounded 
than that of the academic and which seeks to hide and not to reveal personal 
bias.  Perelman's  judge  is  the  perfect  example  of  a  participant  in 
argumentation  who  can respect all views  and by using reason as  well  as 
rationality provide persuasive arguments without resorting to violence. These 
points  have  been  made  before  but  in the  light  of this  understanding  of 
judgment another possible reason behind their failures becomes clear - it may 
be that philosophy's desire to provide one single answer and therefore one 
model of the legal system makes it hard for philosophers to provide models 
which show why, within limitations, the system allows individual participants 
the opportunity to have divergent models. 
2. Judgment as understanding 
In chapter 1 it was suggested by Gadamer that judgment was the paradigm of 
all understanding. This was supported by a view of  understanding as a process 
of mediation and application of past knowledge. It could be argued that the 
view of philosophy which is not a mediation but a questioning could also be 
seen as  a practice akin to judgment in that this has its own limitations and 
certainly,  as  a  profession,  philosophers  do  submit  to  judgment  Yet 
philosophy does  still  retain within itself the pursuit of the  unquestionable 
answer  and  is  more  dedicated  to  its  process  as  pure persuasion than any 
particular paradigm. The goal it is wedded to may be impossible but does this 
mean that we should settle for a bounded view of  understanding when it is at 
least possible to see an unbounded one. 
The  bounded  nature  of understanding  and its  limitations  is  what  gives  it 
authority and allows it to be communicated. A fonn of  understanding that is Malloch V.A 2002  Conclusion  258 
judgment sees knowledge as traditional and rooted in relationships between 
others and texts. The flexibility of such structures has been seen in this thesis 
which considered three different views of judgment in judicial contexts as 
well  as  different theoretical models which sought to  understand them.  The 
boundaries allows us to communicate to each other by setting out a series of 
practices and defining relationships but is this inevitable and should we hold 
on to the possibility of  an unbounded world even though that raises questions 
of  impossibility. 
Yet there is an appeal in the goal of unbounded understanding.  Critchley's 
reminder  that  betrayal  is  the  result  of all  commentary  and  is  inevitable 
whenever a choice or a decision is made22  shows that the implications of a 
bounded understanding are not all positive and there is something attractive 
about  the  goal  of the  reader,  a  pure  desire  to  completely  absorb  and 
reunderstand a  text rather than imposing  one's own  situation on the text. 
There is an ethical argument in saving philosophy and not using a judgment 
as a model of all understanding but rather reestablishing its foundation in the 
impossible. 
This  is  not  to  say  that  philosophy  as  questioning  can  not  be  equally 
problematic.  Its  structure  of questioning and the  goal  of theory to  explain 
everything can make it rigorously intellectual  and  as  has been seen it has 
difficulty  dealing  with  emotions,  character  and  identity.23  It  is  not  being 
argued  that  philosophy  is  a  purer  or  better  goal  than  judgment  but  its 
unbounded nature means that restricting our understanding of understanding 
to judgment which is of  essence bounded leads to a denial of  the core element 
of what has  been for millennia a respected form  of intellectual practice.  It 
may be that the way we understand texts, and each other is too complicated to 
be  understood  by  one  single  theory  and  that  we  need  different  forms  of 
22 See chapter 1 above. 
23It is possible that its current obsession with identity may lead to a form of  study which can be 
more responsive to aspects of  humanity that are not strictly intellectual. Malloch VA 2002  Conclusion  259 
understanding  to  reflect  the  different  ways  individuals  and  intellectual 
communities try and make sense of  the world. This would see philosophy and 
judgment as related in their use of  similar tools but as very different forms of 
understanding.  Any similarity between them would lie in the fact that they 
were used by people as ways of explaining phenomena rather than in any 
relationship to some meta- or more foundational form of  understanding. This 
means that  there  would  be no  overall  theory of understanding that  could 
explain the ways in which people choose to understand but instead the key to 
understanding would be in the decisions of individuals, influenced no doubt 
by their culture and education to adopt and use different forms and the ways 
in which each individual  related them to  each other.  The  advantage  this 
would have over a  meta-theory of understanding is that it would be at the 
service  of individuals  rather  than,  as  so  often  appears  to  be  the  case  in 
theoretical  constructs  of understanding,  at the  service  of the theory.  This 
would place ethics at the core of  any such attempt at understanding and would 
inevitably lead to  issues  of relativism but this  thesis  has  shown that it is 
possible  to  consider  the  complexities  of  the  emotional  commitment 
individuals have to their methode  s) of understanding without having to share 
that  commitment  24  It  has  though  to  be  admitted  that  the  choice  the 
philosopher or theorist makes in choosing a  method of understanding to use 
themselves  that  they  will  inevitably  have  to  make  such  an  ethical 
commitment 
24 This does not mean that the theorists would not be and indeed they would probably have to 
be emotionally  committed to the method  of understanding that they themselves were 
using.  There is an inevitable circularity in this structure. It is also likely that the best way 
to  prove  one  understood  a  certain  methodology  of understanding  would  be  as  a 
practitioner rather than by using a different methodology.  The latter though would have 
the advantage of  introducing new perspectives. References 
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